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ABSTRACT
The emergence of Latin American theology of liberation 
was inspired by vistas exposed by a Marxian analysis of 
society and international power relations. This fact is 
attested to not only by critical analysts of liberation 
theology but by liberation theologians themselves. For
the latter, the attestation of this fact is backed by
deliberate attempts at applying a selection of
fundamental aspects of Marxist theory to theological 
discourse. The resultant methodological orientation this 
imposes on liberation theology, namely, a practical- 
materialist accent, is highlighted as a feature which 
distinguishes liberation theology from its antecedent 
traditional Christian theology, and which expressly 
establishes its socio-political utility as a theology 
for the liberation of the poor from historical forms of 
oppression.
This study is a critical historico-phi1 osophica1 
evaluation of this relationship between Latin American 
theology of liberation and Marxist Theory. Drawing from 
Louis Althusser’s perspective on Marxism, it reveals 
that the former is formulated upon a systematic failure 
to recognise the methodo1ogica1-epistemo1ogica1
implications of Karl M a r x ’s rejection of the humanist
materialism of the philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach during 
and after 1845.
In this way, liberation theology is exposed as being 
trapped into a pre-Marxian Feuerbachian epistemo1ogica1 
framework, which in some major respects, incorporates 
precritical elements of the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel 
as expressed in the pre-1845 writings of Karl Marx. In 
corroboration of this, similarities between the 
fundamental Feuerbachian epistemo1ogica1 presuppositions 
and liberation theology are identified. The conclusion 
defended is that, instead of being Marxist in its 
underlying philosophical orientation, as its proponents 
claim it to be, liberation theology is essentially 
Feuerbachian. As such, its usefulness in the struggle 
for the liberation of the poor and oppressed from 
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In his, The___ Mi 1itant__Gospe1i__An__Analysis__of
Contemporary Political Theologiesl, Alfredo Fierro
established that the emergence of Christian Political
theology is a response to a specific cultural situation
which is chiefly influenced by "the incorporation of
dialectical_reasoning and historical materialism into
Western thought."2. In corroboration of this
observation, in his seminal formulation of the
systematic account of a theology of liberation Gustavo
Gutierrez affirmed that,
It is to a large extent due to Marxism’s 
influence that theological thought, searching 
for its own sources, has begun to reflect on 
the meaning of the transformation of this world 
and the action of man in history.3
Beyond this affirmation of the fact of the service 
of Marxism as a significant catalyst in the
development of a scientific framework which would best 
exhaust the socio-historica1 relevance of the Christian
1. Alfredo Fierro, El evangelio beligerante
(Estella, Spain: Editorial Verbo Divino, 1975) English
transí. by, John Drury, The Militant GospelA__an
analysis_of_contemporary poli tica1_theologies (London: 
SCM Press 1977 ) .
2. Ibid., p.78
3. Gustavo Gutierrez, A T h e o 1ogy_of_Liberation ( 
Lima: CEP, 1971; Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis Books, 1973:
London:SCM, 1974) p. 9
1
faith in the contemporary world, we find that within
liberation theology Marxism is upheld as a theoretical
tool whose conscientious application is posited as the
conditio sine qua non for the realisation of the
liberation which this theology envisions. This
conviction is declared, among others, by Jose Miquez
Bonino who in his Revo1utionary_Theo1ogy_Cpmes_of_A g e ,
declared that Marxist theory,
has proved, and still proves to be, the best 
instrument available for an effective and
rational realization of human possibilities in 
historical life
it is the unavoidable historical
mediation of Christian obedience4.
This issued out of his analysis that:
As Christians confronted by the inhuman 
conditions of existence [christians in Latin 
America] have tried to make their Christian 
Faith historically relevant, they have been 
increasingly compelled to seek an analysis and 
historical programme for their Christian
obedience. At this point, the dynamics of the 
historical process, both in its objective
conditions and its theoretical development, 
have led them, through the failure of several 
remedial reformist alternatives, to discover 
the unsubstitutab1e relevance of Marxism5.
Bonino's analysis tallies with Gutierrez’s original 
concurence with Jean-Paul Sartre that, "Marxism, as the 
formal framework of all contemporary philosophical
4. Jose Miguez Bonino, Revolutionary_Theology 
Comes_qf_Age (London: SPCK, 1975), pp. 97, 98.
5 . Jose Miguez Bonino , Chr i s t i ans_and_Marxi s ts j__The_Mu tual
QhaIIenge_to_Revoiution, (London: Hodder & Stoughton 1976), p.19.
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thought, cannot bo superseded"6
Against this, this study is an investigative 
demonstration that even though liberation theology has 
emerged as a methodological revolution within
traditional Christian theology in reponse to the
cultural influence of Marxism, and its proponents 
venerate the hermeneutic value of Marxist theory to the 
extent of making claims on its indespensability to a 
liberation process, there is a significant
discontinuity between the epistemology of Marxism and 
the one liberation theology has thus far chosen to 
operate with. This demonstration is conducted from a 
c i itica! his tori co-philosophical vantage point which 
resolutely takes account of the historical development 
ol the. thought of kail Marx which begins from the
point of the philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Frederich
Hegel, through that of Ludwig Feuerbach and including
Marx’s own intellectual biography.
From this perspective we draw attention to the fact 
that liberation theology is formulated upon a
systematic refusal to take note of the radical
episteniological orientation M a r x ’s thinking undergoes 
around 1815. We further highlight the fact that this 
epistemological orientation of Marx is constituted by 
i he f act oi his rejection of the epistemological
6. Quoted in, A_Theology_of_Liberation, p. 9
3
framework of the philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach, which 
in his youth he adhered to and employed in his earlier
wi itings, namely a humanist materialism (or humanism as
a n e p i r; t e m o logic - met h o doiogical principle) . Ou r t h e s ± s
is that consequent to a failure to note this
epistemoiogteal variation from a Feuerbachian to a
Marxist philosophical framework in the body of Marx's
writings, liberation theology is found as being
formulated upon a Feuerbachian philosophical basis. This 
failure to base itself fully upon the critical framework 
of Marxist theory, we contend, calls into question its 
usefulness in a struggle for the liberation of the
victims of the capitalist system. Our contention is in 
part esoterically based on the view of liberation
theologians ( e.g. J. Miquez Bonino) that it is only
with the incorporation of Marxism that any liberational 
efforts can ultimately be effective.
II
The refusal to note Marx’s rejection of Feuerbachian 
epistemology, a fact which may serve as an preemptive 
retort against the import of our thesis, is defended, 
among liberation theologians, by Jose Porfirio Miranda, 
and Juan Luis Segundo, the latter only with a limited 
devotion. In a work entitled, Marx Agains t_ t he_Mar x i s tj.
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The Christian__humanism__of_Kar1_Marx7, Miranda devotes 
himself to defending the argument that the fact that 
Marx criticised Feuerbach in 1845 bears no effect on his 
original conception of materialism as being essentially 
an advocacy lor philosophical humanism. This work of
Miranda's constitutes the main platform of our 
evaluation of the compatabi1ity of the philosophical 
presuppositions of liberation theology with Marxist 
Theory.
Our exposure of the fallaciousness and errors of 
Miranda’s position and postulates is presented as a 
first step towards refuting suggestions as to
liberation theology's genetive basis in Marxism. We 
specifically engage in this confrontation with Miranda 
in Chapters 4 and 6. This is located between our
polemical reconstruction of historical materialism
which seeks to highlight the uniqueness of Marx's
tiieorj' against the backdrop of M a r x ’s critique of Left- 
Hegelianism, in Chapters 3 and 5. Upon this, we proceed 
to state our thesis that liberation theology is but a 
version of 1eft-Hege1ianism, more specifically, a 
Feuerbachianism. This is backed-up with a demonstration 
of similarities between the materialism of Feuerbach and 
that of liberation theology, in Chapters 7 and 9. Our 
focus in Chapter 7 is on the conceptual theme of praxis,
7. El Cristianismo__de__Marx (Mexico City:
Published by author 1978) English transl. by , John
Drury (Maryknol N.Y: Orbis; London: SCM Press 1980) .
5
which, we note, is the operational concept of the 
'materialism" of liberation theology. Our observation of 
an overt kinship between the humanist materialism of 
liberation theology and that of Feuerbach’s philosophy, 
compelled us to enquire into the structure of a post- 
Feuerbachian Marxist view of the human person, so as to 
crystallise the fundamental non-Marxian features of the 
former. This is the subject of Chapter 8. In Chapter 10 
we extend the argument by focusing on liberation 
theology’s epistemology as it reveals itself in its
conception of history and the poor as historical
agents.
Ill
Our declaration of the philosophical identity of 
liberation theology is based on the leitmotif of an
affirmation of the fact of an incidence of an
"epistemological break" between Marx’s philosophy of
his youth and that of his later years. This motif of 
ours is formulated along the lines suggested by Louis 
Althusser. This we present in Chapter 2 as a preparation 
for our use of this view as a paradigm for exhausting
our critique of liberation theology. Our intention is
neither to present an evaluation nor a defence of
Althusser’s interpretation of Marxism per se.
Althusser's position is taken §__prior as a critical
framework lor exposing the philosophical foundation of
6
To obviate the well-noted criticism of the 
unsystematic nature of Althusser’s periodization of the 
occurence of the "mature Marx", for purposes of our 
argument we declare that: We see Karl Marx as a Left
Hegelian (much influenced by Bruno Bauer) from 1837 to 
1842; as a Feuerbachian from his Cr i t i aue_of _Hege 1 s
Philosgphy_of Right (1843) to The__Ho1y_Family (1845);
and we regard these periods together as constituting the 
young Marx. Admittedly, the Marx of 1844 perceived 
himself as a communist, but this was only a political 
attitude which philosophically^ was built upon
Feuerbachianism. The Theses_on_Feuerbach and The_German
Ideology are more regarded as transitional works which, 
principally, are important as declarations of a 
rejection of the philosophy of the "young Marx” . The
first part of The German_Ideology, though, reveals the
editorial problems encountered in the reconstruction of 
Marx's original manuscript in that it more poignantly 
resonates the more materia1-scientific methodology which
is found in The Poverty_of_Philosophy (1847) and the
project on "The Critique of Political Economy" (1859-
1867). It is in this later corpus, we argue, that the
epistemological novelty of Marxism is pronounced.
7
In addition, unlike Mark CowlingB, and Alvin 
Gou1dne r 9, who merely highlight the problem of the
incidence of a discontinuity between the thought of
the young and the older Marx, our argument goes further 
and emphasises that, there are no two Marxisms, but only 
one Marxism. All that Marx opined before 1845 cannot be 
called Marxism, in the rigorous historico-philosophical 
sense of the description. It was a Feuerbachianism. 
Marxism starts at the point of the rejection of humanism 
as a theoretical basis of philosophy, and the adoption 
in substitution of this, of the social productive 
process as a key to philosophical analysis (which method 
in the process subverts the very "philosophical" nature 
of such an analysis).
Against what is presented by Jose Miranda as a 
liberation theologian, and thinkers such as Roger
GaraudylO, David MacLellanll, Robert Tuckerl2, Erich
8. "The Case for Two Marxes Restated", in, Mark
Cowling, Lawrence Wilde, e d s ., Approaches to
Marx (Milton Keynes: Open Univ. Press, 1989), pp. 14-32
9. Alvin Gouldner,  The Two Marxisms^
Contradictions and Anomalies in theDevelopment_of
Theory (London: Macmillan, 1980)
10. R. Garuady, _Karl_Marx1_The_Evolution of_His
Thought (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1967)
11. See, D. MacLellan,  MarxCs
TQLLlQdisse^ (London: Macmillan, 1971)
12. See, Robert Tucker, Philosophy and Myth_in
Karl Marx. 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1972), and his editorial of The_Marx-Enge1s 
header (New York: W.W Norton, 1978), p.68
8
Fromm'13, Leszek koiakowski 14 Norman Gerasl5 , and to a 
lesser extent Eugene Kamenkal6, that despite his 
critique of Feuerbach, Marx’s philosophy perennially 
retained a humanist emphasis, we want to show that at 
the stage his thought attained a maturity, Marx had 
methodical1ly eschewed a humanistic epistemology, which 
is what Feuerbach was all about.
The import of our contention on the non-congeniality 
of Marx’s thought from that of Feuerbach, it is
important to note, is not necessarily based on the 
question of whether Marx's philosophy shared the same 
language as that of Feuerbach or n o t , or on the new 
content he gave to a Hege .1 i an-Feue r bachi an notions such 
as "alienation". Our proposition is that there is a 
definite and conscious epistemo1ogica1 reorientation 
which marks out the young Feuerbachian Karl Marx, from 
Karl Marx the founder of dialectico-historical 
¡pal erialism , otherwise known as Marxism. The
Feuerbachian philosophical point de depart of "Man",
and a philosophical concentration on the vicissitudes of
13. See, Erich Fromm, Marxj_s_Concept of_Man (New 
York: Ungar Publishers, 1961)
14. See, L. Koiakowski, "Althusser’s Marx" in, R.
Mill brand and J. Saville, e d s ,__________________ _Socialist
B§£ister (London: Merlin Press, 1971)
15. See, Norman Geras, _M§rx and_Human_Naturep
The_Refutation_of_a_Legend (London: Verso, 1983)
16. E. Kamenaka,  The_Ethical__Foundations__of_Marxisnm
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972
9
the consciousness of this "Man" is methodically 
abandoned. This is replaced by a method which, to begin 
with, notes the weaknesses and inadequacy of the latter, 
and proceeds on a radically new epistemological basis- 
that of an adumbration of the principle that social
being, productive life-process, conditions
consciousness, and not vice versa.
IV
Our disquisition, therefore, is a questioning of the 
claim of a genetive affinity between liberation
theology and Marxism. This is based on the observation 
that the nexus of Marxist philosophy lies in its 
rejection and negation of transcendentalism as an
epistemological tendency. The deliberate and obstinate 
theologic framework of liberation theology, which by
definition is based on transcendentalism, occasions this
contestability.
The background to this is the observation that the 
nature of the history of Western philosophical thought 
from the philosophy of G.W.F Hegel to Marxism, via
Feuerbach, is essentially an epistemological
development. This is characterised by a radical break 
between idealist and Materialist modus_cogens and modus 
Thiionis. In addition, we note that, the definitive
10
differentiation between these two ep i s t. emo 1 os i ca 1 1 7 
tendencies is designated by a historical movement of an 
emancipation of philosophy from idealist-theological 
epistemo1o g y . Feuerbach’s work is a major indicator of
this development. In this context it is plausible to 
argue that the Marxist epistemo1ogica1 system,
dialéctico-historical materialism, represents the
consummation of this process; that it is an attainment 
of a manner of thinking which eschews or marginalises 
all supernaturalist and transcendentalist hermeneutical 
constructs.
On the other hand, our declaration of a verdict as to 
tlie "materialism" or otherwise of liberation theology, 
registers ramifications as to its utility as a self- 
purporting theory for the liberation of the "the poor" 
of the so-called Third World. According to Frederick
Engels in Ludwig_Feuerbach_and the End of___ German
Classical Philosophy18, idealism, beginning from its
vintage form of Platonic rationalism, and as re-
17. Frederick Copleston, A History_of_Phi1osophy.
Vol. 4 (Garden City, N.Y: Image Books, 1963), p. 18.
"It is undoubtedly true that we can trace a progressive 
emancipation of philosophy from theology from the 
beginning of philosophical reflection in the earlj' 
Middle Ages up to the modern era".
18. in, K. Marx, F. Engels, Selected_Works, (One 
Volume) (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968) , p. 595. 
hereafter refered to as Feuerbach_and_the_End.
11
established by R e n e ’ Descartesl9, and defended by 
German philosophers - from Kant to Hegel is a
deliberate false consciousness which the ruling classes 
have used to distract attention away from practical 
critique of the material conditions of the toiling 
masses. Consequently, a move away from this abstract 
and speculative epistemoiogy which predicates, a_priori^ 
an absolute transcendent reality, towards a materialist 
predication as pioneered by Feuerbach and culminates in 
the formulation of Marx’s materialistic epistemoiogy, is 
a definite contribution towards freedom from ideological 
opiation by the ruling classes. Our concern is the 
implications of this observation for liberation theology 
particularly, its claim of being a tool for social 
emancipation and transformation - if a chasm is 
established between its epistemoiogy and that of
Marxism.
19. See, Rene Descartes, _Phi1osophical Writings, 
edited and transi by G.E.M. Anscombe and P. Geach
(London: Thomas Nelson, 1971).
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CHAPTER 2
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PHILOSOPHIES OF FEUERBACH 
AND MARX: LOUIS ALTHUSSER’S PROPOSITION
2.1. BACKGROUND: LUDWIG FEUERBACH IN KARL MARX?
The philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-72) 
represents a historical watershed which marks a 
distinction between two major sytems of Western 
philosophical thought. These are, the absolute idealism 
of post-Kantian German philosophy as finally
reformulated into a dialectical idealism by Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), and the latent
dialectical materialism of Karl Marx (1818-1883) and
Frederick Engels ( 1820-1895). Feuerbach distinguished
himself as a philosopher in that he preeminently made a 
systematic identification of the Christian
theological assumptions of the epistemological 
framework of western post-Cartesian philosophyl. The 
significance of his work, however, lies not only in 
that he was the pioneering proponent of the Left 
Hegelian2 quest for the reformation of philosophy from
1. Ludwig Feuerbach Gesammelte_Werke, 18 Volumes
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1988).
2. Left- Hegelianism: a movement of young German
thinkers who in the period from 1835 worked at 
interpreting Hegel’s philosophy into a mould which
13
Hegelian idealism to materialism, but essentially in 
that he principally introduced the issue of the role of 
the material human person, as a subject of
philosophical discourse, as a fundamental criterion for 
drawing the line between idealism and materialism. It is 
this Feuerbachian philosophy which mediated Karl Marx’s 
move to his more novel and radical reformulations of 
Hegelian philosophy and development of other fundamental 
philosophical contentions.
From the time of his doctoral studies in Bonn in 
1839-41 until his sojourn to Paris and soon thereafter 
to Brussels, that is during 1843-45, Marx was by 
admission, a follower of Feuerbach3. With his work
(together with Engels) on The_German Ideology during
1845, in which he gives a criticism of Feuerbach and 
Left Hegelianism in general, a visible move to his new 
personal philosophical position which consciously 
sought to set a fundamental departure from the
cast it into an anti-establishment ideology. See,
Lawrence S. Stepelevich,  The____ Young
Hegelians (Cambridge; Cambridge Univ Press, 1983);
David MacLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl
Marx (London: Macmillan, 1969).
3. For example Marx’s letter from Paris to 
Feuerbach concerning a contribution to the Deutsch- 
Ernnzgssische_Jahrbucher in 1843, in: K. Marx, F.
Engels, Selected Corespondence (Moscow: Progress
Publishers, p. 356)
And Engels’ testimony that after the publication of
Feuerbach’s The Essence_of Christianity, he and Marx
"became Feuerbachians" in, F. Engels Ludwig_Feuerbach
And the End of German Classical Philosophy, in
Selected_Works_L_One_Volume .
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Feuerbachian version of the critique of Hegel is 
apparent. This new move from Feuerbach became such an 
original and fundamental philosophical contribution 
that it set itself as a distinguishably new
philosophical tradition within the history of Western 
thought.
However, this declaration of a critical departure 
from Feuerbach was never published in M a r x ’s own
lifetime and came to be revealed only in the course of 
controversial disquisitions on the nature of the 
relationship of his thought to that of Feuerbach. The 
first concrete and systematic evidence of M a r x ’s 
disenchantment with Feuerbach was published by 
Frederick Engels in 1888, five years after M a r x ’s
death, in his book Ludwig Feuerbach and_the_End_of
German_Classical_Philosophy4. Appended to this was an
edited version of M a r x ’s Theses pn_Feuerbach, which
Engels introduced in his foreword with the declaration 
that these Theses were, "notes hurriedly scribbled down 
for later elaboration, absolutely not intended for 
publication, but invaluable as the first document in 
which is deposited the brilliant germ of the new world 
outlook"5. Indicating their dating, he further explained 
that he found these as scribbled notes in M a r x ’s old
4. F. Engels,  Ludwig_Feuerbach_und_der_Ausgang
der_klassichen_deutschen_Phi1osophie (Stuttgart, 1888).
5- Selected_Works, One Volume, p. 585.
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notebook as he ferreted through their unpublished 1845- 
46 manuscript of The__German_Ideo1o g y . It is noteworthy 
that this publication by Engels was produced as a kind
of an authoritative intervention on the then already
raging controversy as to the import of Feuerbach’s 
thought on Marxism. In 1885, K.N Stacke had published a 
book on Feuerbach6 in which he had made comparative
references to Marx’s materialism, and Engels was 
approached by the editors of the journal Neue__Zeit to 
write a critical review of this. Engels’ contribution 
was published as a series of two articles in the two 
1886 numbers of the journal. In 1888 he revised these 
articles and published them as a book.
The second factor which occasioned this controversy 
is that the The_German_Ideology, in which a direct and 
elaborate criticism of Feuerbachian philosophical 
assumptions is developed, and a post-Feuerbachian
historical materialism is initially enunciated, had its
incomplete manuscript published for the first time only
in 193 Besides, this problem is further aggravated
by a lack of adequate direct references by Marx to 
Feuerbach after 1845, in comparison to his treatment of 
Hegel, which could have helped in clarifying the extent
6. K.N Stacke, LudwigFeuerbach (Stuttgart: Ferd.
Encke, 1885 ) .
7. For the history of the text of The_German 
Ideology > see, K. Marx, F. Engels, Col 1 ec t ed_Works j_
Vol_L_5 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976) pp. 5-8
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of his rejection of the relevant aspects of Feuerbach’s
thinking. In this regard, Engels clarified in 1888:
Since [work on The__German_Ideology ] more than 
forty years have lapsed, and Marx died without 
either of us having had an opportunity of
returning to the subject [of a critique of 
Left-Hegelian philosophy]. We have expressed
ourselves in various places regarding our
relationship to Hegel . . To Feuerbach, who
after all, in many respects forms an 
intermediate link between Hegelian philosophy 
and our conceptions, we never returned8
This controversy, the extent of the rejection by Marx 
of his earlier Feuerbachianism, and the relevance of his 
earlier works whi ch where produced dur ing his 
discipleship to Feuerbach in giving a composite 
theoretical structure to Marxism, is still with us
today. Mark Cowling, in the introduction to Approaches 
L 2 _Marx, observes that this controversy has raged all 
the more since the first publication of the English
translation of Marx’s Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts (the Paris manuscripts of 1844) in 1959^. 
This raised and centered the debate on how the
philosophical account of the humanistic concept of 
"alienation" found in the Manuscripts, could be
reconciled with the apparent scientific determinism of 
Capital.
8. O p . c i t . p . 5 8 4.
9. Mark Cowling, Lawrence Wilde, (eds. ) ,
AEE£oaches to Marx (Milton Keynes, England: Open
Univesity Press, 1989) p. 1
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For our purposes, what is noteworthy, and what we 
seek to draw attention to is that this debate is only 
correctly perceived and conducted as a methodological- 
hermeneutical disputelO. In these terms, the dispute is 
constituted by the fact that the approach that affirms 
the significance of M a r x ’s earlier writings in giving 
meaning to all his later work seems to operate with a 
conviction that the incidence of Marx’s disillusionment 
with Feuerbachian humanistic materialism has no 
paradigmal value in contemporary interpretations of
Marx and uses of Marxist theory as a hermeneutical 
tradition, whereas the opposite view maintains that this 
does have a paradigmal significance. Generally, the 
proponents of the former view propose that the rupture 
in M arx’s thinking during 1845-46 was a necessary and
natural process which according to the esoteric of the
intellectual milieu within which it occured
(Hegelianism) would have no significance. That is,
M arx’s critique of Feuerbach was an operation of Marx’s 
subscription to Hegel’s theory of the dialectic,
whereby, in order to facilitate progress into a higher 
stage of historical consciousness, he had to negate his 
contemporary philosophy through a progressive criticism 
which results in the formation of a new and higher 
systemll. This line of interpretation is well
10. Alvin Gouldner’s  The_Two_Marxisms, is an
instructive introduction of this approach.
11. See, M. Wartofsky, Feuerbach_XCambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977.) pp. 49ff.
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developed, inter__alia by Marx W. Wartofsky. Proponents 
of the "two-Marxes" view, preeminently represented by 
Louis Althusser, dispute this. In particular, Althusser 
would contend that Marx’s view of Hegel’s philosophy was 
not as uncritical as to this extentl2.
Furthermore - which in fact is what constitutes the 
causa_bellum - an approach to Marxist theory which 
discounts the relevance of M a r x ’s earlier writings,
which have Feuerbachian humanism as their hallmark, has 
been accused of casting Marxism into an anti-humanistic 
and deterministic materialism, whereas in contrast, an 
approach which incorporates this earlier literary
corpus demonstrates the essentiality of humanism to
Marxism and thus dilutes the assertion of over­
determinism of the former view.
In relation to this, we, as matter of argument, find 
together with Louis Althusser that, when viewed from an 
analytical perspective which focuses on their basic 
epistemo1ogies, a definite and radical epistemological 
discontinuity is identifiable between Marx’s
philosophical position up to the writing of The_German 
Ideology, and the one of the period thereafter. The
point of rupture between the two is the manner in which
humanism as a theoretical point of departure is
12. See, L. Althusser, "Hegel and Marx", in,
PoIIiics_and_History (Surrey: Unwin Brothers, 1972)
P P .16 5 f .
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abandoned in favour of the mode of production. This 
epistemo1ogical perspective which exposes this
discontinuity, we maintain, is the most legitimate 
heuristic paradigm for understanding the relationship 
between these two phases of the primal development of 
Marxist philosophy. Secondly, this perspective reveals 
the seriousness of the need to evaluate a variety of 
hermenuetic tendencies which seek to apply the 
epistemological methodology of Marxist philosophy 
without making an adequate recognition of the point at 
which Marxist philosophy assumes its own independent 
post-Feuerbachian character. We apply this perspective 
in evaluating the use of Marxist philosophy in 
liberation theology.
2.2. LOUIS ALTHUSSER’S PROPOSITION.
2.2.a . _Political_Context^
Louis Althusser (1918-1990) began to catch the 
attention of the world of Marxist scholarship when in 
1962 he published an essay, "Contradiction and Over- 
determination", in which he broke with the orthodoxy of 
his Communist Party of France, by arguing that an 
overeva1uation of the concept of "contradiction", which 
is derived from the Marxist-Hege1ian concept of "the 
negation of the negation" in the mechanisms of the
20
theory of the dialectic, has been the source of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)’s toleration
and theoretical silence at the dictatorship and crimes
of Josef Stalin. In 1964, he followed this up, with
another essay, "Marxism and Humanism", in which he
presented a lucid philosophical denunciation of 
"humanistic interpretations" of the philosophy of Marx 
as attempts to salvage Marxism from the scandal of 
Sta1 ini sml3.
Althusser perceived his philosophical activity as a 
necessary intervention against what he called a
"theoretical-ideological conjuncture"14 within the 
International Communist Movement in the aftermath of 
the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, where 
criticism of the Stalinist regime had been unleashed by 
Nikita Kruschchev’s famous address on "the cult of 
personality"15. Althusser found that there was an undue 
over-reaction within and without Communist intellectual 
circles to this public denounciation of the "deviations" 
of Stalinism, which he felt was perilously lacking a
13. Both essays are republished in the 
collection, For_Marx (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd, 
1969. Originally published as, Pour_Marx, 1966), pp 
87-128; 219-247.
14. Essays_In_SeIf-Criticism (London:N L B , 1976)
p. 38 .
15. For a highly critical account of
developments surrounding this, see, Lezsek Kolakowski,
Main_Currents of.Marxism. Vol 3 (Oxford: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1978) pp. 451f.
21
cogent underlying framework for a theoretical analysis 
of the causes of these Stalinist "errors and 
distorti ons" .
Writing in 1967, in the Introduction to the E n g lish_ 
translation of a collection of his essaysl6, which
included the two mentioned above, he reflectingly
characterises this reaction -in its desperate poverty 
of any critical theory - as having "given birth to
profound reaction, ’liberal’ and ’ethical’ in
character, which spontaneously rediscovered the old
philosophical themes of ’freedom’, ’m a n ’, the ’human 
person’ and ’alienation’, and which looked for 
theoretical justification to M a r x ’s Early Works"17.
Althusser begrudged the political as well the
philosophic credibility of this new phenomenon, or new 
"ideological tendency”18. In a later work he dubbed it, 
"a rightist critique of dogmatism"19.
His reading and understanding of the evolution of 
Marx’s thought, and that of the international workers’ 
movement, led him to a view which found this a
16. For_Marx
17. Ibid., p .10.
18. L o c . c i t .
19- "Is it Simple to be a Marxist in
Philosophy", written in 1975, published in, L.
Althusser, Phi 1osophy_and the_Sppntaneous_Phi1osophy
pf_ihe Scientistsi_and Qiher_Essays, e d . G. Elliot.
(London; New York: Verso, 1990) p. 208
22
fundamental corruption of Marxist philosophy, and a
betrayal of the struggle for the attainment of 
Communism. He pointed out that,
Marx, Engels and Lenin . . . ceaselessly
struggled against ideological interpretations
of an idealist, humanist type that threatened
Marxist theory . ■ .it will suffice to mention
Marx’s rupture with Feuerbach’s humanism,
Engels's struggle against Duhring, Lenin’s long 
battle with Russian populists, and so on20.
For Althusser, therefore, the most crucial conjuncture 
besetting Marxism, or rather its theoretical
appropriation, in the post-Krushchev era, is the
struggle between the "humanist interpretations" of Marx 
on the one hand, and the "non-humanist" interpretations 
on the other. This conjecture, he argued in his 1960’s 
"On the Young Marx"21, is as much of a political problem 
as it is a theoretical one, he argued:
First of all, any discussion [ or debate] of 
M arx’s Early Works is a political discussion
[or debate]. Need we be reminded that M a r x ’s
Early Works . . . were exhumed by Social-
Democrats and exploited by them to the
detriment of Marxism-Leninism? . . .22
Furthermore, he reflectingly dramatised,
Philosophers, ideologues, theologians, have all 
launched into a gigantic enterprise of
criticism and conversion: let Marx be restored
to his source, [they say], and let him admit at 
last that in him, the mature man is merely the 
young man in disguise. Or if he stubbornly 
insists on his age, let him admit the sins of 
his maturity, let him recognize that he
sacrificed philosophy to economics, ethics to 
science, man to history. Let him consent to this
20. Ibid., p . 11
21. , pp.51-86.
22. Ibid., p . 51.
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or refuse it, his truth, everything that will 
survive him, everything which helps the men that 
we are, to live and think, is contained in these
his few Early Works.23
Within this politico-theoretical context, Althusser 
saw his own philosophical mission as being a necessary 
attempt to,
draw a line of demarcation between the true 
theoretical bases of the Marxist science of 
history and Marxist philosophy on the one hand, 
and on the other, the pre-Marxist idealist
notions on which depend contemporary
interpretations of Marxism as a ’philosophy of 
m a n ’ or a ’Humanism’24.
2.2.b . 0n_the_"Epistemo1ogical_Break"
This line of demarcation between "Marxist science of 
history and Marxist philosophy" and humanistic "pre- 
Marxist idealist notions" Althusser found as already 
drawn in a fundamental way, and with a profound 
significance for the whole of intellectual history
after Marx, within the history of the intellectual 
development of the Marx himself. "In 1845", he
contended, "Marx broke radically with every theory that 
based history on the essence of man"25.
This radical break - Althusser was at pains to 
explain - was not merely an incidental dropping of the
23. ibid., p. 52.
24. Ibid., p .13
25. Ibid. , 227
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theme of "Man” by Marx; it was a substitution in Marx's 
„thinking, of a whole theory of knowledge for a 
qualitatively and quantitatively new one. To signify the 
profound implications of this, Althusser called it an
"epistemological break". As originally used by Gaston
Bachelard and re-used by Althusser26, this concept
describes a radical departure from an adherence to one 
frame of reference to the other. In M a r x ’s case, 
Althusser maintained, this was specifically a rupture 
between the pre-scientific world of ideas to which Marx 
held before 1845, to the scientific one which is visible 
in his works after this period. As a true
"epistemological break", this involved M a r x ’s radical
break with the whole pattern and frame of reference of 
the pre-scientific notions of the philosophy of his 
youth, and in negation of these, constructed a wholly 
new frame of reference: a dialectical materialist
understanding of nature and history.
As far as Althusser is concerned, beginning from 
1845, with work on The_German_Ideology, M a r x ’s mode of 
discourse and the underlying theoretical framework of 
his philosophy, underwent a radical change from being 
"ideological", to being "scientific". This change, he 
argues, is concretely manifested in the evident
incidence of "a basic difference between the
26. See, For Marx, p. 248, and Althusser’s "A
Letter to the Translator", in, loc^._cit. , p. 257
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ideological ’problematic’ of the Early Works, and the 
scientific ’problematic’ of Capital" 27.
Essentially, M a r x ’s "epistemological break” with
Feuerbachian philosophy, involved an adoption of a new 
’problematic' and the rejection of that of earlier 
philosophy. "The earlier idealist philosophy depended 
in all its domains and arguments - its ’theory of 
knowledge’, its conception of history, its political 
economy, its ethics, its aesthetics, etc - on a 
problematic of human_nature (or the essence of man)"28. 
It is this "problematic" which Marx ditches and in the 
process develops an alternative to.
In the "Reply to John Lewis"29, which is an
extensive polemic against John Lewis, a leading
theoretician of the Communist Party of Great Britain,
who in 1972 published a refutation of Althusser’s
contention of the existence and significance of an 
"epistemological break" in the history of M a r x ’s
thought30, Althusser called upon all those who found 
his thesis defenseless to compare two judgements made by
27. Ibid., p.13. emphasis added.
28. Ibid., 227
29. In, Essays_On_Self-Criticism, p. 62 f f .
30. J. Lewis, "The Althusser Case", in, Marxism 
Joday, Feb, 1972. Althusser’s "Reply" appears in the 
October 1972 and November 1972 issues of the same
journal.
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Marx on Feuerbach and Proudhon. He submitted,
Feuerbach is described in the 1844_Manuscripts 
as the philosopher who has made extraordinary 
discoveries, who has discovered both the basis 
and the principle of the critique of political 
economy! but a year later, in the Theses_on 
Feuerbach, and in The_German_ I. deology , he is an 
object of an all out attack. After that he 
simply disappears31
Similarly,
Proudhon is described in the Holy Family (end
of 1844) as someone who 'does not simply write 
in the interests of the proletarit, but is
himself a proletariat, a worker. His work is a
scientific manifesto_____ of______the French
proletariat’, but in 1847, in the Pgverty_gf 
Philosophy, he gets a hiding from which he will 
never recover.32
It was not only from this historico-textua1 review 
and comparisons of Marx’s life and works that
Althusser based his argument. His theory or argument 
went. beyond this, and isolated an underlying
epistemological shift which occurs in M a r x ’s thought, 
and which shows itself in his writings, leading to a 
formation of two distinct historico-phi 1osophica1 
bodies of his work. A conflative and haphazard 
appropriation of these bodies of M a r x ’s writings which 
did not recognize this essential difference between 
them, was for Althusser, not only an arbitrary attempt 
to create a "whole Marx", but was in essence a 
conflation of two epistemological traditions which are 
critically distinct from each other. In order to
31. Essays_In_seIf-Critic ism, p.66 
3 2. L o c . c i t .
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register this, Althusser added one other fundamental 
example to his argument by pointing out that there is a 
gradual disappearance, starting from 1845, of the 
philosophical categories of "alienation" and the
"negation_of_the_negation” in the progression of M a r x ’s 
writing and intellectual development.
This second claim he posited in the 1964 "Marxism and 
Humanism" essay where he was demonstrating how these two 
concepts were foreign to M a r x ’s "theoretical anti- 
humanism"33. In the 1972 "Reply to John Lewis", he 
granted Lewis’s rebutting evidence of the presence of
"alienation" in The German_Ideology and the Grundisse
(1857-58), by retreating into the defensive elucidation 
that Marxist philosophy, "the Dialectical materialism
of the mature Marx", which Althusser insists on calling 
a "science", does not emerge at once and ready made from 
Marx in 1845. It is therefore not astonishing that in 
the process, even some time after 1845 one may find
"ideological notions and philosophical categories which 
it. will late)’ get rid of "34. Alienation and, the
negati.on of the negat i_on , which, to Althusser, are
ideological concepts which belong to M a r x ’s "pre—
scientific", idealist Feuerbachian epistemology, suffer 
this fate. "You certainly do find these concepts- 
directly or indirectly - in _The_German_Xdeology, and in
33. _For_Marx, p. 239.
34. Essays_in_Self-Criticism, p.67.
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the Grundisse - two text which Marx never published-
and also, though more rarely (alienation) or much more
rarely (negation of the negation: only one explicit
appearance) in Capital . . ."35, Althusser
recapitulated, and charged on: "John Lewis, however,
would have a hard job finding these concepts in The
Communist Manifesto, in the Poverty_of_Phi1osophy, in
Wage Labour and _Capital, in, Contribution to_the
Critigue_of__Politicai_Ecgnpmy, in the Critique_of_ the
Gotha Programme, or in the Notes__on__Wagner^s
Notebooks" 36 . In the Glossary to the English 
translation of Lire_Capitale, it is alleged that where 
the term "alienation" appears in M a r x ’s later works, "it 
is either used ironically, or with a different 
conceptual content."37
As we show below, Althusser’s basic point is that
through an experience of the epistemological "rupture", 
Marx made a scientific discovery, a discovery of "a 
science of history of social formations" which had not 
existed before he came along38. Of necessity, in the 
process of this, "he set out a number of new concepts
35. Ibid., p.65
3 6. Lo c . c i t
37. L. Althusser, Reading_Capital, trnsl by, A
Brewster (London: N L B , 1970) p.309.
38. "Marx’s discovery is a scientific discovery
E'iLhout historical precedent , in i t ’s nature and
effects". For_Marx, p.13.
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which cannot be found anywhere in his humanist works of
youth: mode of„production, productive_forces, relations
of_production, infrastrueture=superstructure, ideology,
e t c ."39
As a qualitative scientific discovery, an
"epistemological break", is "something irreversible . .
a point of no return"40. Therefore, as Althusser 
further adds, Marx could not have gone back to a pre- 
scientific, ahistorical and universalist mode of 
philosophical discourse, and the use of "ideological 
concepts" when he had made an epochal discovery of a 
new science himself. For Althusser, in discovering
"historical materialism" after 1845, Marx had
discovered and created a "canon of interpretation”41 , 
which it would have been sacriligeous for him, the 
creator, to violate by continuing to use pre­
hist or i ca 1 -ma t e r i a 1 i s t epistemological categories after
39. Essays_on_Se1f-Criticism, p. 66
40. L o c . c i t
41. Bendetto Creco, Historical Materialism_and
the Economics of Karl Marx (New York: Russell &
Russell, 1966, o r g . 1913) p.2. He writes: "Historical
materia]ism . . . can neither be a new a_prior notion
of the philosophy of history . . .it must simply be a
SSDcn of historical interpretation. The concept canon
implies no anticipation of results but only an aid 
in seeking them."
In Marxism and Humanism" Althusser submitted that: "
Marx established a new problematic, a new systematic 
way of asking questions of the world, new principles 
and a new method. This discovery is immediatelly 
contained in the theory of historical materialism." For 
M§rx, p .22 9
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1845- 48
c ) . ' Transition_from_Ideology_to_Science.
According to Althusser, "the history of science 
reveals the existence of great scientific continents
[metaphorically] of knowledge"42. The major of these 
being, the "continent" of Mathematics which was opened 
by the Greeks (Thales), and the "continent" of Physics 
which was opened by Galileo. "Marx . . . claims
Althusser, "opened up the third great continent: the
continent of History . . . [he] founded a new science:
the science of history of social formations"43. And
since "the opening up of a new continent of scientific
knowledge presupposes a change of terrain or an
SELStemological_> upture’"44, the foundation of Marxism 
as a critical departure from the philosophy of Feuerbach 
is essentially an epistemo1ogical event. An event of the 
successful opposition of the "scientific" mould of 
thought over the "ideological" one. As according to 
Althusser, this was an epochal event in the history of 
Western intellectual history, this is a historic 
epistemological revolution which should affect the 
conduct of all disciplines of human knowledge after
42. Louis Althusser, Politics______ and
History (Surrey, England: Unwin Brothers Ltd, 1972), p.116.
4 3. Lo c . c i t .
44. L o c . c i t .
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Mar>; .
But primarily, and Althusser insisted on the clarity 
of this: Marx’s discovery is a "scientific” and not a
"philosophical" discovery. Its philosophical deposit, 
is only consequential and secondary. He argued that, on 
reflection on the history of philosophy, it would be 
observed that all major revolutions in philosophy have 
been preceded by scientific discoveries. An example is 
given of how Platonism was preceded by discoveries in 
Mathematics, and how Cartesian Philosophy was preceded 
by discoveries in Physics45. This, according to
Althusser, reveals a pattern that "every great 
scientific discovery induces a great transformation in 
philosophy". What then is the philosophical consequences 
of M a r x ’s scientific discovery of a "science of
history"?: "The 11th Thesis on Feuerbach", is
Althusser’s answer, the "End of classical philosophy, no 
longer an interpretation of the world, but a
transformation of the world"46.
Earlier on, in the political context of the writing 
of the introduction to For__Marx, Althusser had
elaborated this point more scuccinctly. He explained,
The foundation of the science of history by 
Marx has ’induced’ the birth of a new 
theoretically and practically revolutionary
4 5 - PoIiiics_and_History, p.  167
46. L o c . c i t .
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philosophy, Marxist philosophy or dialectical
materialism . . .47.
Proceeding, he applies this theoretical framework, to 
the theoretical perplexity besetting Marxists in the 
post-denunciation-of-Sta1inism era, he further
explains,
The fact that from the standpoint of its 
theoretical elaboration, this unprecedented 
philosophy still lags behind the Marxist 
science of history (historical materialism) is 
explained by historico-po1itica1 reasons and 
also simultaneously by theoretical reasons: 
great philsophical revolutions are always 
preceded and 'borne along’ by the great 
scientific revolutions ’active’ in them, but 
long theoretical labour and long historical 
maturing are required before they can aquire an 
explicit form.48
In Althusser's terms, the identification of the Xlth
oi the lueses on EsySfbach, as the nexus of M a r x ’s
philosophical revolution is as significant as loaded.
Its meaning is located within the perimeters of his
position that, at the point of criticising Feuerbach, 
Marx eschewed ideological specu1ation49. He moved away 
from an epistemo1ogica 1 tendency which concentrated on 
a mere .interpretation of the world, i.e, from the
methodological perspective which imposes the ideal
condi tion of the human person on such an
interpretation, and he moved on to the scientific
47. For_Marx, p.14 
4 8. Lo c . c i t .
49. In the sense that the concept "Ideology" is 
used in Xhe_German_Ideology.
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method, which has action inculcated into it, whereby, 
the conditions of the world are not only critically
reflected upon, but are analysed and prognosed in the 
process of active engagement, summarily resulting in
transformation. A such, Marxist philosophy, dialectico- 
historical materialism, in contrast to the philosophy of 
the younger Marx, is essentially a Theory for the
transformation of Capitalist society, and this it only
becomes later after 1845. In this explicitly utilisable 
form it is then that it is called a "science". M a r x ’s 
thought has undergone an epistemological transition from 
being an "ideology” , to being a "science", and this is 
what the notion of "the epistemological break" seeks to 
communi cate.
In, "Elements of Self-Criticism” (1972)50, Althusser 
makes an elaborate self-criticism of how in the For_Marx 
essays he had used a fheoreticist (emphasising the
primacy of theory over practice) and Rationalist
distinction between "ideology" and "science", where the 
former is simply made to refer to error or illusion, and 
the latter to empirical verity. He blames for his error, 
Marx’s conflative conceptualisation of "ideology" in The 
German_Jideolggy , where he treats the concept as being at 
the same time a philosophical category, meaning 
error , and a scientific category, meaning, a 
formation of the superstructure.
50. In, Essays_In_Self^Criticism, pp. 119-125
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Althusser s corrective redefinition of "ideology"
vis_a__vis "science" is that, the falsehood of ideology, 
which is here reaffirmed, has its autonomous verity 
since it is determined and originates from real class 
interests and experience. And "science" on the other 
hand, differentiates itself from ideology by the fact 
that it is an independent field of human knowledge which 
is governed by laws which are not necessarily 
susceptible to class manipulation. The same observation 
is made by Lezsek Kolakowski in his critical review of 
Althusser’s conception of "science". "In true Marxism", 
he claims, "science does not belong to the 
'superstructure; it has its own rules and its own 
evolution, it constructs objective conceptual wholes and 
is not an expression’ of c1 ass-consciousness”51.
The sum of this position, was a partial revision of 
the original enunc iation of the epistemological 
movement from "ideology" to "science" of the 1960-66 
essays, where this was evidently conceived of in terras 
which were not exposing the incidence of this in terms 
of the social reality which defines the "ideological" 
nature (class-partisanship and manipulability) of 
ideology. In terms of this revision, Althusser could 
then justify how, in a socio-political struggle, an 
ideology may be ’overthrown" without there being an
51. Main_Currents_of Marxism, V o l .3, p. 484
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epistemological movement to "science" (to new Theory), 
but an inauguration of a new concrete reality, which in 
turn produces its own ideological configurations. 
Althusser could even go further and claim that ideology
does survive alongside science, "as an essential
element of every social formation, including a socialist 
and even a communist society"52. This could not augur 
well for some Communist definitions of ideology, which 
maintain that at the attainment of the communist social 
formation, the accompanying process of the
establishment of a classless society, of necessity,
entails the abolition of conditions that produce
ideology, and consequently the disappearance of the 
phenomenon of ideology itself.
Despite these self-critical reformulations, Althusser 
remained insistent on his identification of an 
epistemological break in the thought of Karl Marx, and 
on how this "break” is visible in the corpus of M a r x ’s 
writings. The visibility, of this "break", he 
contended, is essentially constituted by the apparent 
distinction between the "ideological" nature of the 
Earlier Works, and the "scientific" nature of the later 
ones, where when viewed from a perspective of a 
chronological review of Marx’s works, this resembles 
an unfolding tension or a struggle between the 
ideological and the "scientific" in M a r x ’s work. This
5 *■ . Glossary, vid. "Ideology"
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"struggle", Althusser maintained, is most apparent in
Marx's writings at least until Capital. With the writing 
of Capital the "scientific" clearly comes out, finally 
overcoming the "ideological" mode of analysis and
discourse. On the basis of this, and a presupposed 
evaluation of "science" as being superior to "ideology” ,
A i thusser insisted that,
Capital is the work by which Marx has to be
judged. By it alone, and not by his still
idealist Early Works (1841-1844); not by the
still very ambiguous works like The German
Ideology, or even the Grundisse53.
The main purpose of this introduction of a
differentiation between "science" and "ideology” which, 
according to Althusser, constitutes the locus of an 
’epistemological break” in M a r x ’s thought, is best
understood when placed within his politico-theoretical 
campaign against "humanist" interpretations of Marx. 
In this regard, Grahame Locke correctly observes that, 
A 1 thussen 1s "first purpose" is "to distinguish between 
science and ideologies, to show that while Marxism is a
science, all forms of humanism must be classed among
ideologies"54. As an ideological category, "humanism", 
would therefore have no place in a consciously
scientific theory, which Marxism reveals itself as 
be ing.
53. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays
(London: New Left, 1971), p. 71.
54. ibid., p . 1.
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cl ) • _Kar 1 _Marx_and_Humani sm^
For Althusser, a move from Feuerbachian to Marxist 
"philosophy" is primarily "a break" between a 
philosophy of humanism of the younger Marx which is
superseded by a philosophy that moves away from 
reflection on the condition of the individual person, 
as a person, to concentrating on the socio-economic
material factors that shape this person’s humanity. He 
maintained that the essence of M a r x ’s intellectual and 
theoretical maturity lies in his discovery that "the 
only way to talk about the human person in the concrete 
is to regard him as a complex of social
re1ationships"55, and accordingly, the contrast of this 
is what Feuerbach’s philosophy, to which Marx in his
youth had subscribed, was trapped into.
Consequently, Althusser maitained that, it is only
when placed within the context of a critical review of 
the philosophy of Feuerbach that the relationship 
between Marxism and humanism can legitimately be
unders tood.
He explained that Marx "discovered" Feuerbach, like 
all Left Hegelians, under conditions of an agonising 
philosophical perplexity at their experience, during
55. For_Marx, p. 234
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1841-42, of a contradiction between the conception of 
the Hegelian philosophy of State, where the state is
said to be the highest self-actualisation of Absolute 
Reason, and the blatant and persistent irrationality 
of the totalitarian Prussian regime of 
Frederick IV. In Althusser’s words,
Feuerbach saved the Young Hegelian radicals
theoretically from the insoluble contradiction 
induced in their liberal-rationalist
’philosophical conscience’ by the obstinancy of 
the damned Prussian state, which being in
i t se.1 f Reason and freedom, persisted in
mi srecognising its own ’essence’ , pervading all 
propriety in the Unreason of Despotism.
Feuerbach ’saved’ them theoretically by
providing them with the reason for the Reason- 
unreason contradiction: by a theory of the
üiienation_of_man56.
With his Humanism of the alienation of man and of how 
this alienated man is essentially the alienation of the 
very essence of his human being, which in the process 
(as per the Hegelian postulate of the dialectic, of the
"négation of the negation") this essence could_be
reappropriatedJ  Feuerbach provided the young Marx, and
his colleagues, with a theoretical framework which
elucidated how the "unreason" of the State is, in fact, 
the alienation of the very essence of the State, of
Reason itself , wdiich in the cause of the process can be
reappropriated. Feuerbach provided the theoretical
concepts that enabled them to think that just as the
alienation of the human essence is an indispensable
56. Ibid., p.176
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moment in the realization of the human essence, so is 
the "irrationality" of the State a necessary moment in 
the realization of Reason (the ideal State)57.
Althusser observed that, in building his theory of
the primacy of Man as a philosophical concept,
Feuerbach makes a primary employment of the Kantian
problematic of the distinction between Pure Reason and
Practical Reason, and between Nature and Freedom. Out
of a contradiction inherent into these two sets of
concepts, Feuerbach develops the solution of "a unique
principle of Man and his attributes"58 as a
materialistic conceptual unity of the Subject and
Object. Upon this, Feuerbach developed a theoretical
argument of "Man" as being an epistemological and
primary hermeneutic concept that should replace all
former primary concepts of German Idealist Philosophy.
Feuerbach explicitly declared his adoption of this new
conceptual framework in the Preface to the 1843 edition
of The_Essence_of_Christianity where he says,
I Myj philosophy has for its principle, not the 
Substance of Spinoza, not the ego_ of Kant and
Fichte, not the Absolute Identity of Schelling,
not the Absolute Mind of Hegel, in short, no
abstract, merely conceptional being, but a real
being, the true_Ens Realissimum - man; its
principle, therefore, is in the highest degree




This manner of methodological conceptualisation of 
"Man" by Feuerbach, led Althusser to the conclusion 
that unlike other forms of Humanism that had occured 
elsewhere in the history of Western thought,
Feuerbach's is a Theoretical_Humanjsm:
Man, is not just for Feuerbach an idea in the 
Kantian sense, but the theoretical foundation
for a I i his philosophy, just as the Cogito was
for Descartes, the Transcendental Subject for
Kant and the idea for HegelGO.
It is this  theoretical humanism, according to
Althusser, that one finds in M a r x ’s early works: "For
the young Marx, ’M a n ’ was not just a cry denouncing 
poverty and slavery. It was the theoretical principle
of his world outlook"61. "Man", was the theoretical 
basis that governed M a r x ’s whole philosophy, and, 
Althusser contends, he only arrived at a "scientific 
theory of history at the price of a radical critique of 
tin; philosophy of man that had served as his
theoretical basis during the years of his youth (1840-
45) "62. In !’he_German Ideology he begins to criticise
This approach, and it is only in his later work that
59. L. Feuerbach, The_Essence_of_Christianity, 
Transl, George Eliot ( New York: Harper & Row, 1957),
P . XXXV.
60. Pol itics_and_History, p. 183
61. For_Marx, p. 223.
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this theoretical foundation is finally dropped.
Althusser insists that the discarding of this
Feuerbach 1 an approach is supremely attained and
epitomised in C a g i t a l _ H l  . In this regard, he draws 
attention to M a r x ’s statement in the Foreword to the
German edition of Capi t al_X.Il . where Marx declared, in 
equivalence to Feuerbach’s declaration in the Preface to 
The__Essence_of _Chr is t iani ty :
My analytical method does not start off from
man. but. from the social period that is
economically given.63
The new theoretical principle was the economically
determined social order in which the human person
lives, which was more interested in pointing out the
place and role of this person as part of the collective
within this particular order. In this regard, pointing
out the "Scientif icism" and uniqueness of this
depature from philosophical anthropology, Althusser
argumentatively explains that,
Marx replaced the old postulates of which were 
the basis not only for Idealism, but also for 
pr e -~Ma rx i s t materialism, by a historico- 
dialectical materialism of praxis: that is, by
a theory of the different specific l e v e l s o f
human gractice (economic practice, political
practice, ideological practice) in their 
characteristic articulations, based on the 
specific articulations of the unity of human 
society . . .  In a word, he substituted for the 
’ideological’ and universal concept of
Feuerbachian ’practice’ a concrete conception 
of the specific differences that enables us to 
situate each particular practice in the
63. Cited in, For_Marx, p. 225
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specific differences of the social structure.64
In the "Reply to John Lewis"65, Althusser rebuts
Lewis’s explication of the Marxian theory of
determinism, where Lewis argued that according to Marx,
"it is man_ who makes history". He counter-asserted that
such an interpretation belongs to the "pre-Marxian",
non-scientific phase of Marx's intellectual development.
Contradicting Lewis’s claim, Althusser argued that " it
is ihr masses which make history”6 6 . In Althusser’s
opinion Lewis’s proposition is a legacy of Feuerbachian
anti-religious argumentation which had sought to negate
the religious thesis that , "it is God who makes
history". According to Althusser, the post-Feuerbachian,
Dialectical-materialist position goes beyond this focus
on individual "man” , and focusses on the masses as a
social class, and as a collective element of the
relations of production. "The Masses can be defined",
charged Althusser,
in Capitalism the masses does not mean the 
'mass’ of aristocrats or the intelligentsia or 
the ideologists of fascism; it means the set of 
exploited classes, strata and categories
grouped under the class which is exploited in 
iarge_scale_production, the only class which is 
capable of uniting them and directing their 
action against the bourgeois State: the
proletariat.67
64. Ibid. p.229
65. Essays_on_SeIf-Criticism, pp. 46ff
66. Ibid., p. 46
67. Ibid., p . 47
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However, this "proletariat", is not here conceived in 
terms o f , or being used "in the sense adopted in M a r x ’s 
early works, where the proletariat in its ’alienation’ 
represents the human essence itself whose ’realization’ 
is to assured by the revo1ution"68. This sense of the 
proletariat, which Marx introduces in the essay, 
"Towards a Critique of Hegel’s _Philosgghy_of_Right: 
Introduction"69, Althusser calls, "the religious
conception of the pro1etariat"70, which conception Marx 
later ditches.
The individual person, or the human condition per s e ,
as u fundamental focus of Philosophy, where Philosophy
68. Forjarx, p. 221 n . 1
69. In, D. McLellan, Karl___ M§rxj___Selected
Writings (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press) pp. 72-73, where 
Karl Marx writes:
"So where is the real possibility of a German
emancipation? . . . in the formation of a class with
radical chains, a class in civil society that is not a 
class of civil society, of a social group that is 
the dissolution of all social groups, of a sphere that 
has a universal character because of its universal 
sufferings and lays claim to no praticular right, 
because it is the object of no particular injustice 
but of injustice in general. This class can no longer 
lay claim to a historical status, but only to a human
one. It is not a one-sided opposition to the
consequences of the German political regime, it is in 
its total opposition to its propositions. It is,
1inaily, a sphere that cannot emancipate itself 
without emancipating itself form all other spheres of 
society and thereby emancipating these other spheres
themselves. In a word, it is the complete redemption 
of humanity. The dissolution of society, as a
particular class, is the proletariat".
70. Por_Marx, p. 221
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i novi conci! i v«d an 'the class s I ruggle at the level of
theory"71 is not important. And any negation of this
approach, insists Althusser was opposed by Marx . He 
concludes that: "Strictly in respect of theory,
therefore, one can and must speak of Marx’s theoretical 
anii-humanism".72
Putting this conceptual claim within the
epi s t emologi ca.’l context of his understanding of M a r x ’s 
"philosophical" innovation, he continues to assert that
in this iheoret icai an ti.- Humanism one must see "the
absolute precondition of knowledge of the human world 
itself, and of its practical transformation"73, which
lead., to his personal conclusion that,
it is impossible to know anything about men 
except on the absolute precondition that the
philosophical (theoretical) myth of man is 
reduced to ashes. So any thought that appeals 
to Marx for any kind of a restoration of a 
theoretical anthropology or humanism is no more 
than ashes, theoretically 74.
71 . Philpsgphy_And._the_Spontaneous_Phi losophy_of 
lb § _ Scientists, p. 210
72. Ibid. p. 230
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CUN;: LUC I UN : THKOLOG I. L’A L. i MPLI CAT IONS
I
Two propositions emerge out of Althusser’s
philosophical review of Marxism. The first is an
adamant affirmation of an emergence of a new
epi s t emo 1 ogi. c a 1 consciousness and method in Marx, 
beginning from 1845. The second is that the gist of this 
new "theory" of knowledge, was a rejection of the 
"theoretical humanism" of the earlier method, whereby 
the later one becomes, by definition, a "theoretical 
anti-humanism” , The manner in w’hich these two postulates 
a i-e inter - roiuted leaves no room for a separate
acceptance of one while the other is rejected. An
agreement with Althusser that Marx underwent an 
intellectual transformation and bequeathed to later 
organised human knowledge a new "science of history" 
which at the same time is essentially a theoretical 
dogma on a new interpretation of socio-historical 
reality (praxis), cannot be divorced from Althusser’s 
definition of the very locus of this transformation and 
discovery, namely a rejection of Feuerbachian humanism.
This raises the question of whether is it essential 
to a Marxian methodological approach which posits an 
argumo.nl for a recognition of a historical
epistemo1ogica1 duality in the course of a development
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of Marx’s thought, to cast Marxist philosophy into an
an t i human i r; i i c mould as Althusser does. A response to 
this question, makes an absolute demand for an
un d ci r s 1 an d 1 n g o f A 1 thu s s e r ’ c use of the term 
"humanism", and this is where many of his critics have
fa1 tere d 7 5.
As our above reconstruction of Althusser’s theory
revealed, Althusser derives his position from his 
evaluation of the epistemological nature of the
development of M a r x ’s thought and this leads him to a 
fundamentally methodological view of M a r x ’s approach to 
humanism. One novelty about Althusser's approach to the 
study and presentation of Marx, which has been missed by 
some of hi.: cri ties, is that he deliberately set out to 
treat Marxism as a Philosophy. Unlike other reviews of 
Marx"s thought. which in the main are from Economic and 
Sociological perspectives, Althusser’s is decidedly a 
philosophical treatment of Marx. The implication of 
this is that a concept such as "theoretical anti- 
humanism" which is philosophically arrived at, may not
necessarily mean an anti-humanism as it can be
understood in Politics, for instance. Althusser did not
mean that a promotion of dialectico-historical 
materialism, should mean a promotion of a devaluation
75. See for example, Lezsek Kolakowski, _Main
Tyrro n t s_o t_ Marxism V's Ij. 3, pp. 483-486, and our
discussion of J.P. Miranda’s reaction to Althusser in 
Chapters 4 and 8.
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of unman worth. What ho sought to highlight is that the 
approach to promoting human worth in "authentic 
Marx i r.in'’ is broader' since it focusses on class (which in 
an ensemble o t a productive relations which in a class- 
society is a constant state of struggle between the
capitalist class and the working class). The resolution
of this class struggle leads to a more fundamental and
comprehensive promotion of the good of the human person.
II
Althusser’s definition of the rupture between the
postulated two philosophical positions of M a r x ’s 
developing thought, as "epistemological" presents 
itself as a credible I on the basis of the systematic 
manner in which Althusser had developed it, and the
consistency with each he has dealt with criticisms
against it) and a useful theoretical tool for assessing
the extent to which Christian theology can be identified 
with Marxist philosophy.
from a theological perspective, Althusser's theory
raises at least two fundamental issues for Christian
theology, both of these are located at the scientific-
methodological level of theological enquiry. The first,
is the is sue of 1 he definitional relationship between
"ideology" and "science". The second one, is the
impj i co t .i on o.t Althusser's theoretical conception of
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"humanism” in Marxist terms on latent theological
appeals to the "humanism" of the philosophy of Karl
M a r x .
We merely raise these issues at this stage, they shall
a] i, be treated in some detail in later stages of our 
vvork .
Ideol ogí.L_Sc i enc e_and_Theol ogy
According to Althusser, the difference between
"science" and "ideology" is not only epistemological, 
but the epistemological definition of this difference 
J.ies in the fact of the determination of the equation
of the utility of either of the two, in relation to
ear:, other in serving as theoretical means of social 
revolution. In Althusserian terms, and other76
interpretation:; of Karl Marx which highlight the
epistemological turning-point of 1845-46, the equation
of the place of whatever discipline between these two 
epistemological tendencies is made to determine the 
social utility of the discipline in question. At one end 
is "ideological speculation" which is a superstructural 
entity, and at other is "scientific analysis" which is 
not tainted by the contaminations of superstructura!
76. See, A. W. Gouldner, The Two Marxisms^
yqnirad_i_ctj,ons and Anomalies in t he_Devel opmen t _o f
Theory, pp. 38.
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format i on 7 7 . According' to this perspective, all
"fields of human knowledge" can be placed at certain 
p o m  l,s of a spectrum which ranges from "ideology" at 
the one end. and "science" at the other, where the
measure rr; t he i r distance away from the former towards 
the latter is taken as an indication of the sum of the
p. > I« ntiai of their revo1u ti o narj utility.
On the basis of this, therefore, an examination of
the epistemological status of theology, in particular
where it is claimed that it serves the cause of
political liberation, is rendered pertinent. Of
necessity such an examination should be able to produce 
:.i declaration of the rate of the potential utility of
theology (or theological mode of thought) in
contributing to the kind of revolutionary activity and 
social order which Karl Marx in his philosophy (at the 
slugs j.i had moved away from "ideology" to "science")
promotes and envisages. Since almost all theologians 
who appeal to Marxist theory in their theology are, 1 ike 
Althusser, writing from a context and background of an 
anguish for social change, and operate with a measure 
of conviction that Christian theology is useful in 
bringing about this change, the implications of the 
verdict of this assessment have very serious 
consequences. This is worse for a theology, such as
77. See, L. Althusser, Essays on Ideology
I London: Verso; 198 4) , p p . 1 3f .
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Latin American theology of liberation, which has defined 
its "revolutionary" credentials on the fact that it is 
based on elements of the thought of Marx or - to grant 
t.he predominant affirmation of faith in God as the basis 
oi inspirat i on that, had it not been for the
theoretical tools provided by Marxism, it would not 
havr assumed the image and relevance it now posses.
Theoretical_Anti-humanism_and_Christian_Humanism
The question of the place of Humanism within this
Althusserian methodological configuration, as well as 
its implications for the use of dialectical materialism 
in Christian theology has been pre-empted by Jose 
Miranda, with his aptly entitled work, Marx_Against_the
Marxistsl_The_Christian_Humanism of_Karl MarXj.7 8 as we
noted in our previous chapter. Miranda’s work is an
n > tempi., at addressing the theological conjuncture of the 
controversy on the usability and and the legitimacy of 
the challenge of Marxism to Christianity. However, in
the final analysis it turns out to be a bold plunge
into this debate on the sources and place of "humanism” , 
as one of the possible themes that could facilitate the 
"atonement" and "redemption" of Marxism after the 
theoretical ravages of its post-Sta1inist experience.
Miranda, then, ends up writing "for Marx" against the
78. Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis Books; London: SCM
Press, 1980 (El Cristianismo de Marx, Mexico City:
Publ. by author, 1978)
Marxists such as Althusser who seem to be making it 
difficuJ t. for (,;h ristians to accept Marxism. As far as 
his arguments apply to Althusser, Miranda’s theme is 
vei'j simple: " Althusser takes a fatal leap in
concluding that Marx is an anti-humanist. Just the 
oppor: i t«; i true . Marx is so much the humanist that he 
is interested only in real-life human beings, not in 
a b s t r a c I. i. o n s ” 7 9
Miranda makes pointed and systematic critical
reference to two aspects of Althusser’s work. These
are: 1) An interpretation of Althusser’s position on the
role of "Subject” in Marx's theory of historical
de ve 1 opinen 18 0 , and: 2) The consequences of Althusser’s
theory to the question of the place of ethics in Marxist 
phi 1osophySl. The former is the subject of our Chapter 
4, and the latter is addressed in Chapter 8 below.
79. Ibid. p. 45
80. Ibid. pp. 29-51
81. Ibid., pp. 182-184.
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S E C T I O N  II
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ixi this Section we develop the premiss that there is 
a qualitative difference between the philosophies of the
“young Marx" and the "older Marx". The gist of our
submission is that the philosophy of the "young Marx" is 
in its epistemológica! essence, the philosophy of Ludwig 
Feuerbach; that was only at a rejection of the latter 
tiuvl Marx developed his independent philosophical
position, namely, d i aletico-historica1 materialism. We 
u i iovt tnat the uniqueness of the Latter against the 
former needs to be emphasised and upheld as a paradigm 
for appraising views on Marx: which refuse to appreciate 
the discontinuity between the methodological framework 
of Marx's ear 1y work from the later one.
The discussion in the following four chapters
distills this fact from the intellectual biography of 
Marx himself, and by way of appraising Jose Miranda’s 
contentions on Marxist theory, all of which are based 
on a failure to note the radical difference between 
r uerbachiam sis and Marxism . The subject of this Sect i on 
is a premiss wliich we develop with the intention of 
emp,ioying in our verdict on tlie relation of liberation 




ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MARXIST THEORY OF HISTORY: 
KARL M A R X ’S DISCOVERY OF DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In the previous section we noted Althusser’s view 
that the specificity of Marxist philosophy lies in the 
epistemological variation Marx introduces between his 
materialism and that of Ludwig Feuerbach. The cantus 
iirmus of this variation, it was highlighted, is a
critical adoption of theoretical anti-humanism, and 
"science” as a new and uniquely Marxist methodological 
framework. These claims of Althusser’s form the basis
of our paradigm on establishing the philosophical
orientation and social utility of liberation theology as 
expressed by its Latin American exponents.
In this chapter we distill the actual import of this
position vis a vis an understanding of historical
materialism. This import is encapsulated in the two 
compound and inter-related claims that: historical
materialism, the "Philosophy" of Karl Marx, was
established in M a r x ’s rejection of the Feurbachian-
humanist Weltanschauung of his youth, and that
according to this post-Feuerbachian Marxism, history is 
not a project of conscious human se1f-emancipation, but 
an autonomous system whose laws of motion do not 
readily disclose themselves to the consciousness of
the human historical actors. Besides presenting M a r x ’s 
intellectual itinerary in order to corroborate these 
claims, the goal of our discussion is to introduce a
philosophic substantiation of the latter claim. We 
point out that M a r x ’s act of reworking Hegel’s doctrine 
of the dialectic, presents itself as the foundation on 
which his entire theory is constructed.
The conclusion we develop is that up to 1845, Karl
Marx did not have a distinct philosophy of his own,
even though he did write prolifically, In the basic and 
traditional philosophic sense of having a Philosophy as 
an independent and original systematic body of 
postulates which in structure and content differs from
what has gone before, Marx had no such philosophy. He 
was a Feuerbachian. He started to construct a 
philosophical system with marks of originality, a new 
content, as well as a new field of problematics, a 
unique structure, and critical relation to other 
philosophies that had gone before, only during and after 
1845. Therefore, we would argue and demonstrate that 
the problem of "the two marxisms'T or two
Philosophies of the differentiated Early or Young Marx,
1. See, in particular, Alvin W. Gouldner, The_Two
Marxisms: Contradictions §nd_Anomalies in_the_Deve1opment
of—Theory.
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and the Old or Matured Marx, is a
pseudo-problem. We will also seek to emphasise that, 
besides this being merely a pseudo-problem, it
presents a contestable situation where any dealing with 
Marx has to be alerted of the challenge that it is
confronted with only one philosophy, the "philosophy" 
Karl Marx woven together during 1845-6, which is,
dialectico-historical materialism. There was no "Marxist 
philosophy" before 1845.
This goes a step further, at least in emphasis, from 
Althusser’s position, in that the latter was, of
necessity, pre-occupied with arguing and establishing 
the fact of the occui^eoctof an epistemological rupture 
in Marx. What remained to be emphasised, is what he 
attempts in his essay "Marx’s Relation to Hegel"2,
namely, that in inverting Hegel’s philosophy, Marx
arrived at conclusions which marked themselves as 
nothing but a new philosophy - and even more: a "post­
philosophy" which can only be called a Theory.
2. In, Louis Althusser,  Politics And__History, pp.
1 6 6 - 1 8 6
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2 MARXISM: A PRODUCI OF THE DECOMPOSITION OF LEFT-
HEGELIAN ISM
We maintain that the objective and motif of the
Theses on Feuerbach is a declaration of a fundamental
epistemo1o g y , whose basis is a realisation of "The 
chief defect of all previous materialism (that of 
Feuerbach included)"3. It is an announcement by Marx,
or rather, since the Theses pn_Feuerbach were never
meant for publication, and never fully developed, it is 
a rapturous declaration of a personal discovery by him 
of the fundamental epistemological inadequacy of 
Feuerbach’s philosophy. This was a "Copernican
revolution" which came at the end of a period of a 
personal intellectual self-assessment, since, during up 
to that time, he was a Feuerbachian ( who was a 
Hegelian to the extend that, and in the sense that 
Feuerbach's philosophy was primarily Hegelian). A 
number of practical factors facilitated this personal 
revolution. The prime catalyst though, was the 
theoretical struggle he plunged himself into as he 
sought to apply this Hege1ian-Feurbachian intellectual 
disposition of his to the task of accounting for the 
material injustices suffered by workers at the hands of 
the owners of the means of production.
As he explains in the Preface_to_"A_Contribution_to
3•-Thesis I. Opening sentence.
58
lho_CrL J. i gue_o 1 Political Roonomy", he was propelled
into this task of a critical intellectual self- 
examination by the crisis and "embarassment" he
experienced as the editor of the; Rhei.nische_Zeitung in 
the yea r .L b 4 £. ~ o that his phi losophical disposition did 
not equip him to deal with "discussions on so-called 
material interests"!. For the first time, he realised 
the conceptual restrictiveness of the "problematic" of 
his Feuerbachian philosophy.
The importance of the fact that Marx scr i bbled the
I£i§hes_gn Feuerbach at the height of his undertaking
of an independent reassessment of Hegelian philosophy, 
which he undertook in the period around his departure 
from Prussia for Paris in November 1843, and while 
there, need to be noted. It is from this process and
dur ing this period that the emergence of a distinctly
Marxist "philosophy" first sprouted.
This independent critical review of Hegel’s
philosophy - independent from the approach and findings 
of Feuerbach on Hegel5 - is codified in the "Critique 
of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right" which Marx undertook in
4. In, D. McLellan,  Kar 1 _Marx j__Se 1 ec t ed_Wr i tings
(0x1or d : Oxford Univ Press, 1977) p . 388
5. C f . L. Feuerbach, "Towards a Critique of Hegelian
Philosophy", 1839, in Lawrence S. Stepelevich, e d . _Tho 
ioung_Hege1i§ns__An_Anthoiogy, pp.95-128
5 9
late 1843 and never completed nor published6, and part
of which he published in Paris in 1844 as "Contribution 
to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of „ R i g h t :
1 ntroduction"?.
Of this, he was to reflect later, giving a summary of
his findings:
The first work which I undertook for a solution 
of the doubts which assailed me was a critical 
review of the Hegelian philosophy of right, a 
work the introduction of which appeared in 1844 
in the Deutch-Franzosische_Jahrbucher, published 
in Paris. My investigations led to the result 
that legal relations as well as forms of state 
are to be grasped neither in themselves nor 
from the so-called general development of the 
human mind, but rather have their roots in the 
material conditions of life, the sum total of 
which Hegel . . . combines under the name 
"civil society’, that however, the anatomy of 
civil society is to be sought in political 
economyS
With the reflection that went into the manuscripts on
_Economic And P§ ilpsoph i cal M 2 2 2  script s Par is
Manuscripts2_(March -August 1844), and the book, The
Hp2y Eamp ¿Z 21'__§1 it iqu e_of _Cr it i cal _Cri ticisra_ Against
§1202__§0221 And Qompany9 (September-November 1844),
elements of a disenchantment with his Feuerbachian- 
Hegelian past began to take concrete shape. In essence,
6. The complete text of this work is published in
English as: Critique of Hegel^s Philosophy of Right,
translated and edited by Joseph J. O ’Malley (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970)
7. See, Robert Tucker, e d ., The MarxpEnge1s_Reader.
(Nev. York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), pp. 53-65
8. Preface to A  "Contribution to the_Critique_of
§9litica1.Economy, in D. McLellan, e d . p.389_
9- K. Marx, F. Engels. Co 11ectedWorks Vol. 4
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the Paris__Manuscripts10 were infantile attempts at
applying the realisation that the "anatomy of civil
society is to be sought in political economy". Their 
basic analytical perspective - being only drafts of an 
autodidacticism in political economy - remained that of 
Feuerbach's philosophy, namely, the adoption of an
inverted version of Hegel's concept of alienation ( a 
move from Consciouness to Man), and its use as the basis 
of a critical analysis of civil societyll.
Significantly, in the opening section of the 
Manuscripts, Marx admiringly writes of Feuerbach that,
"It was only with Feuerbach that positive, humanistic 
and naturalistic criticism begins"12, and that
Feuerbach’s writings are "the only writings since
Hegel’s Phenomeno1ogie and Logik to contain a real
theoretical revolution"13, yet in the sentence which
follows, he makes a point that "a critical discussion 
of Hegej.ian_dial.eetics and philosophy as a whole 
ie a task not yet performed"14. This task he then
attempted in one of the sections of the Manuscripts
10. K. Marx, F. Engels, Collected___ Works, Vol. 3.
(London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975), pp. 249-346
11. See, Mark Cowling. "The Case of the Two Marxes 
Restated", in, Mark Cowling, Lawrence Wilde, eds . 
4pproaches_to_Marx, pp.14-32
12. In, Robert Tucker e d ., __The_Marx-Enge1s_Reader ,
P . 68
13. L o c . c i t .
14. Loc. c i t .
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entitled: "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and
Philosophy as a Whole"15. We would contend, as we 
discuss below, that it is this particular engagement in 
a critique of Heg e l ’s philosophy which was to lead to 
Marx’s discovery of d iaj.etica l_mate rial ism .
In The Hqi y _ F a m i 1y , which unlike the Manuscripts was
expeditiously published after writing, together with 
his newly found collaborator16, Frederick Engels, he 
decisively declared his disavowal of the methodology 
which he, together with his Left Hegelian colleagues in 
Berlin, so defensively used against Hegel and his 
Rightist proponents17. Armed with his new perspective on 
the dialectic, Marx criticised the veneration of
Critique, as an activity which is believed to
actualise in the realm of practical reason the Hegelian 
principle of the "negation of the negation" as a means 
of producing higher qualities of historical
consciousness.
He perceived that his erstwhile Left-Hege1ian 
colleagues were giving their theoretical activity a
15. Ibid., pp. 106-125
16. Marx and Engels first met in November in 1842. In 
January 1844 Engels sent from Manchester his article,
Outlines of Political Economy" to Marx in Paris for
publication in the De u tsch-Franzosische Jahrbucher.From
August 1844 they began to maintain a constant exchange of 
ideas.
17. See, David MacLellan, The_Young_Hege1ians_and_Kar1 
Marx (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 39f.
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status oi a substantive entity, as if by achieving a
critical extension of a particular intellectual
position they had thereby effected a progressive
movement of history. He critically observed that in
Bruno Bauer - their mentor' on the technique of
"critical critique" (including himself) - "criticism is
transformed into a transcendental being.18 He declared
(with Engels):
What we oppose in the criticism of Bauer is the 
speculation which produces itself as a 
caricature. We see in the completest expression 
of the Christian-Germanic principle which is 
attempting to retain its supremacy by
transforming "criticism" itself into a
transcendent power.19
His gradual realisation of the meaning of
materialism, and the importance of basing this on a 
socio-historical premise, led him to a revealing 
discovery that Bauer’s thinking in relation to the 
question of history inadequately comes to the
foilowing:
On the one side is the mass as the passive, 
spiritless, unhistorical material element in
history. On the other is the Spirit, Criticism 
- Herr Bauer and Co. as the active element from
which all h i s t o r i c a l  action proceeds. The act of 
transforming society is reduced to the cerebral 
activity of Critical Criticism.20
Elsewhere he concluded:
The Berliners do not regard themselves as men
who criticise, but as critics who,
18. Karl Marx, F. Engels, Selected_Correspondence, p.356
19. Op c i t . p .7
20. The_Holy_Family, Collected_Works, Vol 4, p.86
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A c c i d e n t a l l y , have the misfortune of being men.
They therefore recognise only one real need, the 
need of criticism . . . this criticism thus
regards itself as the only active element in 
history. It is confronted with the whole of 
humanity as a mass, an inert mass, which has
value only as an antithesis of the intellect.21
It is noteworthy that the foregoing disdainful 
conclusion on the "Berliners" was written in a letter 
he wrote to Feuerbach, dated, August 11, 1844. Marx's
admiration ol Feuerbach was so complete that by the. 
time he settled in Paris he sharply turn against his 
comrades of the "Doctors Club", and used Feuerbachian 
formulations as a basis of his criticism. Note the last 
sentence of the above qoutation: The Left-Hege1ians are
accused of failing to assert the dynamism and value of 
humanity - in other words, humanism - and of placing 
against this the primacy of critical thought. As a 
matter of fact, during this period Marx was working on 
his study of the relationship between philosophy, as he
then knew it, and economics - the _Paris_Manuscripts. In
the Manuscripts, as noted above, he applies this 
alternative Feuerbachian humanistic epistemology as a 
theoretical foundation of a study of political economy:
in The Holy Family, he uses this as a framework
undergirding his newly discovered critique of Hegel 
which he finds to be exposing the fallacy of the method 
by which Left Hegelianism has distinguished itself. At 
this stage though, what is important for him is a self-
21. Se1ected_Correspondence, p. 356
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exorcism and an indication of his critical departure 
from his employment, of the speculative Critique of Bruno 
Bauer in favour of Feuerbach’s materialism.
Engels’ advice in Feuerbach and_the__End, that as an
indication of how "enthusiatically" Marx had embraced
Feuerbach’s teachings "and how much - in spite of all
critical reservations - he was influenced by it, one
may read in The_Holy_Family"22, is opportune. Also, in
the same letter referred to above, which in a gist
serves the historical significance of dating Marx's
conscious option for Feuerbachian epistemology in
substitution of his Bauerian Left-Hegelianism23, we
find him intimating to Feuerbach:
I am glad to find an opportunity of being able 
to assure you of the exceptional respect and- 
allow me the word - love that I have for you.
Your Phi 1osophy__of the Future and Essence_of
E§iih are, in spite of their limited scope, of 
more weight than the whole of contemporary 
German literature put together. In these 
writings you have - whether intentionally I do 
not know - given a philosophical basis to 
socialism, and communists, too, similarly 
understood these works in that sense. The unity 
of man with man based on the real differences 
between men. the concept of human species 
transferred from the heaven of abstraction to 
the real earth, what is this other than the 
concept of society!24
A year later, this admiration of Feuerbach’s
22. Se 1eçted_Works (One Volume), p.592
23. See, Zui Rosen, Bruno_Bauer_____and_Kar 1 _Marx j__The
Influence of Bruno__Bauer__on Marx.ls_Thought (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), e t p a s s i m
24. Se 1eçted_Correspondence, p.357
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theoretical humanism, was to turn into the minute
denunciation of the Theses on_Feuerbach; and Feuerbach
is lumped together with the rest of the Left Hegelians- 
from David Strauss to Max Stirner - in the castigation 
which is presented in The_German_Ideology.
Through a continuing reflection on what was to become
the Economic and_Philosophical_Manuscripts, epecially
the last chapter on a critique of Hegel, incorporating 
aJso, the results of the newly found contact with 
Frederick Engels, Marx sought to reduce Hegelian 
philosophical concepts and structure as reinterpreted by 
Feuerbach to theoretical tools for analysing socio­
economic realities. He came out dissatisfied. However, 
this essentially marked a disapointment with Feuerbach, 
more than with Hegel. While in Brussels in 1845, he 
confronted the results of his disillusionment with 
Hegelian idealism as reformed in Feuerbach. With the
ground work he had done on the Manuscripts, he began to 
see the theoretical framework of a materialist 
conception of history. When this realisation was written 
down, it had to be entitled The_German__ I deol ogyy_A
Criticism_of_Recent_German_Philosophy_as Represented_by
Feue rbachx Bauer  Stirner^ and_of _German_Soc i al i sm_in
ihe__Wprks of its Various Prophets25. It was thus
entitled for, indeed, it was basically a critique of the 
manner in which ail Left-Hegelian philosophy had
25. Collected_Works, V o l .5.
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suffered from the flaw of being uncritical of the 
relationship between intellection and its material 
context - consciouness and social being - and how in 
sum, it not only remained "ideological", but by being 
bound to the idealist conception of the Hegelian
dialectic, remained within a religious epistemology 
which reduced the entirety of material reality to a 
mys t i c i sm2 G .
The Theses pn_Feuerbach27 were written at the summit 
of this realisation, as a reflective account of why it
had been difficult to apply the Hegelian dialectic, as 
conceived in Feurbach's philosophy, in material-social 
reality. Marx went back to Hegel, leaving the route
26. The_German_Ideology, in Co11ected_Works, Vol 5, p. 29 : 
"The entire body of German philosophical criticism form Strauss
to Stirner is confined to criticism of religious  conceptions.
Ihe critics started from real religion and theology proper . 
the advance consisted in including the allegedly dominant
metaphysical, political, juridicial, moral and other conceptions 
under the category of religious or theological conceptions; and 
similarly in declaring that political, juridicial, moral
consciousness was religious or theological consciousnes, and that 
Political, juridical, moral man - ’M a n ’ in the last resort - was 
religious . The dominant role of religion was presupposed.
Gradually every dominant relationship was declared to be a
religious relationship and transformed into a cult, a cult of 
J av, , a cult of state, etc. It was thought merely a question of 
dogmas and belief in dogmas. The world was sanctified to an ever- 
increasing extent . . . The Young Hegelians are in agreement
with the Old Hegelians in their belief in the rule of religion,
1 concepts, of a universal principle in the existing world.
27. For an exposition of the Theses_on_Feuerbach, see,
Nathan Rothenstreich . Basi c_Probiems of _Marx j_s_Phi 1 osophy .
(Indiana: The Bobbs-Marri11 C o . , 1965)
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ou1, and from there, with the cumulative experience of
his own reflections, discovered that there was a
rational structure within Hegel’s system, which if
stripped of its theosophic form can present a
progressive and materially critical conception of
social reality. As he was to testify in 1873, in the
Preface to the second German edition of Das_Kapit a l :
The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I 
criticised nearly thirty years ago . . With
him it is standing on its head. It must be
turned right side up again, if you would
discover the rational kernel within the 
mystical shell.
In its mystical form, dialectic became the 
fashion in Germany, because it seemed to
transfigure and to glorify the existing state 
of things, in its rational form it is a scandal 
and abomination to bourgeoisdom and its 
doctrinaire professors, because it includes in 
its comprehension an affirmative recognition of 
the existing state of things, at the same time 
also, the recognition of the negation of that 
state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it 
regards every historically developed social form
as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into
account its transient nature not less than its 
momentary existence; because it lets nothing 
impose upon it, and is in its essence critical 
and revo1utionary29.
It is out of this critique of Hegel, the inversion of
Hegel’s doctrine of the dialectic, that a new
Bruno Bauer and Ludwig Feuerbach28 had already mapped
28. See, K. L. Clarkson, D. J. Hawkin, "Marx On
Rel igiori; The Inf luence of Bruno Bauer and Ludwig Feuerbach 
on his thought and its implications for the Christian-
Marxisi Dialogue", Scottish_Journal of_Theology, Vol. 36,
Ho, 6, 1978, and also,
Sidney Hook,  From Hegel To Marxy Studies in_the
lQ±§II§ctual Development of Karl_Marx (London: Gollancz
Ltd., 1936), pp. 98 f .
29. K. Marx, Capital, Vol I (London: Lawrence &
Wishart, 1974), p.29
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Phi Losoplij , descriptively called, dialectical
materialism (a materialised dialectic), emerged. 
Accordingly, our view is that, strictly speaking,
Marxism did not emerge as a critique of Feuerbach pari 
passu, as a chronological sequence may suggest; but, on 
the contrary, as a critique of Feuerbach’s inadequate 
critique of Hegel, and as such as a fresh critique of 
Hegel’s philosophy itself.
3.3. MARXISM: A PRODUCT OF M A R X ’S INVERSION OF THE
HEGELIAN DIALECTIC
The identification of the centrality of M a r x ’s 
critique of liegeJ as being at the core of a development 
of a Marxist "philosophy", is one of the major findings 
of Althusser’s recharacterisation of the thought of 
Marx. It is upon this observation that the postulation 
of the fact that Marx's new epistemological point of
departure is a theoretical anti-humanism, is grounded. 
Also, this offers an explanation to the philosophical
background of this "theoretical anti-humanism" as
applied to the summum_bpnum of Marx theory - an account 
of history. It buttresses the argument that, resulting 
from his inversion of Hegel’s dialectic (doctrine of the 
unity of opposites)30, he developed a theory of history
30. For an exposition of the meaning of the
fSiyiect i c , see, Sidney Hook. From Hegel to Marx ,
PF.OBf., and, G.E Muller, "The Hegel Legend of Thesis 
antithesis- Synthesis", Jpurnal_of_ theHistory_of_ Ideas, 
No.19, June .1985, pp . 8 3 f .
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wherein t ho human subject is perceived as not being a 
decisive player31. Althusser addresses this in his 
essayr. "On the ivla ter ial i st Dialectic" (.1963) 3b. and 
"Marx’s Relation to Hegel" (1968)33. According to this 
reading. Marx's conversion of the Hegelian dialectic 
from d i a 1. e cticaJ ¿deal ism to dialectical materialism is 
what is definitional of Marxism34.
We concur with Althusser that, first of all, what
Marx perceived as open to criticism in Hegel’s theory 
of the dialectic was the pervasive nature of the 
tel «o.i ogica 1 property of the activity of the dialetic, 
that is, its visualisation of the self-realisation of 
the "Absolute Idea" (GuistJ. through a spiral of a 
series of self-negations, into a higher unity of the 
contradictions of being and thought which could not be 
expressed in concrete reality. In this Hegelian system, 
the motive_force of the process of the dialectical self- 
realisation of the Absolute Idea as its self­
objectifications ( as Idea at the moment of conscious 
conception) returns to itself, is the autonomous and
31. See, L. Althusser, "Reply to John Lewis", in,
Eh says_ j. n_Sel f-Cri_ t i cism , pp. 62f, and our Chapter 4
32. L. Althusser, For_Marx, pp. 161-217
33; In, Louis Althusser, Politics____And_H_is t ory , pp.
I 66-186
34. T. I Oizerman. The_Making_of _Marxi st _Phi losophy
From I deal ism and Revolutionary Democracy to_Dialectical
Materialism and Scientific Communism. (Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1977) is also instructive in this regard.
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autogeneric process of the Absolute Idea’s own self- 
supersession, Au f hebung. ( which Althusser defines as 
i: rans o e ndeuce pr e s e r v ing- t he - ■ t r ans c ended— as - t lie • 
internalised- transcended"35). This self-contradiction 
and sc i i - super session oi the Absolute Idea is, insofar 
as it is the motive force of the entire process, the 
t . Even the very self-manifestations of the 
Absolute Idea, its se1f-alienation as it becomes 
Objects, is immediately subsumed and returned into being 
a subject - it negates itself form being an Object, back 
to being a Subject.
Marx perceived that this Subject of the Hegelian
system is so pervasive of the entire system that, in 
i act, it is awkwardly the very teleology of the process 
itself; that is, the being of the Objective is there for 
the unrecognised moment of its being negated back into 
being the Subjee136. The Absolute Idea is in unity with 
the motive force (process of dialectic - Aufhebung), and 
together conspire against any considerable existence of 
the Objective. Both Subject and Object are
undistinguishably dissolved into a teleological Subject.
It is a fine unity of the Absolute Idea producing 
itself, being concrete Object, while it is, at the same 
time, essentially, the abstract Subject of its self-
35. Poll tj.cs_And_Hi story, p. 181
3b. !n, _Pari§_Manu§c r ¿gt s , in R. Tucker, oil . . Marx
Engejs_Readcr, p. 110
71
production. This, as Althusser aptly noted, "is the
speculative sin par_excellence: the sin of abstraction
which inverts the order of things and puts the process
oj the auto - genes is of the concept (the abstract) in Lne 
place of the auto-genesis of the concrete (the real) "37.
Marx rejected this abstract (Subjective : based on
the unity of the Absolute Idea with its purpose) 
conception of the Objective moments during which the 
Absolute Idea is in a state of se1f-a1ienation. He
called for a concrete recognition of these moments of 
the se1f-objectification of the Absolute Idea (which
se1f-objectifica tions he identified as be ing soc io-
economic phenomena). He thereby put emphasis on the
(Jhjccj jvc . in place of liege 1 Subjective. He wrote;
W h e n , for instance, wealth, state power, etc., 
are understood by Hegel as entities estranged 
from human being, this only happens in their 
form as thoughts . . . they are thought-
entiti.es, and therefore merely an engagement of 
pure, i.e, abstract, philosophical thinking.38
In rejecting Hegel’s abstraction of the Objective into 
the speculative Subjective, Marx also had to do away 
with an idea of the veneration of simple unity, as being
the goal of a dialectical process. Hegel’s objective of 
establishing unity between Subject and Object, led him
to shy away from the idea of the self-alienation, or
3 7 . For ..Marx > P • 189 
3 8 . Loc. c i t .
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soli•estrangement of the Absolute as it is its Objective 
states, between itself and its object (as concepts of 
111 o A b s o i u L e J cl o a ) 3 9 . M ar x pul i. m port on this d i s u 1 11 1 y , 
alienation, which characterises Objective existence. The 
dialectic, was now expected to be visualised as
operaiiup more clearly within this objective, concrete 
rcuIi tx which is riddled with contradictions a 1 1d 
antagonisms. And, also the resolution of these
disunities (contradictions) in reality was to be seen as 
happening as an Objective phenomenon, a creation of 
higher forms of socio-historical being, instead of some 
abstraction which exists only in the individual 
human’s consciousness.
Hegel had failed to point out the series of these
Object j.ve moments , wherein the Idea is in a state of 
dialectical unity of its opposites just before a new 
.. g pa r <31, i on (self-es t rangemen t ) occurs. Instead the
personal motivation, preoccupation, and gist of his 
dialectic was to emphasise the unity of Subject and 
Object, wherein, even then, the Subject, as Absolute 
Idea or Spirit, remained predominant. For instance, he
asserted in his Introduction to the History of
Philpsophy40 :
39. Charles Taylor.  Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1975, pp.22-29
40. Text in, Quentin Lauer . Hegelj_s Idea of
Phiipsophy. (New York; Fordham Univ. Press, 1971) pp.
79 f i .
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Spirit must know itself, externalize itself, 
have itself as its object, must know itself in 
such a way as to exhaust its own possibilities 
in becoming totally to itself. It must reveal 
itself completely, going down into its 
uttermost depths and revealing those depths 
. The goal of spirit is to comprehend itself, to 
remain no longer hidden to itself. The road to 
t hi r is its development, and the series of 
developments form the levels of its
d e v I  opmen14 1
inferring from Marx’s contradiction of this monistic
sell -knov.'ledge of Spirit through its object of it own
consciouness, Althusser elucidates that,
Marxism rejects the theoretical presuppositions 
of the Hegelian model: the presupposition of an
original simple unity . . . whatever its form
(the concept of the beginning that for example, 
Hegel sees as being immediately identical with 
nothingness; the simplicity that, for Hegel once 
again, is the starting-point - and restarting- 
point , indefinitely - for every process); it
rejects, therefore, the Hegelian pretension 
which accepts this original simple unity
(reproduced at each moment of the process) 
which will produce the whole complexity of the
process later in its auto-development. but 
without ever getting lost in this complexity 
i tsei I . v, i ihout evei- losing in i t ei ther i ts 
simplicity or its unity - since the plurality 
and the complexity will never be more than i ts 
own ’phenomenon’, entrusted with the
mani f er. ta t ion of i ts own essence42 .
The failure to give an empirical account for the 
operation of the dialectic and to leave it shrouded in 
explanations of mystical self-outworking of the self- 
realisation of the Absolute Idea, or the fact of the 
logical necessity of the tendency of the dialectic to
41. Ibid. p.80
44. Lp]2_Marx, p. 198
74
obiit orate the Objective, was, in M a r x ’ opinion, to
leave a defective description of the very motor of the
whole pz’ocess , leaving an impression that:
The whole history of the alienation process and
the whole of the retraction of the alienation is 
nothing but the history of the production of the 
abstract (i.e absolute) thought - of logical, 
speculative thought43
Lji I ig 11 I.oned by leuerbach s exposure of t he re 11 gioiis 
presuppositions, and thus, the mysticism of Hegel’s 
phi 1. osophy 4 4 . Marx could not be impressed by the
absence of a "rational" account of the actual operation 
•it this Subject of the Hegelian sytem. He rejected it.
A rejection of this speculative presupposition of the
Hegelian idea, meant a rejection of both the abstractly 
conceived Absolute Idea/ Geist, the Subject, as a
catalytical concept which is being identified with the 
did_t_iL us conceived in Hegel as being in uni 1 j with 
the Absolute Idea (as its activity, Subject of the
process). in its first dimension, Marx s position is a 
counter-assertion which rejects the ground of the thesis
43. Par is Manuscripts, in, R. Tucker e d . , The_Marx- 
E n g e l s _ R e a d e r  , p .  1 1 0
44. Inter alia_L in "Provisional Theses for the
Reformation of Philosophy" Ludwig Feuerbach wrote: "The
secret of theology is anthropology, but the secret of 
philosophy is theology; whoever fails to give up Hegelian 
philosophy fails to give up theology. The Hegelian 
doctrine, that the nature of reality is posited by the 
idea, is merely the rational expression of the theological 
doc trine that nature is created by God, that the material 
essence is created by the immaterial, i.e, abstract
essence." in. L.o Stepelevich ed . The_Young IJege 1 i ansj__ An
Anthology, p,15G
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of Heg e l ’s____Phenomenology of_the__Spirit, namely, the
theosophic presentation of the relationship between 
object and subject to the deliberate extent that, the 
Absolute Idea, which this is presented as being its
phenomenology, reveals itself as being the mysterium of 
the Chritian deity45. By removing this mystical
element out of the dialectic, and by focussing on the 
material, Marx was left with a process which was
nothing but the effects of the material world, as
Subject, on the labouring human being as Object. In the 
labour process, the rubric of the production of
material life, the labourer, as creator of his material 
life which in turn creates him, is both Subject_and
Qbject46 (within the context of the contradictions of
Objective reality, of which the labourer, as a
representative of productive relations, is ultimately a 
p a r t ).
In its second dimension, the rejection of the
preponderance of the inyrstical Subject (Absolute Idea),
45. See, Charles Taylor, Hegel, pp. 43-44, lOOf.
46. For evidence of the derivation of this from
He gel’s "expressivist theory", see Charles Taylor, ibid., 
PP. 23-29, 44.
Taylor maintains that it this expressivist view of Hegel 
which explains the schema of his philosophy: that man is a
se1f-expressing being, whereby this self-expression is 
essentially the self-expression of the cosmic Spirit, 
reducing man in his self-awareness to being a vehicle of 
this Spirit. Marx transformed this from being a self- 
expression which happens at the level of abstract self- 
consciousness, to being self-expression in the concrete of 
the activity of the production of subsistence.
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owing to the inextricable unity to the meaning of the 
dialectic in its whole on this Subject ( Absolute 
Idea’s own self-supersession), meant a reworking and
transformation of the Hegelian dialectic itself, in 
toto. the reformulation of the Subjective_dia 1etic
into an Ob jec tive_dia 1 ect _ic . The total nature of this 
critical rejection" is communicated by the concept of 
" inversion"47.
This "rejection" of the Subject of the Hegelian
dialectic the t ej-eô L ¿sat ion_XSubjec ti visa tion_[_of_ the
Y® is what constitutes M a r x ’s demystification
of the Hegelian system, and its materialisation.
However, it is important to note one important aspect 
of the restrictiveness of M a r x ’s critique of Hegel’s 
philosophy. In criticising Hegel’s conceptualisation of 
the dialectic, Marx only inverted its form - exchanging 
tin. places between the abstract and the concrete. The 
very mod us_ v _iv end i of the dialectic, as a process which 
operates autonomously and with a semblance of necessity, 
he found no problem with. He affirmed Hegel’s 
proposition that: "The negative in general contains the
47. Althusser: "To invert the Hegelian dialectic [means] to
demystify ft, to separate the rational kernel from the irrational 
shell. This separation is not mere sorting out: to take some and
leave some. If can only be a transformation. Marx’s dialectic can 
°n 1Y be the Hegelian dialectic worked-1ransformed". Politics_And 
SisiShY, P. 173
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ground of Becoming, the unrest of se1f-movement"48. He 
used this as a principle of developing the theory of the 
imminent se1f-decomposition of capitalism which is 
proclaimed in TheComunist_Manifesto, and elaborated in 
Capita 1 Vo 1 . I .
Dialectical materialism, therefore, is an affirmative
identification of the self-contradictions which
o b j e c 1: i v e n o cio- economic reality generates, of
necessity, as well as an explication of how the 
resultant self-resolution of this contradiction, in a 
manner which marginalises the role of human
consciousness and volition, becomes a motive force of 
historical development. This, explicitly, is the
reversal of the process whereby the auto-genesis of the
concept, the abstract, is put in the place of the auto­
genesis of the concrete. Now the auto-genesis of the
concrete is on the head49: concrete historical
development is a process demunitive of the Subject
which initiates, as an external player, a movement of 
the dialectic. It takes place autogenerically. It is
the complexity of social contradictions, manifesting
themselves us the class struggle which cause the
movement of history. As Althusser would assert:
instead of the ideological myth of a philosophy 
of origins and its organic concepts Marxism
48. G.W.F. Hegel. Science of_Logic, trnsl. by, W.H.
Johnston and L.G. Struthers (London, 1929), p.180
49. K. M a r x , G§Eital^_ Vol 1, p.20
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establishes the principle of the recognition of 
the givenness of the complex structure of anjr
concrete ’object’, a structure which governs the
development of the object. . . . there is no
longer any original essence, only ever-pre- 
givenness . . . there is no longer any original
simple unity (in any form whatsoever), but
instead, ihe_ever~pre-givenness_of a_structured
complex_unity50.
This presents a version of reality, according to 
winch history is determined and not predetermined. 
"Determination" lies implicitly within the very shape 
of the contradictions which obtain within a given 
sot ia.l formation. This version is a negation of the
view of history as a process with active actors and a
prede te nn i nod tgl_os towards which, and according to
which historical actors behave. It is an explicit 
rejection oi the Christian eschatological premiss of
God as having gradually se1f-revealing purpose in 
history, which purpose is manifested in beneficent
human actions51. At the same time it is a rejection of 
the view of the socialist revolution as having a
historically distant telos, to which all must be
50, For_Marx, p. 198
51. In tandem to this, F. Engels wrote in Feuerbach
3Q£i_lhe_End ( Selected_Works . p. 613) :
"The his lory of philosophy as represented by Hegel 
recognises that the ostensible and also the really 
operating motives of men who act in history are by no means 
the ultimate causes of historical event; that behind these 
motives are other motive powers, which have to be 
discovered. But it does not not seek these powers in 
history itself, it imports them rather from outside, from 
Philosophical ideology, into history".
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actively conditioned and engineered52. All this is an 
Idealism which is borne of a Hegelian view of history 
as being the self revelation of a particular pre-given 
goal or subject, in treading away from this idealist 
tendency, dialectical materialism focuses on
"scientificism" , as the opposite of the "ideological” 
nature of the former tendency, as a way of analysing a 
given historical moment. It is on the basis of this 
scientific analysis that predictions which are based on 
the observation of the previous operation of the 
phenomenon of history that Marx made a postulation of 
the eventual advent of a communist social formation.
To conclude we cite the following two statements of
Alex C a11i n i c o s :
Once freed from the teleology of the negation
of the negation, which suppresses the
specificity of the instances of the social 
totality into the spirituality of a simple 
whole, the notion of ’the process without a 
subject’, of history motored by the peculiar 
articulations of the contradictions internal to 
it, can serve as the foundation of the 
materialist dialectic. Here lay M a r x ’s
novelty5 3
What does this conception of the dialectic 
leave us with? Centrally, with the idea of the 
ç1ass_struggle. History is not the working out 
of' some plan implanted in the nature of man. It
is the result of the struggle between different 
and opposed classes54.
52. See, L. Althusser, "Contradiction and Over-
determination" , Eor_Marx, p. 87
53. Alex Callinicos, A1 thus se r j_s Marxism (London:
Pluto Press, 1976), p.68
54 • Ibid., p .71
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CHAPTER 4
HISTORY AS A PROCESS INDEPENDENT OF THE HUMAN SUBJECT: A 
CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF MIRANDA’S CRITICISM
OF ALTHUSSER
4.1. INTRODUCTION
In our previous discussion we noted that Louis 
Althusser distinguished himself as a notable twentieth 
century thinker through his interventionist submissions 
that Marxism. as a dialect .ico-historicai materialism, is 
essentially a "theoretical anti-humanism"1. He sought to 
develop an interpretation of M a r x ’s writings which would 
highlight the fact that as from 1845 Karl Marx 
discovered a new epistemological foundation for his 
work which was formulated on a radical and deliberate 
rejection of his earlier Feuerbachian humanism.
Central to his exposition of this epistemological- 
methodo Logical anti-humanism of the later Marx, is his 
construction of a view that according to Marx, the
movement of history from one socio-historica1 epoch 
other, is not dependent on the role of the human
individual as an agent or subject of history. In this 
chapter we lay our focus on this latter aspect of his
For_Marx, p. 230
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i ri t e rpr o t a t i ori o f Marx
One of those who have found Althusser’s view 
particularly questionable is Jose Porfirio Miranda, a 
Mexican proponent of liberation theology. Writing as a 
theologian who is convinced of the epistemological 
consanguinity of Marxist philosophy and Christian 
theology as radicalised in the form such as that of 
Latin American theology of liberation2, Miranda found 
Althusser’s postulates as being not only what he 
thought to be a malicious misrepresentation of Marx, 
bu i also as a disservice to the enterprise of seeking 
to make Marxism useful to a theological mobilisation of 
the poor and oppresed for social revolution.
We shall first outline the main points of Miranda’s 
criticism of Althusser’s proposition that progression 
of history, in terms which are definitional of
dialectical historical mai©£iaIi§!P > is a process
autonomous of the human subject. In the process of this 
examination, which is based on Miranda’s work Marx
Against The Mar xi s t  The Chr i s t i an Marxism of _Kar 1
Marx3, we trace the actual meaning of this view of
Althusser’s by referring to primary references of his 
introduction and use of this proposition. This process
.. 2. See Miranda’s other works: Marx__and_the_Bible . Maryknoll,
Orbis Books, 1974; Communism_in_the_Bible. Maryknoll, N.Y:
'bis Books, 1982
3- Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis Books; London: S C M , 1980
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leads to a formulation of a judgement on Miranda’s
reading of Althusser, the basis of his dismissal of a 
theory of Marxism which emphasises the "materialism" of 
Karl Marx, as well as, the very philosophical roots of 
his method. We expose Miranda’s philosophical
presuppositions -- which in essence are shared by all
liberation theologians, and are here being used as a
critique of dialectical Materialism - as being a
Hegelianism of Ludwig Feuerbach as expressed in the 
writings of the young Karl Marx.
•1.2. ALTHUSSER IN THE PARADIGM OF MIRANDA’S THESIS
Miranda's work (Marx_____Against the__ Marxist^ The
Christian Humanism of Karl Marx) is built around a
critical paradigm which identifies three major kinds
of traditional "distortions" of the philosophy of
Karl Marx. What binds these three "distortions"
together, according to him, is that they all cast
Marx’s thought into a theoretical mould which fails to 
display and demonstrate the fundamental element of his 
philosophy, namely, its humanism- Miranda, however, does 
not only stop here: he goes further, and seeks to prove
that this humanism of Karl Marx, which some Marxist 
theoreticians are maliciously suppressing, is not even 
"humanism" in the secular philosophical sense of the
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concept. but as specifically a "Christian Humanism"4.
In his observation, the opposite of this humanism, or 
this- human i i. i c in t erprotati on of Marx, is materialism, 
which i at the core of what he identifies as distorted 
representations of Marx. Of these, as we mentioned 
above, he identifies three types. The first he calls, 
"Motivational Materia1ism"5, the second "Materialism as 
the be-all and the end-all"6, and the third, "Economic 
determinism"7. The stated purpose of his work is to 
negate all these by "showing in gradual steps what
Marx himself did not mean by materialism"8.
Miranda opens with an introduction and criticism of 
"motivational materialism", He defines this as a theory 
that interpretes Marx as if he taught that, "the 
decisive moving force in history is self-preservation, 
the acquisition of material goods, uti1itarianism"9, and 
that, consequently, the socialist revolution can only be 
motivated by the abject poverty and hunger, as well as 
other threats to the instinctive urge for physical self- 
preservation of members of the oppressed class. Alfred
4. See in Ibid. pp. 197ff Miranda’s claim of "the Gospel 
roots" Marx’s thought, and his argument in pp. 224f, that M a r x ’s 
Philosophy is a "conscious continuation of early Christianity"
5. Ibid. p p .  2 - 2 8
6 • Ibid., p . 9
r' • Ibid . p . 69
&• Ibid., p .1
tJ ■ Ibid., p . 1
84
Schmidt with his The Concept of_Nature_in_MarxlO is
singled as the proponet of this type of materialism.
Having offered a criticism of this view that holds 
i ha I "the primordial motive of the proletarian 
revolution is the satisfaction of material needs"ll,
he proceeds to the second type of a "materialist 
distortion" of Marx, namely, "Materialism as the be-
all and end-all". This is where Louis Althusser is 
encountered. Beginning with a declaratory rejection of 
the former type of materialism for being an (un)ethical 
reduction of the struggle of the working class to the 
base motive of a mere gratification of physical needs, 
he opens his address of the second type of materialism 
with a comparative assessment that, notwithstanding the 
grave distortion of this type of materialism, "the neo­
orthodoxy of Stalin and Althusser is much worse”12. In 
characterising this, Miranda remonstrated:
Althusser's thought is not just another 
Parisian fashion; it is symptomatic of a whole 
group of thinkers. For them, raaterialism_comes 
£iLst. Only then comes the communist
revolution, if it is feasible. If the latter is 
not feasible, so much the worse for it because 
the real aim and goal is materialism_for_ its_own 
sake [own emphasis]. They seek to take hold of 
the proletarian revolution in order to use it as 
a way of spreading materialism. They have no 
real regard for the thought of Marx himself.
Instead they seek to use Marxism in order to
I®' A. Schmidt,  The_Concept of_Nature in_Marx (Atlantic
1shlands, N.J: Humanities Press, 1972) (vid. p.34)
^  • Ibid., p.6 
12 • Ibid . p ,29
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inculcate materialism in the people.13
4.3. IS HISTORY A PROCESS WITHOUT A SUBJECT?
under a chapter proc1amatlonally entitled, "A 
History with a Subject", Miranda proceeds to introduce 
this ’neo-orthodoxy of Stalin [!j and Althusser". This 
Stalinist neo-orthodoxy, according to Miranda, is the 
position of Althusser’s theory which "denies that the 
proletariat is the active subject or agent of the 
revolution", which theory, in addition, "denies that 
there is any subject at all"14 that is responsible for 
the movement of history from one epoch of a social
formation to the other.
As a primary source of his understanding of
Althusser’s proposition of a history as process without
a subject, which he uses as a principal charge for
Althusser’s denial of the existence of subject at all, 
Miranda qoutes from Althusser's essay, "Reply to John 
Lewis", where Althusser asserts that:
The category of subject . . .  is meaningless 
for dialectical materialism. The latter rejects 
that category purely and simply, even as it
rejects such problems as the existence of Godl5
Miranda insists that this is a serious
13. Ibid. p.32
11• Loc c i t . .
13. tssays_in_Self-Criticism, p.32.
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misrepresentation of the philosophy of Karl Marx, and
insofar as "this distortion constitutes the absolute
core of [Althusser's] philosophy and his whole 
interpretation of Marx"16, so is "Althusser’s thesis 
nothing more than hogwash"17. (On the other hand if 
Althusser, were to respond to Miranda, he would say: 
"any thought that appeals to Marx for any kind of a 
restoration of a theoretical anthropology or humanism
is no more than ashes . . .”18)
Miranda then proceeds to rebut and invalidate 
citations from M a r x ’ writings which Althusser uses as
the basis of what he presents as the Marxist theory of 
history in relation to the participation of the human 
subject. He concentrates on one, namely, Althusser’s
use of a passage from M a r x ’s Notes on A^_Wagner,
which he had used as an epitaph to his essay, "Marxism 
and Humanism”!9. This is Marx’s declaration that:
"My method does not start from the human being , but 
from the economically given social period"20.
Miranda simply dismisses Althusser’s evidence by
16. Marx_Against_the_Marxists, p. 31
17. Ibid., p.43
I®- --Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of_the
-?i§Qtists L_and_Other_Essays, p .230
19. For J a rx.  p. 235f.
20. In ^6: Foreword to the second edition of the German
edition of Capital (I)
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counterposing that Althusser ’’mutilates the passage”
from Notes o n W a g n e r , and that "his use of the passage
is fraudulent"21. In proving Althusser’s "fraud", he 
explains in only one paragraph that Althusser has
ommitted to leave as italicised the article the in the 
phrase "the human being” , and has thus (conveniently)
failed to recognise the significance of M a r x ’s 
italicisation of this article.
He argues that the context of M a r x ’s debate with
Wagner, from which this passage is taken, was M a r x ’s
critical reaction against Wagner’s treatment of the
human subject in his philosophy. M a r x ’s phraseology of 
"the human being" was to indicate his reverse
interpretation of Wagner’s method. He is making a 
negating emphasis against Wagner’s abstract and 
speculative treatment of the human being (as if he is a 
mere concept). Thus Miranda argues that the emphasis of 
ftiarx's statement is not on that he is starting "from the 
economically given social period", but rather that he 
starts from the concrete human being who exists
historically (humanist materialism). This for Miranda, 
in contrast and contradiction of Althusser’s
interpretation, is an indication that Marx took human 
beings seriously in his analysis and recognised their 
value in the structure of the system of his
¿1- Marx_Against_the_Marxists, p.44
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philosophy22. "Althusser” , on the basis of what he 
deduces from M a r x ’s statement to Wagner, says Miranda, 
"takes a fatal leap and concludes Marx is an anti­
humanist, and according to him, "just the opposite is 
true. Marx is so much the humanist that he is interested 
onlj in real life human beings, not in abstractions."23.
Miranda then claims that Althusser uses the same 
tactics as Lenin24: "They seek to use use philosophy
for politcal ends"25 . In doing this they attribute to 
thinkers "theses that are contrary to the views of those 
people"26. That is not all: "Althusser, however, goes 
even further, and uses Stalin’s approach . . . the basic
idea is to cite phrases, allegedly from Marx, that are 
not his at a 11."27
As further proof of Althusser’s "misrepresentation" 
of Kaivl Marx, Miranda then proceeds to quote a number 
of passages from M a r x ’s writings as "main pieces of 
Marx's testimony" as to his disapproval of the notion 
of history as being without a "subject" and to show
22. Ibid., p. 44
23. Ibid., p.45
24. Ibid., p.46
2 5. Loc. c i t .
26 . Loc. c i t .
27. Loc cit.
89
that Marx used the category of subject in history 
positively. He explains why he calls these "main pieces 
of Marx's testimony." 28
Because . . .  of the fact that the human being
as the subject of economics and history is one 
of the main criteria that Marx uses to pass 
judgement on Capitalism and condemn it.29
In constructing this "testimony" Miranda deliberately
quotes from Marx's writings after his Theses on
Feuerbach ( 18-1 f>) so as to pre-empt and undermine 
Althusser’s contention of the change that has occurred 
in M a r x ’s opistemoiogj after 1845. Most of the
quotations are from the Thepries_of Surplus_Va1ue and
the Grundrisse, all which are aimed at demonstrating 
that what spurred Marx into criticising capitalism was 
his ethical protest against the fundamental tendency of 
capitalism to treat workers as objects and not as 
subjects. For instance, he quotes Marx's statement from 
Theories_of_Surplus_Value, that,
In [capitalist] conception, the workers
themselves appear as that which they are in 
capitalist production - mere means of 
production, not the ends in themselves and not 
the aim of product ion.30
He concludes that there are basically two reasons whj’ 
Althusser "expressly denies the existence of subjects".
28. Marx__Agains t_ the_Marxi s t s , p. 38 
2 9. Loc. c i t .
30. Karl Marx, Theories of_Surplus Value. Vol 2. (Moscow:
regress Publishers, 1963), p. 548, Cited in, Marx_Against_the
«assists, P. 39
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The tirsi. out; is that, "for Althusser, who is a good 
positivist, science as such recognizes no subjects"31. 
Miranda does not explain what he means by Althusser’s 
positivism, and how would this relate to a
differentiation of positivist materialism and
historical materialism which Althusser would evidently 
be aware o f .
The second reason for Althusser’s rejection of 
subjects’' in hi story , is, according to Miranda, 
because Althusser wants to create a logic for the 
denial of the existence of God. Miranda points out that 
according to H e gel’s demonstration, "if subjects exist, 
then God exists"32, and this is what Althusser is afraid 
of falling into. To back up his point he quotes from 
Althusser’s essay, "Ideology and the Ideological 
Apparatus of the State", where Althusser says that, 
"multitude of religious subjects can exist only on the 
absolute condition that there is another unique, 
absolute Subject: i.e, God"33.
Miranda bases his connection of Althusser’s remarks
on the existence of God and his discussion of the 
"Subject" from the l a t t e r ’s saying that dialectical 
materialism rejects the category of_subject "even as
31. M§rx_Against_the_Marxists, p.35
32. Ibid. p .33
3 3. Loc. c i t .
91
it it: joc t s such problems an the existence of God" . He 
does not discern a philosophic difference between the 
propositions: "the rejection of the existence of God"
and, "the rejection of such_problems as the existence
of God". Althusser uses the latter proposition, which 
is aimed at pointing out the methodological concerns 
and parameters of dia1etico-historica1 materialism, 
i.e, the agenda of its problematics (which is normally 
determined bĵ  the nature of the subject) . Is Althusser 
not saying that, according to its philosophic agenda and 
methodology, dia 1ectico-historica1 materialism has no
conceptua J structures that relate to, nor induce the 
problematic of the exstence of God? Is he also not 
saying that, unlike, for instance, with the philosophy 
of Descartes34, whether God exists makes no difference 
to the systematic postulates of dialectico-historical 
materialism?
4.4. THE MEANING OF ALTHUSSER’S NOTION OF "HISTORY
WITHOUT A SUBJECT"
in his "Reply to John Lewis"35, Althusser made an 
assertion, which was to be the most profound of all 
features of his theory. He submitted that,
lo be dialectical materialist, Marxist
• Rene Descartes, Discourse_on_Method
35. _Es§ays_Xn_SeIf-Critic ism, pp. 62 ff.
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Philosophy must break with the idealist
categori of the 'Subject as Origin, Essence
and Cause, responsible in its inferiority for
all the determinations for the external
’Object , whose internal 'Subject' it is
called.36
At any initial consideration, this communicates an 
express denial of the place and role of the subject in 
the praxis of the transformation of objective reality, 
in the following discussion, which in a way, is a
response to Miranda’s conceptualisation of this view of 
Althusser’s, we shall seek to go beyond this "initial 
consideration" and attempt to place this within the 
context and intention of Althusser’s theory, and distill 
what the import of what he actually meant yields for our 
understanding of Miranda and liberation theology’s 
perception of Marx.
To begin with, Althusser’s call for Marxist 
philosophy to break away from the "idealist category' 
of Subject" as being the main and sole motor for the 
determination of any extended object, has to be
understood as one of the themes of his theory of the 
"theoretical anti-humanism" of Karl Marx. An assertion 
that "history' is a process without a subject" is thus 
primarily aimed at arguing for a conception of the role 
of the human individual, as subject in history (and 
where history :i s the object) , which does not posit the 
historical practice of this individual as being the
36 • Ibid., p .73
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iiu, iuj dc: i ti'irn innj; force: of the historical process . As
Alex Gal 1 ini c o s , explains, this is where "the burden of 
Althusser ■: theoretical an t j-humanism” , lies, namely :
"the denial that the human essence is the subject of
history and that it determines its direction according
to a predestined drama of alienation and
r e cone i. 1 i a t i on " 3 7 .
Within this perspective, Althusser’s proposition
that, to be dialectical materialist, Marxist Philosophy
must reject the notion of Subject as being_the_sugrerne
^oiprmpnanl of alp objective reality, is simply' a
t he ore. t ica 1 foundation for the rejection of the idea 
tha I history' develops in accordance with an immanent
and predetermined necessity, which in the case of
"humanistic" interpretations of Marx, would be the 
necessary' dynamic of the dialectic of the alienation and 
self-realization of human nature - the creation of the
"new man". As we show below, it is a suggestion that
history develops out of its own internal dynamic in 
accordance with the particular overdetermined
configuration that the social contradictions
constituting it at any one time takes. There is no drama 
of the historical exigencies of human nature here; this 
is corollary' from the stance which rejects any notion of 




-i . i , I . luc bnlUkii of Aliijy 5  § e r  Deni. al. of the
"Sub jecj." •
In the light of Miranda’s observations, the questions 
we need to ask a r e : What did Althusser mean and
understand by the category of "subject"; did he
actually deny the existence of "subject" ? If so, in
what sense did he deny it, and if he did not deny it, 
in what sense also did he do this? Also, what were the
philosophic  intentions of his construction of the
position he finally maintained?
k i c ( alii ni oooSt ’ d review of Althusser, being one of 
the major works on Althusser, is unhelpful in this 
regard , lie is merely offering an apologia to
"Althusser’s denial of the subject". Our review, 
however, will point out that the issue is not whether 
Althusser recognised the subject in history or not, 
but: W'hat is his intention in introducing this theme in
his theory of Marxism, and how it falls in line with 
this, did he conceive of the role of "the human subject" 
in history, where history is admittedly a struggle for 
the attainmenl of higher, and thus more Just social 
f ormations.
The context of Althusser’s discourse on "history 
• Loc. c i t .
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•u i thou! H subject 1 in the essaj "Reply to John Lewis", 
was his intention to negate Lewis’s39 proposition that 
■ i i i r. man who makes lustorj " . We note with interest 
that AJ thusser does not rebut this proposition of 
Lewi::; s. a::: we would expect after reading Miranda, with
a counter-assertion which, in Miranda’s words, "denies 
that there is any subject at ail"40. Instead of saying 
to Lewis, "there is nothing like a subject at all in 
history", Althusser rebuts: "it is the masses which make
history . . ."41. Lest this be taken as a confused 
contradiction of his above mentioned position which 
comes from the same reply to Lewis, he added in the same 
sentence, " . the class struggle is the motor of
h i st ory" .
Besides its addition of a shift in emphasis, this is 
an explicit recognition of the existence of "subject" 
in history. This, therefore exposes the baselessness of 
Miranda’s claim that Althusser’s theory "denies that 
the proletariat is the active subject or agent of the 
revo1ution"42, and that "it denies that there is any
39. John Lewis then, a leading theoretician of the Communist
lai’ly of Great Britain (CPGB) , published under the title "The 
Althusser Case" his refutation of Althussser in, M§£xism_Today, 
>ieb., .1972). Althusser’s "Reply" appeared in the October 1972, 
and November 1972 issues on the same journal
‘d. Mar¿_Against_the_Marxists, p.29
' 1 • jn_helf _Ci l ticism , p. 46
4 ̂ . Up ci t . , p . 29
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In his recognition of "subject” in Marx’s thought,
■, i ’ : main aim war; to point out the radical
difference of M a r x ’s conception of this, from that 
employed by H e g e l . And it is here that the cutting edge 
of his argument is located. A failure to discern this 
may gives an impression that Althusser is contradicting 
himself. The placing of this in the context of a search 
for the post-Hegelian specificity of Marx’s formulation 
of a philosophy of history, helps us to remember that 
Althusser uses the term "subject", specifically and 
exclusively as a philosophic concept which has its roots 
in ihe phi losophical tradition of post-Kant ian German 
Idealism (as Subject). Thus, when Althusser argues for 
a denudation of the "category of subject" from the 
theory of the historical process, he does this within 
the backgi’ound of a conception of "Subject" as an 
element of the dialectical process, as introduced by 
Hegel. It is not subject as in the grammatic subject-
object relation of, "the dog bites the boy", or as used
in the scientific sense of the mechanical relationship 
between Cause and Effect. The latter case being how 
Miranda seems to have understood Althusser. Being on a 
crusade to argue for the primacy of the human being as 
being primarily the Cause, the sine_aua_non, and not
h i  f e e t  0 1  historical change, Miranda accused Althusser
Lor, , oil.
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of promoting a version of Marxism which "treats people 
as an object rather than as a subject"44.
Kxp 1 a i n i ng i h i s philosophical use of the concept of 
"subject’, and how this falls into place in support of 
his thesis , Althusser elaborated to John Lewis:
In my opinion: men (plural), in the concrete
r;evise , are necessarily subjects (plural) in 
historj . because they act in history as subject 
(plural). But there is no Subject (singular) of 
history. And I will even go further: ’m e n ’ are
not ’the subjects of history’.45
Accordingly, he continues by adding an important
methodological key* to unravelling this:
To understand these distinctions one must 
define the nature of the questions at issue.
The question of the constitution of individuals
as historical subjects, active in history, has
nothing in principle to do with the question of
the_ 'Subject of history’, or even that of the
'subjects of history’. The first question is of 
u u £ i c n t_ j f j e kind: it. concerns historical
materialism. The second is of a philosophical
i. i n d : i t c oricerns dialectical, materialism . 46
The important distinction lies in the meaning 
communicated by the prepositions "in" and "of", and in 
the philosophic difference between "subject(s)" and 
"Subject” . As we show below, Althusser does not deny 
that human beings are subjects in history; what he 
finds as being out of step with Marx’s philosophy, is 
the opinion that human beings, as a collective and as
44. Marx_Against_the_Marxists, p.30
45. E§says_ In__Sel f-Cr i t i ci sm , p. 95
40. L o c . c i t .
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individuals, are a Subject of history.
4.4.1. I'ht Human_Individual_and_Historical_Development
A i 1. hu t conceded t ha t human individuals do play a
roie in history. The advance he added was that they
pin;. this roi.c no I as j.nd i v r dua 1 s whose activity is the
motor ot in s lory , but only as embodiments of the
uistoi tea J process , never as its subjects nor Subject.
As a historical being, an individual is a social being;
the societal. processes in which he lives and works
define his being. He is never as such, a bare
individual. He is either a serf or landowner, a slave or
master, a worker or a capitalist - an embodiment of
productive relations that obtain in a given form of
social formation. In corroboration of his subscription
and defence of this view, Ai thusser quotes f rom Capital,
The principul agents of this mode of production 
itself, the capitalist and the wage-labourer, 
ar* as sue h merely embodiments,
personifications of capital and of wage-
labour : definite social charecteristics stamped
upon individuals by the process of social 
production, the products of this definite social 
production relations.47
Althusser based his contention of the irrelevance of 
the theoretical consideration of the human condition as 
the motive i orce of history on this understanding of 
men" as being principal agents of a given mode of
production in the sense of representations rather than
of catalysts. It is only in their status as
representations of an "ever-pre-givenness of a
structured complex unity"48 that they are subjects in 
history. Thi: means that , only in his pre-given (by the
social structure) status of being a representation of a 
i-c i , cr j 11 i.u . class category within a social system or
mode of production which necessitates class divisions, 
bOi n d  system d iaj.eeticajii. produces its own se 1 f - 
con t ruii a •• I ions of class antagonism and struggle , that 
the individual is a factor in history. He is this factor 
only to the extent that he is an ensemble of the
relations of production obtaining within the social 
formation in which he lives.
In the philosophical sense of the context from which 
this emerges, the implication of this is a suggestion 
¡hoi:, in fact, instead of being "subject in history", 
the human being is actually part of the objective
j so i it1,. Ah. s'.. inverted Hegel ' c notion of the
dialectic, whereby he reversed Hegel’s abstract
conceptualisation of the Subjective (the teleology of 
the yeigl or Absolute Idea) , as being the preeminent
aspect of the process of the Absolute Idea’s self- 
realisation, as well as the embodiment of the 
objective. He emphasised that the objective
realisations of this "Absolute Idea", thereby giving 
Prominence to objective reality, which he was to
48. For_Marx. p. 198
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perceive as essentially being socio-economic productive 
process49. The human being, therefore, as an ensemble of 
the shape of productive relations within a given system 
of pi’oduction, is part of the Objective. The fact that 
this objective reality is historically developed by 
self-contradictions which it necessarily generates means 
t. ¡1 i> i the human being in history, as such, plays no
initiatory nor dominant role.
On the oasis of this understanding, Althusser could
then charge that :
If we take seriously what Marx tells us about
the real dialectic of history, it is not ’m e n ’
who make history, although its dialectic is 
realized in them and in their practice, but the 
masses in their relations of the class
struggle.50
The weight this had on the construction of his theory 
of the "anti-humanism of Marx", may well prove Miranda 
right in his claim that "the denial of the subject . 
constitutes the absolute core of [Althusser’s]
philosophy and his whole interpretation of Marx"51.
it I: t h i s entire view of Althusser now in full sight,
Callinicos propitiatively hastens to defend Althusser 
against his vulnerability to criticisms like the one of
49. See, Althusser, "On The Materialistic Dialectic", in,
Marx, pp. 161-217
50. L. Althusser, "Marx’s Relation to Hegel” , in, Politics
History, p.168
51. Marx_Against_ the_Marxists, p.31
Mi randn l, . lie caut] otis that this 'structuralist" view of
human historical existence,
Should not be seen, as it had been, as a denial 
of the role of political organisation or 
activity in bringing about the proletarian 
revolution, or as a juxtapositon of the naked 
power less individual and the omnipotent
historical process. Rather, it is the argument 
that there is no such thing as the individual 
as such, but that each mode of production 
produces its own mode of individuality in 
accordance with its specific character.52
4.5. CONCLUSION
IV. 1 . Miranda Conf uses_Al thusser j_s_Concept ion_of _the
Human_Subject_ in_History
There is a striking agreement between Miranda and
Ai. ihusser on the conception of the human individual as 
being a factor in history. They both agree that there 
is a subjec1 in history. The point of disagreement is 
on the nature of this subject’s being in history. For 
Miranda this subject is there as "individual human 
beings", who are the motor of history; they are 
therefore a Subject of history. For Althusser, history 
according to Marx, where its process is seen as a 
dialectical one, cannot have a Subject. "Men" in it
52. A j, t hyss e r j_s_Marx i sm , p. 70
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(history) are social categories who form the social 
configuration which through its own internal
contradictions develops itself into higher social
format i ons .
Miranda failed to notice this faint convergence of
his view with Althusser’s. Consequently, he blindly
proceeded to claim that Althusser "denies the
cxlc ici'ice of subject' . and he went on to construct his 
entire counter-argument on this false accusation. Since 
hi:, argument is built on the production of quotations 
which are deployed to prove that Marx did use the 
category of subject in his writings, against what he 
claims Althusser maintained, his entire altercation and 
theory against Althusser, reduces itself into a pseudo­
argument when it is revealed that Althusser did not 
argue that Marx never used the category of subject. 
Althusser conceded that according to historical
materialism "man" is (objectively) a subject in
luntory; however, philosophically, in terms negative of 
Hegel's conception of the dialectic, history has no 
bubjuct. "man" is only an ensemble of its necessary
dialectical social processes.
Characteristic of a structure of a pseudo-argument, 
we find Miranda quoting passages from Marx’s writings 
which Althusser, in turn, could use to support his own 
view (of the social representativity of human
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individuality). for instance, Miranda quotes from the
Lrundrjsso :
In the slave relation the worker is nothing but 
a. living labour machine, which therefore has a 
value for others, or rather is a value. The
totality of the free worker’s labour capacity
appears to him [slave-owner] as his property, as 
one of his moments, over which he, as_subject 
[Miranda’s emphasis], exercises domination, and 
which he maintains by expending it.53
Althusser would find this as a radical affirmation
of his own view that human individuals are merely forms 
oi being in the historical reality of the class- 
antagonisms which through the resultant struggle propel
In story forward. in the "Reply to John Lewis",
Althusser said:
Every human, that is to say social individual, 
cannot be the agent of practice unless he takes
the_ form of.subject. The 'subject form’ is in
fact the form that the historical existence of 
every individual, every agent of social 
practices, takes: for the relations of
production and reproduction necessarily
involves, as the integrating element
ideol.ogi.cal-social relations, which, in order
to function, impose on every individua1-agent 
the form of subject.54
Also, in his argument with Althusser on the latter’s
use oi Marx s debate wi th A. Wagner, Miranda quoted a 
passage which, as we show by quoting it in this 
conto: I . A Ithussej could in turn have used to 
corroborate his view of M a r x ’s conception of the role
53- K. Marx, Grundrissej_ Foundations of the Crtitigue_of
7~-iiisal_Economy (New York: Vintage Books, 1973 ), p . 476. Cited
ln MarxAgainst_the_Marxist s , p . 35
• Essays_In_SeIf-Critic ism, p . 95
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ot : !c: human individual m  ii icitory , ] lie passage reads:
’The' human being? If we are talking about the
category’ human being , the latter has no needs 
whatsoever. If we are talking about a human 
being confronting nature as an individual, then 
we must view him as a non-gregarious animal. If 
we are talking about a human being already
living in some form of society . . . then our
point of departure must be to spell out the 
specific character of this social human being, 
i.e, the specific character of the society in 
which he lives; for in that case production, the
process of making a living, already possesses
some specific character.55
l.ns toad of demonstrating Miranda’s allegation that 
Althusser gives the phrase attached to this56, a 
i . eonili ng v, hi ch i . o u  t:. i de of its textual context , this 
serves tire opposite purpose. It strengthens Althusser’s 
argument i or the super fluouness of the individual, as a 
Subject of history, in the structure of M a r x ’s 
philosophy. Shooting himself further on the foot, as it 
were . Miranda quotes against Althusser from the
tjkyndrisse :
Rather, it is always a certain social body, a
social subject, [and not the individual, MJL]
which is active in a greater or sparser 
totality of branches of production.(emphasis 
Mi randa’s )5 7
Either Miranda had not read Althusser adequately, or
his interpretation of Marx is qualitatively' a step 
behind that offered by Althusser. The latter is the
. Cited in, Marx_Against_the_Marxists, p.44
55. Marx's declaration which Althusser used as an epitaph to 
111 - os ¡¿ay . " Marxism and humanism” : "My analytical method does
n°f start from man but from the econoinicaly given social period".
1 ■ Cited in, Miranda, Marx_Aga ins t _t he_Mar xi § t s , p. 43
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more safe and useful judgment to make. What this debate 
v, i ¡.¡i A I i nu.s i on this question of the "subject" in/of 
history has revealed, is the centrality of the impact of 
f.lar.'c - critique o f He go L in the shaping of his mature 
philosophy. The implications of Althusser’s theory leads 
us to the view that the conversion of Marx from 
Feuerbach lies in the unique manner in which he inverted 
Hegel’s diaiectj.c. Here Lies the locus of the self-
definition of dialectical materialism from dialectical 
jucoiism . Tli i r; view is also shared by Sidney H o o k , who 
states that in a sharp redefinition of Hegel’s notion, 
in Mors; "the dialectic is the principle of social
activity, its _.medium__i s the class struggle, its
spearhead, in class society, the social revolution”58
i empiias i s added ) .
If therefore, Miranda agues for a form of a Marxist 
phi 1osophy which does not grant the radical
significance of this post-Feuerbachian conversion of 
Marx, wTiich "conversion" lies in M a r x ’s reformulation 
of Hegel’s theory of the dialectic^ it means that his 
is a "Marxism" which is far from the Marxism of Karl 
Marx as this is still based on the Hegelian conception 
°f the dialectic - a Dialectical Idealism.
4 . 5.b . Miranda_Equates_Materialism_with_Anti-Humanism
58. Sidney Hook, From Hegel to Marxy. Studies in the
M?tellectual JDevelopment of Karl Marx , p. 76
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It is important to note that Miranda’s supreme 
in tc;*> t i on in all thal he isolates for criticism in
Althusser, and any other promotion of a "materialist" 
interpretation oi Marx, is to demolish the type of
Marxism erne rging from this int erpre tat ion with the
express purpose of creating out of this a foundation 
for his construction and defence of a Karl Marx who is 
a Christian humanist, in the process, Miranda operates 
with two presumptions, which in his particular
treatment of Althusser are the primary sources of his 
misunderstanding and misrepresentation of Althusser’s
v i H U S  .
The first of these presumptions, is his apparent
belief that the antonym of "Humanism" is "Materialism"; 
or rather, that it is not possible for a materialist
philosophy to be humanist, and vice versa. This kind of 
perception is a consenquence of his failure to
explicitly differentiate Marxist materialism from a 
variety of "materialisms" which the history Western
philosophy has experienced over the centuries. This
mistake pervades his entire work. For instance he
accuses Althusser. in his conception of history without 
a human subject, of being a "good positivist"59. Miranda 
makes this charge in an inverse argument that because
Althusser is an "anti-humanist", and an "absolute
59. Marx_Against_the_Marxists , p . 35
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mu 1 f riui i r; * ” - In' i s t ac re i oro . a l'osi t ivisl . To round up 
on the fallaciousness of an equation of materialism with 
anti lmmaunriii, and to bring this up because of Miranda’s 
accusation of Althusser of Positivism, one wonders what 
would be Miranda's reaction to the note that Auguste
Comte, the "father" of Positivism, developed a quasi- 
religion of the worship of humanity in replacement to 
that of the deity of the monotheistic faiths. The 
materialism he accuses Althusser’s "anti-humanism" of, 
had a very strong history of the affirmation of value of 
the human person, even to an extent of sacralising it.
The second of Miranda's presumptions is that
■ unde f m e d  as he treates it, necessarily
involves a negation of a belief in God. This on the
other hand, is derived from his explicit view that the 
basis of Humanism is faith in God. At an extended
critical treatment what this would reveal is that the
gist of his argument, as a liberation theologian, is 
not that, ultimately, it is not human beings who are
the motor of history; it is God who is executing this
role. His tory is the self-revelation of God60. Like 
Hegel’s Geist God objectifies himself through Creation 
and the resultant activities of the human race.
Miranda accused Althusser of fearing to recognise 
the "existence of subject” because in doing this he
60. See, Gustavo Gutierrez, A_Theology of__Liberation,
PP. 154, 158, and The Power_of_the_Poor_in_History (London: SCM
ress, 198a), P. 3 2
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would have fcu t o 1 low through Hegel's conclusion that,
"if subjects exist, then God exists"61. He agrees with
¡Kg e I rtgdi.ii::! A! t husser . in his own def ini t ion of
humanism, where this is exclusively understood in the 
ii i i 1 i tar ian terms 0 1 the normative enquiry of the human
person as being either an end or a means, in a chapter
entitled, "The Gospel roots of M a r x ’s Thought" Miranda 
states :
Christ was formulating the same value
judgement that constitutes the essence of 
Marx's humanism. . . .  It was from Jesus Christ 
that the West learned that a human being is an 
end in itself, and the rest of the world learned 
it from the West I ! ] .62
Ihe humanism which Miranda accuses Althusser of
i aj i ing to display has as its source, according to him,
the Christian Gospel. It is from Jesus of Nazareth that
K;.u j Mar.'. learned ii umarii s m , and the failure of Marxist 
theoreticians to point this out, is a conspiracy to 
subvert the fact of the religiosity of Karl Marx63. 
Miranda's contention is build by the syllogism that:
Humanism is universally derived from the teachings of
Jesus of Nazareth; the roots of Karl Marx’s thought is 
the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth; therefore, Karl Marx 
was a Christian Humanist64.
■ M§rx_Against_the_Marxists. p. 33 
• Ibid., p . 197
I bi d . , 224f .
64. Miranda writes in an exposition of Marx’s letter of 26
11 1 - 0 to hug go l.mann : "1 would suggest that Marx felt an




On the other hand, if for Miranda, materialism means
a i he i Mu • und -i the \ sin mean:; anti-humanism , it will be
interesting to see how he would deal with Ludwig
Four r bu< h : n m a torialist, peipetual theist and foremost
champion of Human ism65. The fact that Miranda does not 
corifron1 this anywhere in his work reveals his omission 
of looking into Feuerbach’s philosophy and the extent to 
which it permeates the Early Mai1 x.
In his engagement with Althusser, Miranda does not 
adequately crystalise the problematic of his work and 
theology (which is poorly presented in his entire
argument). namely, the question of the exclusivity or 
otherwise of Christian humanism and materialism-
sp-iu: i t i ca I a:. £!A§_Lec 1 i ca 1_ materialism . The
ma ter inI ism presented in Marx's writings is a unique 
form of philosophical materialism, which demands a 
t i'a in e work of enquiry and set of questions, which would 
be different from those traditionally posed by 
Christian theology against materialism generally.
Althusser's work goes a step further than the 
traditional emphases of the uniqueness of M a r x ’s
materialism as being a historical materialism. He
makes a specific assertion on dialectical_material ism
message of Jesus Christ and the career of the early Church in
11 cui«i‘ • 1 . i. bid . . p . 225
tjJ ■ Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, pp.i i i j .
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as differentiated from historical materialism, for
theoretical purposes of isolating the Hegelian 
connection of M a r x ’s theory. Unfortunately, Miranda 
does no! conl'ronl this. He treats Althusser’s 
conception of materialism as if he had implied a
iih. taphy i; i ca I , and a mechani cal , non-his tor i cal
( s o c i a 1 1 5. r e a 1 ; m a t e r i a 1 i s in .
4 . 5 . c . Miranda__Misunder s tands_Al thusser_^s_Use_of _the
Term_"Humanism"
Miranda seems to have completely missed the point of 
the context in which Althusser is discussing the anti­
humanism of Marx, how he reaches this conclusion and 
vhai he understood and meant by this. In reading
Althusser it is crucial to note that the issue of
humanism enters t.he debate essentially as a theoretical 
and methodological issue and concept. Althusser is not 
claiming that harl Marx was an anti-humanist. His claim 
is that Marx's new and matured philosophical methodology 
:i s a "theoretical anti-humanism" . This he derives from, 
and bases in is his drawing of a contradistinction 
between M a r x ’s earlier philosophical background which 
admittedly had Feuerbachian leanings and his later more 
original one. Althusser’s intended contribution has
been to isolate the methodological cantus firmus and
specific intention of Feuerbach’s philosophy. This he 




the uniqueness of M a r x ’s philosophy against this. It is 
against this ieuerbaclhan epistemological humanism that 
the emergence of Marxism is contrasted. Hence Althusser 
was care I u .1 to state, in addition to his painstaking 
explication of the theoretical nature of Marx’s anti- 
humanism : "I would say that Marx's theoretical anti-
humanism is above all a philosophical ant i--humanism" 66
Miranda missed the philosophical context of
Althusser's debate. Consequently, he understands
Althusser’s use of "anti-humanism", as anti-humanism in 
the popular and political sense of the word, which
means - in the words - "treating people as an object 
rather than as subjects"67. This, on the other hand,
demonstrates one of the basic systematic flaws of
Miranda's work on Marx: without compromising his
thr.o i og i c a 1 presuppositions, he approaches Karl Marx 
with a method and critical tools which treat Marx more 
as a social scientist than as a philosopher. It was in 
awareness of the grave consequences this flaw can lead 
to, that Lezsek Ko.lakowski had to open his major study 
on Marx with the apparently insignificant but loaded 
phrase, that, "Karl Marx was a German phi 1osopher. "68
"Is it Simple to be a Marxist in Philosophy” , in,
s2£?hy_and the Spontaneous Ph i 1 osophy of the_Sc i ent i s t s ,
J'. Marx_Against_t h e M a r x i s t s , p. 30
8̂. Leszek Kolakowski, Ma in_Cur r ent s_of __Mar xi sm Vol I, p.l
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CHAPTER 5
HISTORICAL MATERIALISM: A POLEMICAL EXPOSITION
In this chapter we test and demonstrate the validity 
of the claim that history, according to Marx, is a 
process without a Subject, through a systematic and 
critical reconstruction of M a r x ’s theory of history. 
This reconstruction of M a r x ’s theory of history is being 
done with the view to critically comparing it against 
the theory of history which Latin American theology of 
liberation posits. This should lead to an excavation of 
the epistemologica1 presuppositions and conceptual 
determinants of a work like Miranda’s and, at the same 
time set a conceptual contrast between historical 
materialism and a philosophy of history which is 
proclaimed by Gustavo Guttierrez and liberation theology 
in general, after him (See Chapter 10 below).
Our supreme aim and concern is to crystallise the 
epistemological uniqueness of M a r x ’s thought for 
purposes of contrasting it against that emerging from 
liberation theology. The eventual intention, therefore, 
is to compare and contrast Marx’s theory of the 
vicissitudes of socio-historical change and development
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with that of liberation theology in general, and in 
specific aspects with that of Mirada's. The rate of the 
compatibility or otherwise of the two should 
substantiate our view that the employment of Marxist 
philosophy presents epistemological complications, which 
Miranda and other liberation theologians have taken for 
granted.
In line with our subscription to the view that from 
1845, signified bjr the scribblings of the Theses_on 
Feuerbach, M a r x ’s thought assumed a radically new 
epistemological framework, which negates that held 
until then, and which distinguishes itself as being a
composite result of his materialisation of Hegel’s
dialectic, we shall draw our construction of his theory
from works dating from after the Theses,, In
justification of this, we refer to our earlier account 
of the dynamic transformation Marx progressively 
underwent in his thinking between 1842 and 1846.
5 . 1 The_Epistemological Primacy of Marxjs Theory_of
History^
Historical-materialism , Karl M a r x ’s theoretical
system, is essentially an account of history, wherein 
’history" is conceived of in a broadened meaning which 
seeks to encapsulate a deliberate emphasis on the
material primacy of existence. It is primarily a
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demonstrative polemic of the epistemological framework 
which Marx worked out in the course of his intellectual 
development. As such, a Marxist theory of history is 
essentially a demonstration of the philosophic rubric 
of a dialectical materialism. As a theory of history it 
is preceded by a radical discovery of a critical 
epistemo1o g y . This critical epistemology is crytically
announced in the Theses on_Feuerbach; and a theory of
history which eventuates out of this, is summarised in
the Preface_to_"The_Critique_of_Po1itical_Economy.
The Theses on Feuerbach, are an epistemological
introduction of this new philosophyl discovered by 
Marx, wherein in criticising Feuerbach Marx is 
criticising the optics, as it were, he had been using in 
trying to make Hegel’s philosophy sensitive to socio- 
historical reality. They are a prolegomena to a 
systematic process which culminates with M a r x ’s self-
devotion in early 1850 to work out a critique of
political economy as the raison__dj_etre and basic
content of this "philosophy". This "philosophy", it is 
important to note - if at all it is to be conceived of 
as a Philosophy - is a historico-phi1osophica1 theory. 
This we assert in line with Louis Althusser’s
interpretation of M a r x ’s identification of ideology
A philosophy which, as Thesis XI declares, was n
lntending to remain a philosophy in the traditional sense of t 
V'0rd : "The philosophers have only interpreted the world
various ways; the point is to change it." K. Marx, F. Engel 
-2iIected_Works . Vol. 5, p. 4
2
1984 ) ,
with a form of cognition which is overly vulnerable to 
class manipulation, and the fact of "science" or Theory 
as being a correlative of this2. (Note that, in working 
on a critique of Political Economy, before he published 
what became the first volume of Capital, Marx had since 
1862 researched and written a mass of data on purely 
technical economic observations. This was published 
after his death as the second and third volumes of 
Capital). As a theory, historical materialism is not 
merely a Philosophy of history where the process of 
history is reflected upon, but the very concept of 
"history” itself undergoes a metamorphosis. In the 
crucible of Marxist analysis it is transformed from 
meaning a reflection on events, time and actors, to a 
clinical analysis (not reflection) on the process of the 
totality of social reality. It is an establishment of 
the "first principle" or laws of the processes of being, 
and an adoption of this as a basis for explaining 
whatever is sensually observed. Here economics, 
politics, morality, and the past as well as the present 
of human communities, are all subsumed into a singular 
theoretical analysis which weaves a common connection 
and meaning amongst all of these.
This analysis as well as a search and establishment 
°f meaning leaves a deposit of what, excusably, may be
• See, L. Althusser. Essays_in_Ideology, (London: New Left,
§d_passim
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called a Marxist philosophy - a dialectico-historical 
materialism . In this way, as we have already hinted, 
it is at the same time a reworking of the notion of 
Philosophy itself. It is now no longer an interpretation 
of the world in various ways, but a theory on how the 
world (Nature in its totality) is changing and is to be 
changed. The form and system of this new "philosophy" is 
epitomised by the quality and nature of the work, 
Capital. This is what led Althusser into spotting the 
development of a transition from philosophy which is
identified with ideology to science as being what
principally- characterises Marxism, and what
substantiates his contention that it is only in Capital 
that the anti-Feuerbachian epistemological break
finally becomes apparent3.
Writing in 1914, Lenin perceptively provided the
following model of the problematic which formed the
schema of M a r x ’s development of a historical-
mat erialism:
People make their own history; but what
determines their motives, that is, the motives 
of people in the mass; what gives rise to the 
clash of conflicting ideas and endeavours; what 
is the sum total of all these clashes among the 
whole mass of human societies; what are the 
objective conditions of the production of the 
material means of life that form the basis of 
all the historical activity of man; what is the 
law of the development of these conditions? - to 
all these questions Marx directed attention,
pointing out the way to a scientific study of
, C- Althusser. Lenin__and_Phi1osophyx_and_Other_Essays.
London: New Left, 1971), p.71
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history as a unified and true-to-law process 
despite its being extremely variegated and 
contradictory. "4
5.2. ON HISTORICAL MATERIALISM
5.2.1. Introduction
Marx’s theory of history, which ipso facto, is an
outline of what can exclusively be labelled a Marxist 
philosophy is incidentally encapsulated in the summary 
Mar?: gives in "Preface to the Cr i t i gue_of _Po 1 i t i cal
Economy" (1859)5. This was written as a wri te-up6 for 
the publication of the results of a project which Marx 
had started on "The Critique of Political Economy"7.
4. "The Teachings of Karl Marx", in, _Handbpok_of 
Marxism (London: Victor Gollancz, 1935), p.545
5. David McLellan, e d . , Karl Marxi_Selected Writings, pp.
388-390 ..
6. See, Arthur A. Prinz, "Background and Ulterior Motive
of Marx’s ’Preface’ of 1859", _Jpurnal_of the_History of_ Ideas,
Vol. XXX, 1969, p .  437-450.
7. Marx wrote the Qritique_of_Political„Economy in 
1859 with the intention of having it as a summary and
Side de mémoire for the project on his studies on
Political Economy which he had been attempting to 
concentrate on since the early 1850’s. The fruits of 
this appeared in 1857/59 with his writing of the post­
humously published Qytlines of_Political Economy
(Grundrisse), which followed by work in 1862-3 which 
also was posthumously published as Theories_of_Surplus 
Value_ (Capital Vol IV); After this was research during 
1963-4 on the technicalities of circulation of capital 
and the roots of economic crises, which was also 
edited and published after his death by Frederick 
Engels in 1885 as Capi tal_VpI_^_H , and on some work on 
Price fixation and profit in Capitalism which was edited 
with the latter but appeared in 1887 as Capital_VolJ_
III- The pinnacle of the entire project became the
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For reasons of the logical expediency of our
presentation, we shall use this as the basic text on
which we shall base our critical reconstruction of
historical materialism. This decision is legitimised by
a unanimity, articulated by John Plamenatz, that the
propositions in the Preface, have "always, since that
time, been treated as the classic formulation of
historical materialism"8. All other writings of Marx
shall be cited as elucidations to this text. For this
reason we shall take the license of making the
following extensive reproduction of the pertinent part
of this Preface (for easy reference we have added verse
indications between propositions that can be cited and
expounded as independent propositions):
[l] In the social production of life, men enter 
into definite relations that are indispensable 
and independent of their will, relations of 
production which correspond to a definite stage 
of development of their material productive 
forces. [2] The sum total of these relations of 
production constitutes the economic structure of 
society, the real basis on which rises a legal 
and political superstructure, and to which 
correspond definite forms of social
consciousness. [3] The mode of production of 
material life conditions the social, political 
and intellectual life process in general. [4] It
Publication, by Marx himself, in 1867 of Das_Kapitalp
likltik der Do lit i s chen Qekonomie (Capital I). First
English translation, based on M a r x ’s 3rd German edition 
°f the latter ( 1883) , by, Samuel Moore and Edward 
Aveiing, under1 the editorship of Engels published in 
1887, as Capitalp A  Critical Analysis_of_Capitalist
Product ion.
8. Quoted in, Arthur M. Prinz, Op_cit., p.437. See 
also , V .I Lenin, "The Teachings of Karl Marx", in 
Handbook of Marxism, 1935, p. 543; G.A Cohen, _Karl
Mar 5is_Theory o f H i s t o r y p  A_Defence (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1978)
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i s no I t he connciousness of men that determines 
their being, but, on the contrary, their social 
being that determines their consciousness. [5] 
At a certain stage of their development, the 
material productive forces of society come into 
conflict with the existing relations of 
production, or - what is but a legal expression 
for the same thing - with the property relations 
within which they have been at work hitherto. 
[6] From forms of development of the productive 
forces these relations turn into fetters. Then 
begins an epoch of social revolution. [7] With 
the change of the economic foundation the entire 
immense superstructure is more or less rapidly 
transformed. [8] In considering such
transformations, a distinction should always be 
made between the material transformation of the 
economic conditions of production, which can be 
determined with the precision of natural
science, and the legal, political, religious, 
aesthetic or philosophic - in short, ideological 
forms in which men become conscious of this 
conflict and fight it out. [9] Just as our 
opinion of an individual is not based on what he 
thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a 
period of transformation by its own
consciousness; on the contrary, this
consciousness must be explained rather from the 
contradictions of material life, from the 
existing conflict between the social productive 
forces and the relations of production. [10] No 
social formation ever perishes before all the 
productive forces for which there is room in it 
have developed; and new, higher relations of 
production never appear before the material 
conditions of their existence have matured in 
the womb of the old society itself. [11]
Therefore mankind always sets itself only such 
tasks as it can solve; since, looking at the
matter more closely, it will always be found 
that the task itself arises only when the
material conditions for its solution already 
exists or are at least in the process of 
formation.[12] In broad outlines, Asiatic,
ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of 
production can be designated as progressive 
epochs in the economic formation of society. 
[13] The bourgeois relations of production are 
the last antagonistic form of the social
process of production - antagonistic not in the 
sense of individual antagonism, but of one 
arising from the social conditions of life of 
the individuals; [14] at the same time, the 
productive forces developing in the womb of
bourgeois society create the material
conditions for the solution of the antagonism.
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[15] This social formation brings, therefore,
the prehistory of human society to a close."9
An outstanding feature of historical materialism as 
presented above, is that history, in which human 
individuals certainly are a factor, moves on out of its 
own, and forms successive concrete patterns of social 
relationships, without any primary dependence on the 
contribution or volition of a human community (Verse 1, 
above). This movement is facilitated by changes in
produclive__forces10 which in the process of their 
occurrence assume their own independent dynamic which in 
the process enhances and leads to the growth of the 
human beings capacity to produce their subsistence. This 
growth in the capacity to produce creates a conflict
with existing relations of production, thereby inducing
an inauguration of a new mode of production, a new 
socio-historica1 epoch. This new mode of production, 
then appears with its own corresponding pattern of
9- K, Marx, F. Engels, Selected Works. Vol. I (Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1935), pp. 361-2.
10- By productive_forces which we will use interchangeabls 
T1^'. forces of production, we understand: quantifiable
”c niques that emerge in the invention of tools, machines as 
'■C-1 1 as the development productive skills and systems (e.| 
communications) which have an impact on industry. In The 
-~fflPjynist_Mani f esto , Marx and Engels, explicitly refers to this, 
add historical events of scientific advance, such as, "the 
scoverj of America, [and] the rounding of the Cape" as dynamics 
ich resulted in the transition from the Feudal mode of 
I'1 oduction to the Capitalist one. Cf . Emile Burns, ed. , Handbook 
2l_Marxism , p. 24
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social relational 1 and state of productive forces, which 
are derived from the past stage or mode of production, 
and which in turn will be developed and eventually 
induce a further stage of development, a new mode of 
production. Upon this mode of production, then emerges a 
corresponding infrastructure of political, juridical, 
and religious institutions. History, thus, is a 
successive movement from one mode of production to the 
other, wherein in each mode of production there is a 
determinant of the nature of a society that emerges. In 
other words, history is a progressive series of forms of 
collective social being, which being is determined by 
the circumstances of the material production of life.
The ci'ucial and only motor of this movement of 
history is the inexorable emergence of the clash 
between the development of productive forces and the 
given societal status quo (relations of production) 
within a given mode of production. For Marx, it is this 
conflict - where the productive relations are no longer 
forms of the development of productive forces but their 
inhibition - which constitutes the locus of a "social
11- Social relations is here used as synonymous to
Jclations of production” or production_relations. According to 
tflis Perspective, society is perceived as primarily organised 
uccording to the anatagonistic classes which emerge from their 
Position in the process of social economic production. It has 
"ays been a series of dialectic correlates of, "Freeman and 
“! ave' Patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and 
Journeyman, [capitalist and worker], in a word, oppresser and 
oppressed. Communist Manifesto, in Emile Burns e d ., Handbook_of 
sS££±sm, p. 2 3
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revolution” (Verses 5-8, above). This conflict
eventuates into the inauguration of a new stage of
development of mode of production, as. demonstrably, it
had happened with the movement from the Asiatic, up to
the present capitalist stage. This is illustrated in
The Communist Manfesto (1848) in relation to the
development of Capitalism from its precedent epoch:
The means of production and of exchange, on 
whose foundation the bourgeoisie built itself 
up, were generated in feudal society. At a 
certain stage in the development of these means 
of production and of exchange, the conditions 
under which feudal society produced and 
exchanged, the feudal organisation of
agriculture and manufacturing industry, in one 
word, the feudal relations of property became no 
longer compatible with the already developed 
productive forces; they became so many fetters.
They had to be burst asunder; they were burst 
asunder. Into their place stepped free 
competition, accompanied by a social and 
political constitution adapted to it, and by the 
economical and political sway of the bourgeois 
class.12
Where does this leave the human factor ? What about 
the role of the "class struggle" and the proletariat as 
a collective class of human beings? This is the crucial 
question in our polemics against humanistic Marxism.
5.2.2. The_Mode_of_ the_Partiçipation_of_the Human_Being
in_History
Clearly, M a r x ’s philosophy of history is not merely
a view that "history is fundamentally, the growth of
12. Handbook_of.Marxism, p. 28
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human productive power, and [that] forms of society 
rise and fall as they enable or impede that growth", as 
G.A Cohen remarksl3. It is this, and more: the
fundamental view is that the growth of human productive
power - which Cohen perceives as the motive force of 
history without, defectively, emphasising the fact of 
the conflict this has to engage in with relations of 
production - is taking place autonomously, independent 
of human conscious control. The human being has no 
direct or agitational role towards the creation of a 
conflict between productive forces and relations of
product ion.
The definition of the relationship between the human 
person and the development of productive forces or 
means of production, is what constitutes the central 
thesis of The_German_J. deol ogy . It is due to this reason
that The  Ih§olo£2I stands as the very
foundational stage of the structure of the theory of a 
materialist conception of history . There, inter_alia, 
Marx with Frederick Engels, seminally introduced the 
materialistic doctrine that, "by producing their means 
of subsistence men are directly producing their 
material life"14, and that, "the language of
Politics, law, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc, of 
a people . . . is conditioned by a definite development
°i their productive forces and of the intercourse
13, har 1 _Mgrx^s_Theory_of _historyj__A_Def ence , p.x
lhe_German_Ideology, Col 1ected_Works, V o l .5, p.31
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corresponding to these, up to its furtherest forms"15
Even the activity of a production of the means of
subsistence, which is definitional of the human
person's social being. as we show below, is not
intiated on his own terms nor is it entirely controlled
by him. For "the way in which [people] produce their
means of subsistence depends first of all on the nature
of the means of subsistence they actually find in
existence"16. To the human being, the mode of
production (the socio-historical epoch into which he or
she is born), and a complex of productive relations that
issue out of it, including the ideological
superstructure, is historically pre-given. Further, it
is not pre-given in the passive sense, rather, it
continues to determine his entire being:
In the social production of life, men enter 
into definite relations that are indispensable
and independent of ±heir__will, relations of
production which correspond to a definite stage 
of development of their material productive 
forces . . . the mode of production of material
life conditions the social, political and
intellectual life process in general. It is not 
the consciousness of men that determines their 
being, but, on the contrary, their social being 
that determines their consciouness" (Preface, 
Verses, 1,3,4 above) (own emphasis)
The only role of the human person in this process is 
that of a producer who is conditioned by the mode of 
Production he finds. And insofar as we are here
15. Ibid., p.36
! 6 . Loc cit.. .
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dealing with history - the only arena of human
existence - this means that what is definitional of the 
human being, according to Marx, in The_German_IdeologY, 
is that he produces his means of subsistence, and
towards this goal he develop tools and means which 
subject and model nature to the satisfaction of his own 
needs. "Men" Marx conceded, "can be distinguished from 
animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else” , 
but continued to make his point that, ". . . they
themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals 
as soon as they begin to produce their means of 
subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their 
physical [social?] organisation. By producing their 
means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their 
rnaterial 1 i f e " 1 7 .
As a perpetual "new-comer", onto to the stage of
history, the human being continues to built on and 
within the given mode of production, further producing 
his material life and in the process producing himself 
insofar as what he is, is conditioned by the material 
base to which he is contributing. This is a cyclic 
movement in which man enters conditioned, and drops out 
when he has produced his means of subsistence, thus 
contributing to the development of forces of 
Production, leading to the need of a new social 
formation, of which his progeny will be part, again
17• Gq 11e c t e d W o r k s , Vol 5, p.31
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only as a preconditioned ensemble of the antagonistic 
production relations of this spiral of history.
] a a letter to Pavel V. Annenkov, dated 28 December
1846, in which Marx discusses his view of Pierre
Proudhon ' s work , Phi losophie___de J,a Misere , Marx
presented the following apt summary of what we present 
above:
. Is man free to choose this or that form
of society? By no means. If you assume a given 
stage of development in production, commerce or 
consumption, you will have a corresponding form 
of social constitution, a corresponding
organisation, whether of the family, of the
estates or of the classes - in a word, a
corresponding civil society. . . Needless to
say, man is not free to choose his_productive 
forces - upon which his whole history is based 
- for every productive force is an acquired 
force, the product of previous activity. Thus
the productive forces are the result of m a n ’s 
practical energy, but that energy is in turn 
circumscribed by the conditions in which man is 
placed by the productive forces already 
acquired, by the form of society which exists
before him, which he does not create, which is 
the product of the preceding generation 
his material relations form the basis of all 
his relations. These material relations are but 
the necessary forms in which his material and 
individual activity is realised.18
Here Marx makes a clear emphasis on the determining 
force of economic relations on the social history of 
the human race, and a statement on how the individual 
human person is unconsciouly participating in this
Process which in effect is a process of his self­
creation. In The_German__Ideology, the same was stated,
(8. Collected_Works, Vol. 38, p.96
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in a critical differentiation from the view of the Left
Hegelians, in particular Bruno Bauer:
History does not end by being resolved into 
’self-consciousness’, but that each stage 
contains a material result, a sum of productive 
forces, a historically created relation to 
nature and of individuals to one another, which 
is handed down to each generation from its 
predecessor: a mass of productive forces,
capital funds and circumstances, which on the 
one hand is indeed modified by the new 
generation, but on the other also prescribes for 
it its conditions of life and gives it a 
definite development, a special character. It 
shows that circumstances make men just as much 
as men make circumstances.19
For Marx, what Feuerbach and others had identified as 
the "essence of man", and searched for in nebulous and 
idealistic abstractions, is for him the sum of these 
productive forces20. The "essence" of human being is 
the human person’s productive activity - labour, 
whereby, unconsciously, he in turn is producing his 
ultimate nature. This aspect, originally mooted in 1846
in Thê German Ideology is what forms the foundational
motif of Capital. There, in a trenchant exposure of how 
the capitalist mode of production misappropriates what 
is in fact défini tonal of being human, it is explained 
that ,
Labour is, in the first place, a process in 
which man and Nature participate, and in which 
man of his own accord starts, regulates , and 
controls LNB, within the constraints provided 
by the mode of production he finds in 
existence] the material re-actions between
19. ColIeçted_Works, Vol 5, p.54 
20• Loc. cit.,
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himself and Nature . . . in order to
appropriate Nature’s productions in a form 
adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the 
external world and changing it, he at the same 
time changes his own nature. He develops his 
slumbering powers and compels them to act in 
obedience to his sway.21
However - which is what introduces the element of the
primacy of the process of a development of productive 
forces insofar as this is the locus of the conditioned
sell-production of human nature Marx hastens to add
No sooner does labour undergo the least
development, than it requires specially
prepared instruments . . . The use and
fabrication of instruments of labour,
although existing in a germ among certain
species of animals, is especially
characteristic of the human labour-process, and 
Franklin, therefore, correctly defines man as a 
1 2 2 1_muking_animai . . .  It is not the article 
made, but how they are made, and by what 
instruments, that enables us to distinguish 
different economic epochs. Instruments of labour 
not only supply a standard of the degree of 
development to which human labour has attained, 
but they are also indicators of the social 
conditions under which labour is carried on."22
This view drasticaly challenges the speculative
principle of Rene Descartes’ cogito., ergo sum, and
replace:; it wi th iaboroj. ergo_sum, wherein in labour
human persons reproduces themselves; and where this 
self-reproduction is predetermined by the tools they 
already find in existence. The human being does not 
have much say in his self-production. History, is a 
process of the self-development of the human person, a
21. K. Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, pp. 173
22. Ibid., pp .  175,176
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process in which ho has no authority
5.2.3. On the_Class_Struggle_and_Revolution
In the system of M a r x ’s theory, the issue of class, 
in emphasis, and the reality of the "class struggle" is 
uniquely, and in some sense exclusively, concentrated on 
Iho analysis of the capitalist stage of history. Hence 
the factor of the working class or proletarians, and its
role. is specially introduced in  The Communis!
Manifesto, where a programmatic analysis of the
movement from capitalism to the succeeding epoch of 
communism is made. Marx and Engels viewed capitalism 
as being unique from the preceding historical epochs in 
that, in it the estrangement in production relations, 
between the owners of the means of production and the 
worker is coagulated in an unprecedented manner into two 
sharply rival classes:
The history of all hitherto existing society
as the history of class struggles . . . Our
epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, 
however, this distinctive feature: it has
simplified the class antagonisms. Society as a
whole is more and more splitting up into two
great hostile camps, into two great classes 
directly facing each other - bourgeoisie and 
proletariat.23
Unlike other past stages, here, the further movement, 
to the next and "final stage", the communist one, can 
°nly take place through a visible struggle between the
XheC o m m u n i s t  Manifesto, in, Emile Burns e d . Handbook
o n M a r x i s m , p.23
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working clans and the c a p i t a l i s t s . But this last 
statement does not appear in M a r x ’s definitional summary 
of historical materialism in the "Preface".
Arthur Prinz explains that Marx was forced to write 
the Preface, as a pre-announcement of a book on "the 
critique of political economy", so that German
publishers who were notoriously intimidated by Prussian 
obnoxious press laws should have the ’feel’ of what he 
wan working on with the hope that one of them might 
offer to publish the work. In doing this he had to omit 
any mention of the specifically "subversive" terms such 
as "class" and the "class struggle". Prinz, therefore, 
argues that the Preface should be read with the 
suspicion that Marx was writing it under the strain of 
not wanting to arouse the suspicion of the Prussian 
censor and that the "class struggle" should be taken as 
implied in his outline. We do not agree with this as 
being the reason for the omission of "class struggle” in 
the Preface.
In contradiction of Prinz’s claim, we find that in the 
Pro lace. Marx is intentionally giving a general 
theoretical outline of his conception of history without
24. In his, "The Teachings of Karl Marx" Lenin offers this 
^mPhasis with an amplification that the original proposition of 
anc  ̂ Engels in The_Coinmuni s t _Mani f e s t o that, "the history of 
a hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle", 
”.not entirely correct since the same cannot be said of the 
siatic mode of production. In, Emile Burns.  Handbook_of
JahSism., p,  5 4 5 -6 )
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seeking to bo bogged down on the details of the specific 
features of each epoch or stage of the mode of
production. "Class struggle" is poignantly and
specifically relevant to the dynamics of change from the
capitalist to the communist mode of production. The 
Preface is not an analysis of a particular mode of 
production; it is presentation of a singular postulate 
on the material primacy of history. This is what marks 
the difference between this piece of writing and the
The Communist Manifesto. The latter concentrates
spcritical 1 y on cap] tai ism as the immediate target of 
the programme of action of the Communist League, for 
whom the Manifesto was writ ten25. Hence a paucity of any 
direct introduction of the place of the class struggle, 
in the former.
As we stated above, the emphasis on the class 
struggle, and thus the only theoretical possibility of 
human activity in history as conceived in matérialiste 
terms, is uniquely located in the analysis of
Capitalism, as the Manifesto_ itself states that it is 
within this epoch that class conflicts are most acute.
Yu thus observe that class struggle as understood as 
workers actively acting to bring about the downfall of
Capital i s m , is, strictly speaking, not sui generis, to
historical materialism when the latter is taken as a
25. For further background to the production of The
û̂ifiniUQis t Manifesto , see, David MacLellan , ed . , Kar 1 _Mar xp
-i issted_\vprks^ p. 221
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theory of the entire process of history which begins 
with the Asiatic: mode of production, which mode of
production, admittedly26, had no class
differentiations. Only "class struggle" in the sense of 
the functional note of the existence of differences and 
tensions of group interests — objective contradictions— 
is perennial in this theory. And in its presence as 
such, it is there as category which does not denote a 
preponderance of the actors within this struggle: Thus
concludes the Commmunist_Manifesto its discussion of the 
emergence and role of the industrial workers, the 
proletariat:
The advance of industry, whose involuntary 
promoter is the bourgeoisie, replaces the 
isolation of the labourers, due to competition, 
by their revolutionary combination, due to 
association. The development of modern industry, 
therefore, cuts from under its feet the very 
foundation on which the bourgeoisie produces and 
appropriates products. What the bourgeoisie,
therefore, produces, above all, is its own 
grave diggers. Its fall and the victory of the
proletariat are equally inevitable.27
This does not mean that the activity of "class 
struggle", is excluded or condemned, it is just not put 
forward as the absolute motive force of history. 
Futhermore. it leads us to the question of the
traditional linkage of the class struggle to
revolutionary activity, where theoretica1-humanism
26. See Frederick Enge1s 'reference to the first sentence of
tl‘c j[h<— Cqmmuni s t_Mani f es to , in the 1888 English edition of same. 
n’ ted_Works_lQne_Vo1 ) , p . 35
2"'• In, Se 1 e c t ed_Wo r ks (One Vol ) . p. 46
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won id seek to po i u I to t h i s a s  evidence- of the place of 
human activity in the analysis of offered in historical 
muteria 11s m .
In The German_Ideology, Marx made the very important
point that the determination of all superstructura1
reaLity by the material basis of society extends even
to the determination of the possibilities of a
revolutionary f«5.n h © V V  of one epoch in favour of the
other. Even this - a case where a revolutionary
overthrowing must occur - is not open to determination
by the human actors involved:
Conditions of life, which different generations 
find in existence, determine also whether or not 
the revolutionary convulsion periodically
recurring in history will be strong enough to 
overthrow the basis of everything that exists.
And if these material conditions of a complete 
revolution are not present - namely, on the one 
hand the existing productive forces, on the
other other the formation of a revolutionary 
mass, which revolts not only against separate 
conditions of the existing society', but against 
the existing 'production of life’ itself, the 
total activity’ on which it was based - then it 
is absolutely immaterial for practical
development whether the idea of this revolution 
has been expressed a hundred times already, as 
the history of communism proves.28
In 1859, the same view was repeated :
No social formation ever1 perishes before all 
the productive forces for which there is room 
in it havo; developed; and new, higher relations 
of production never appear before the material 
conditions of their existence have matured in 
the womb of the old society' itself. Therefore 
mankind always sets itself o 1 11 y such tasks as it 
can solve; since, looking at the matter more 
cJosely , it will always be found that the task
■ L’cl Iected_Works . Yol 5, p. 54
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itself arises only when the material conditions 
for its solution already exists or are at least
in tin. process of formation. (Pref ace , Verses,
I 0 , J.l, above )
In the same vein, in addressing the issue of the
manner' of the supersession of the present epoch, The
Com§unis j_ MilDii.cc to , remarkably ex si 1 ent io on
conscious revolutionary activity, states that,
Modern bourgeois society with its relations of 
production, of exchange and property, a society 
that has conjured up such gigantic means of 
production and of exchange, is like a sorcerer 
who is no longer able to control the powers of 
the nether world whom he has called up by his 
spells . . . the weapons with which the
bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are
now turned against the bourgeoisie itself. But
not only has the bourgeoisie forged weapons
that bring death to itself; it has also called
into existence the men who are to wield those
weapons - the modern working class -the
pPi) i e r.ar ianc . 29
A number of vital points stand out of this last
passage. The first to note, is that this is the 
paragraph where the proletariat are introduced for the 
first time into the analysis and programme of the
Manifesto. And this, only about one-fourth into the
entire Manifesto - after the description of the
essentially autonomous nature of historical
development. Even here they are introduced as a linkage 
to the fact that the capitalist system is busy bringing 
"death to itself". If is not the working class that is 
to kill Capitalism. On the contrary, they are brought 
into being by Capitalism itself, as one of the "weapons” 
which Capitalism has generated against itself. In
In, Handbook_of _Mar xi sm , p.30
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acid i t .1 on , "in proportion as the bourgeoisie, i.e,
capital, is developed, in the same proportion is the
proletariat., the modern working class, de ve 1 oped ” 3 0 .
They are part of the automatic machinery of a self-
super s e s s j on oi an epoch. They are constituents of the
category of "productive relations” which gets into
conflict with productive forces and thereby inducing a
social revolution. In a strictly theoretical sense their
conscious se1f-constitut ion as a revolutionary mass is
dispensable to the process of history. The following
statement from the Manifesto, communicates this
impression better :
If the proletariat during its contest with the
bourgeoisie is compelled^___by the force of
circumstances, to organise itself into a class; 
if, by means of a revolution it makes itself the 
ruling class, and as such sweeps away by force 
the old conditions, then it will, along with 
these conditions, have swept away the conditions 
for the existence of class antagonisms and of 
classes generally, and will thereby have 
abolished its own supremacy as a class.31(own 
emphasis )
Again, as to the class-consciousness that makes the 
class struggle possible, Marx maintained that this
"consciousnes, must be explained . . . from the
contradictions of material life, from the existing 
conflict between the social productive forces and the 
relations of production" (V.8, above). And quickly adds
33. hoc. c i t .
31• Op . c i t . , p .4 6
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that " • new higher relations of production never
appear before the material conditions of their
existence have matured in the womb of the old society 
itself" (v.9). In other words, even in Capitalism, the 
struggle of the proletariat against bourgeois
exploitation and oppression can never succeed until
such time that the capitalist system has developed up 
to a certain level which radicalises the conflict
between productive forces and the existing relations 
of production (v.5,6). All this is largely outside the 
will and initiative of the individual. The entire 
process takes place of itself under the governance of
Laws akin to those operative in Natural history. This
Marx reiterated in the 1867 preface to Capital,
here individuals are dealt with only
insofar as they are personifications of
economic categories, embodiments of particular 
c1ass-re1 a tions and c1 ass-interests . My
standpoint, from which the evolution of the
economic formation of society is viewed as a 
process of natural history, can less than any 
other make the individual responsible for
relations whose creature he socially remains, 
however much he may subjectively raise himself
above them.32
In the Afterword to the Second German edition of 
Capital (1873) , Marx quotes approvingly, and at length, 
from a review article of the Russian edition of Capital 
which was published in the European_Messenger (May
1872). Concentrating on the method of Marx’s work, the 
writer observed:
32 • -Capital Vo1. I , p. 19
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Marx treats the social movement as a process of 
natural history, governed by laws not only 
independent of human will, consciousness and
intelligence, but rather, on the contrary,
determining that will, consciousness and 
intelligence . . . in his opinion every
historical period has laws of its own . . . as
soon as society has outlived a given period of
development, and is passing over from one given
stage to the another, it begins to be subject
also to other laws. In a word, economic life
offers us a phenomenon analogous to the history
ol evolution in other branches of biology ,
.33
5.3. CONCLUSION
In the foregoing we have provided a systematic
reconstruction of the structure of M a r x ’s
"philosophy", concentrating on pointing out the fact of 
the epistemological shift that Marx undergoes since 
after 1845, and as this is primarily demonstrated in his 
theory of history. According to our finding, the role of 
the human person, as an individual and as a member of a 
social collective, which in the capitalist stage, 
crystalises itself as a class in antagonism to some
other class, is theoretically dispensable to the process 
of history as Marx viewed it. However, on the other 
hand, history is seen as, fundamentally, being a process 
of human self-development through the unavoidable 
Participation in the labour process. Even as a process, 
of human self-development, it is a process which is 
governed by laws which the human person has no control 
over, but can only learn to understand and harmonise his
33 • Ibid. , p . 27,
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life accordingly34
It is also significant to note that the element of 
the autonomy and "auto-genesis" which emerges in the 
foregoing is a theoretical by-product of Marx’s
counter-emphasis against Hegel’s view of the dialectic, 
where in Hegel, the generation by a "thesis" of its 
negative is explained in terms of a logical necessity 
which refuses to name the actual resolution of this 
self-actualisation of the Idea in time and space, which 
we discussed in our previous chapter.
We proceed in the following chapter to expose this 
interpretation of historica1-materia1ism to Miranda’s 
criticism. A comparison with liberation theology in 
general, is reserved for chapter 10.
jj ■ Frederick Engels. Introduction__ ±o__IDial eç t i cs__of
~yr §_, in, Selected_Works (One Vol.), p. 359, 350
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CHAPTER 6
THE DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM OF M A R X ’S THEORY OF HISTORY: 
AN APPRAISAL OF MIRANDA’S REFUTATIONS
6.1. INTRODUCTION.
According to Karl Marx, historical development occurs 
independent of the role of the human being as Subject, 
it is an autonomous process of the resolution of the 
dynam ics of the interaction of elements of economic
production as a social process. This attests the
preconditioning power of the mechanism of the process 
of the acquisition of subsistence by the human person on 
his social self-determination. These assertions which 
we established in our disquisition thus far, constitute
what J. p. Miranda dismissively calls "economic
determinism"1. As his work reveals, his critical
consideration of this is what forms the basis and 
motivation of his overall disputation against what he
perceives as being malicious anti-humanist formulations 
°f the thought of Karl Marx.
The pivotal point of his dispute with this "economic
1- Marx_Against_ the_Marxists., p. 69
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determinism", which he understands as a theory holding 
that, "the laws governing economic reality impose
determinism on the actions of human beings"2, is the
implications this has for human freedom. This stems 
from his belief that "any good materialist is logically 
obliged to deny human freedom"3. To justify his 
suspicion, he quotes Lenin’s statement that, "the idea 
of determinism maintains the obligatory nature of human 
actions and rejects the fictitiousness of free will"4.
In summary, the counter-thesis in Miranda’s argument, 
stated in his own words is that, when faithfully
interpreted, Marxism should be understood as teaching
that :
It is we human beings who make history for 
ourselves. Incontrovertible laws exist only for 
nature, for plants and animals; and even here 
they exist only insofar as human beings do not 
intervene to alter them and thus turn them into 
h i s t o r y 5
Proceeding to refute this "materialism", with the 
prime intention of establishing the paramountcy of the 
notion of human freedom in M a r x ’s system, he embarks on 
a reinterpretation of Marxism which seeks to recast the 
materialist centrality of M a r x ’s theory into a form
2 ' Ibid., p.52
3• Loc. cit.
 ̂• From, Lenin, Sochinenia, 4th ed., 1:456, Cited in, ibid.
P. 53 --------------
5' Op . cit., p. 55
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which is accomodat ive of humanismG. In this chapter we 
evaluate this reformulation, and go further to consider 
some of the theoretical problems which an "anti­
humanist" interpretation of historical materialism
presents to revolutionary praxis. Our discussion in 
Chapter 4 of Miranda’s assertion that history is a 
process which has its motive force the will of the human 
individual, who ipso_facto is its Subject, in a certain 
sense, introduced his systematic criticism of the 
presentation and interpretation of Marx’s theory of 
history, which we presented in the foregoing chapter. 
Here we respond to his reactions against the philosophic 
"thread" which weaves this anti-humanistic import of 
dialectico-historical materialism.
The bulk of our discussion focuses on the way in which 
Miranda has failed to note and recognise Marx’s tendency 
of subjecting the theoretical tools and objects of his 
analysis to a conceptual mutation which suits the 
conclusions he reaches, and how this results in his
misinterpretation of the materialism which Marxist 
theory propounds. Examples of this are the new meaning
Marx gave to "ideology" in The German Ideology; the
redefinition of Philosophy, announced in Theses On
feuerbach; the broadened and deepened meaning given to
6. Besides Miranda, Juan Luis Segundo also engages
in the same task in his Faith_and jdeo 1 ogi e s_jpp_L_ 200-
2191 . Segundo, however, concentrates on developing the 
Proposition of the autonomy of ideology from 
determination by the material mode of production.
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"history" in the formulation of historical materialism; 
and, the unique meaning which the concept "materialism" 
itself assumes in this context.
What is pertinent at this stage of our discussion, is 
how Miranda has failed to recognise this trend in 
respect to M a r x ’s transformation of the meaning of the 
category "the economic” , or the discipline of Economics 
itself, as well as, "determinism” .
in Marx's thought system, the concept "determinism", 
when used in relation to the dynamics of social
production is used with the specific philosophical
consciousness which adumbrates the change in meaning 
like the one "materialism" undergoes when used in 
relation to the new meaning of the "historical" in
historical materialism. As we show below, this is not a 
proposition of "determinism" as conceived in the
empiricist context of a reflection on the relationship 
between "cause and effect"; instead, it is "determinism" 
as emanating from the context of Hegelian philosophy, 
where the epistemo1ogical quest for unity has introduced 
the idea of the mutual effect between opposites, as well 
as , between Subject and Object, i.e, dialectics.
We begin our appraisal of Miranda’s refutation of
economic determinism" at this point.
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6.2. THE UNIQUENESS ON THE MEANING OF THE MODAL
CONCEPTS OF M A R X ’S THEORY
6.2.1. DETERMINISM_IN_POLITICAL_ECONOMY
Miranda argues that "Marx ascribed determinism to 
bourgeois theoreticians, and that he himself regarded 
human beings as free no matter what mode of production 
may be in"7. This is the meaning he attaches to Marx’s 
demonstration of how traditionally, economists such as 
Adam Smith have tended to explain the workings of the 
(capitalist) economic system in a manner which gives an 
impression that a given economic system has a sovereign 
inner-law of its own which uncontrollably governs the 
functionings of the economic process.
Here we agree with Miranda that there is as part of 
Marx's philosophical project this critique of a claim of 
the existence and activity of a law in economics.
However, what we will point out is the extent to which 
Miranda has misunderstood the actual object of Marx’s 
criticism, and the defective implication this has for 
the construction of his critique of what he calls 
economic determinism".
Contrary to Miranda’s understanding of this critique 
by Marx as being a critique of any notion of a law which
7 • Op. cit., p.  60
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conocrj ptc and marginalises human volition in history, 
we maintain, that this is exclusively a fundamental 
criticism of the methodology of the classical
Political Economy of the economists of capitalism who 
Marx had devoted himself to studying during 1844 and
during his work on Contribution to the Crtique_of
Political Economy (1859) . M a r x ’s objective was to
expose the tendency of the owners of capital to ascribe 
what they are actually responsible for, to some 
assumedly uncontrollable laws of economics, thereby 
expecting to be absolved of responsibility for the 
crises which are generated by the capitalist system 
i i. s e 1 f .
For instance, in Capital_l.il he systematically argues 
in contradiction to the analyses of David Ricardo and 
Adam Smith that even apparently "complex" phenomena such 
as the occurence of unemployments and over-production9 
are not the results of some supra-human and omnipotent
8- Capital, I, p. 594:
After Political Economy has demonstrated the 
constant production of a relative surplus- 
population of labourers to be a necessity of 
capitalistic accumulation, she very aptly, in 
the guise of an old maid, puts in the mouth her 
’beau ideal’ of a capitalist the following words 
addressed to those supernumeraries thrown on the 
streets by their own creation of additional 
capital: ’We manufacturers do what we can for
you. whilst we are increasing that capital on 
which you must subsist, and you must do the rest 
by accomodating your numbers to the means of 
susbsistence".
9- Ibid. p.  543
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iavv , but resu 1 t o  ot u socio-economic system which is 
consciously manipulated by those who benefit from it by
inducing these crises
In Tb§ Civil War in France, written in April 1871
during the period of the difficult experiences of the
Paris Commune, Marx wrote,
A great lot of shops and factories have been 
closed in Paris, their owners having run away.
This is the old method of the industrial
capitalists, who consider themselves entitled
’by the spontaneous action of the_laws_of
PQIilica1_economyi not only to make a profit 
out of labour, as the condition of labour, but 
to stop it altogether and throw the workmen on 
the pavement - to produce an artificial crisis 
whenever a victorious revolution threatens the
’order’ of their ’system’.10 (own emphasis)
Miranda cites the same passagell and uses to buttress 
his argument while failing to note that, in fact, Marx 
is derisively quoting (the sentence we have underlined) 
from a rival source. He mistakes this critique of
bourgeois Political Economy as being references to the 
general self-working of the process of the inauguration 
of the various modes of production, and as being proof 
of Marx’s rejection of a notion of humanly 
uncontrollable laws operating in historyl2.
Marx, however, is very clear in this regard. He makes
10 ' -Sollected_Works__Vo 1 1 7 , p. 528
11 • O p . cit. , p . 54
12. Miranda, op_cit , P P • 52-56
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a clear distinction between laws operative within a 
particular mode of production and the general law of
his tor i ca'i development . In this instance, he is
critiquing the particular laws of capitalist
production; naj , he is exposing how capitalist 
industrialists armed by their theoreticians, construct 
and use the fact of the existence of these laws as an 
externalised sovereign phenomenon and an absolute 
necessity which they can arbitrarily refer to as an 
excuse and instrument for their exploitation and 
miserisation of the working class.
As a matter of fact, while analysing the relationship
between population increase and the employment of labour
in capitalism, Marx explicatively added:
in fact, every special historic mode of 
production has its own special laws,
historically valid within its limits alone.13
The problem for Marx, or rather his dispute with 
bourgeois economists, to be precise, is not a 
recognition of an existence of these laws or inner-law; 
instead, it is how the identification of the existence 
of this law, by virtue of the fact that it is a
theoretic product of capitalistic economics, is
essentially serving a negative social value because of 
the manner that it is used in bourgeois political 
economy. Furthermore, he is exposing the fact that
13■ Capital, I, p .  592
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since this identification emanates within a specific 
socio-historical epoch - the capitalist mode of
production in this case it is a partisan and
ideological construct. It is a product of capitalist 
theoreticians who are in the task of rationalising and 
legitimating capitalism.
In the Inaugura1_Address_of_ the_International_Working
Menj.s Association (1864) , making reference to the
British workers’ campaign for a Ten Hour working day, he
presented the following note of the class partisanship
of Political Economy as a discipline in practice:
This struggle about the legal restriction of the 
hours of labour raged the more fiercely since, 
apart f rom frightened avarice, it told indeed 
upon the great contest between the blind rule of 
the supply and demand laws which form the
Political economy of the middle class, and
social production controlled by social
foresight, which forms the po1itical_economy_of 
the_working_cI a s s . Hence the Ten hours Bill was 
not only a great practical success; it was the 
victory of a principle; it was the first time 
that in broad daylight the political economy of 
the middle class succumbed to the political 
economy of the working class.14 (emphasis ours)
In the same speech he makes a comparative statement 
about the "victory of the political economy of labour 
over the political economy of property"15.
What is it that differentiates the political economy
14. Iril David McLellan, Kar l_Marx_Seleçted_Wr i t ings^__p^_535 
15 ■ ibid., p. 5 36
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of the bourgeoisie from that of the working class, and 
what is the defining character of each of the two? From
the point we made above on the historical
restrictiveness of the analytical structure of classical 
Political Economy, it is evident that the political 
economy of the middle class, essentially, distinguishes 
itself by its restricted subjectivism; by the fact of 
its being part of "the ruling ideas of the ruling 
class"16. The fact that it is unique to a particular
epoch, and consequently, operates exclusively within 
that epoch, wherein as an intellectual system in a 
society which is built on class antagonisms it becomes a 
creation of the dominant, renders it an ideology. An
ideo .Logs' of exploitation. It is therefore
epistemo1ogica1ly inferior (underdeveloped), as much as 
it is having a negative ethical value.
In contrast, the political economy of the working class 
is historical-materialism. Since this is imbued with a 
vision which transcends the epoch of capitalism, it is 
def initionally supra-epochal, and is as such superior to 
that of the middle class. The former is concerned with 
the laws of an economy within a given mode of 
production, where the nature of the historically
restrictive scope of these laws renders them inexorably
roanipulable by class interests. The latter is concerned 
v']tlj the broader and general law of social formations.
• Ihe_Cqmmunist Manif esto
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It envisions the transcendence of the ills of 
capitalism and the attainment of a freedom which a 
classless society promises. Marx’s critical references 
to the involuntary laws in economics refers to the
former: an ideological use of economic analysis.
Therefore, we conclude that Miranda is wrong in 
inferring that Marx's criticism of the notion of the
"spontaneous action of the laws of political economy" as 
used within the context of a critique of capitalism, 
applies universally to any view of the existence of "a 
law" of historical development. This error leads him to 
the fallacious claim that Marx "is mocking those who 
maintain that determinism is imposed on us by the mode 
of production, and he is saying that it is the
capitalists who maintain this point of view"17.
6.2.2. ON_THE_ECONOMIC
What we also note is Miranda's apparent ignorance of 
the transformation which the term "economy” undergoes in 
Marx’s philosophy. Like the change Marx effected on the 
traditional definition of History, so he also did with 
economics". He broadened the meaning of the term and 
gave it a meaning which goes beyond the traditional 
precincts of the science Economics. He transformed the 
meaning and object of economics from being a theoretical
 ̂7• O p . c i t . , p . 5 6
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investigation of the techniques of supply and demand,
as its bourgeois history dictated (Adam Smith), to being 
a focus on an investigation of the primary processes of
the development of collective social being of the human
kind which takes place as they engage in the task of 
producing their means of subsistence.
For him, this was more than a technical redefinition 
of the discipline of economics, it was a purposeful
philosophically-motivated reconceptualisation of what 
actually the discipline was all about and ought to be 
about. The restricted definition of economics, as far as 
he could see, derived from what he identified as 
bourgeois political economy and was borne out of an 
undisclosed objective which such a self-imposed
restriction as to the scope of the disclipine served. 
This polemic on the critique of the methodology of 
traditional economics is specifically undertaken in his 
critical response to Pierre Proudhon’s work, The_System 
of _EconomIc_Con t r ad j.c t ionj__The_Pover ty_of _Phi 1 osophy , in 
his correspondence with P.V Annenkov, and in, The
Poverty_of Philosophy (184718). Proudhon was criticised
for a failure to grasp the material basis of the 
historical development of humanity, and consequently 
for taking recourse to externalising concepts without 
relating them to them to their genetic basis. Marx
18. for both see, K. Marx, The Poverty of
Philosophy (New York: International Publishers, 1975)
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observed :
Economists express the relations of bourgeois
production, the division of labour, credit, 
money, etc. , as fixed, immutable, eternal
categories . . . [they] explain how production
takes place in the above-mentioned relations, 
but what they do not explain is how these
relations themselves are produced, that is, the 
historical, movement which gives them birth. 19
Proudhon was accused of still operating with the
bourgeois concept of economics, and this is what
according to Marx, accounted for the defects of his 
work and analysis in general. He obfuscated the
relationship between social relations, on the one hand, 
and abstract categories and expressions of classical 
economics, on the other, putting the latter as causes of 
the former, thereby reducing social relations into 
"thoughts, which are to be found alphabetically 
arranged at the end of every treatise on political 
economy"20. Against this, Marx counterposed that,
"economic categories are only the theoretical
expressions, the abstractions of the social relations of 
production"?!. So-called traditional economic
categories, he contended, cannot be sensible and valid 
unless they are explained in relation to the material 
social relations, of which they are but intellectual 
constructions and expression. He declared:
P ■ J . Proudhon the economist, understands very
19- In, D. MacLellan, _Kar 1 _Marxj._Sel.ec ted_Wri tings , p. 199
20, Lo c . c i t .
21. Ibid., p .202
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well that men make cloth, linen, or silk 
materials in definite relations of production.
But what he has not understood is that these 
definitive social relations are just as much 
produced by men as linen, flax, etc.22
The import of M a r x ’s reconceptualisation of economics, 
which became the foundation of his philosophy referred, 
primarily, to the vicissitudes of the system of human
seIf realisation through the process of his acquisition 
of means of his subsistence, and how this in turn, is 
onlj expressed in social relations which are modelled 
according to the obtaining system of production. This, 
we explain elsewhere (Chapter 8), merged the subjects of 
the sciences of Economics and Anthropology.
Before accusing Marx of "economic determinism", as 
Miranda does, it is important to take cognisance of this 
unique meaning of economics in Marx. Because of his 
failure to recognise this, Miranda (and Segundo23) fell 
into the serious error of reading into references to the 
word "economic" in Marx, "economics" as narrowly 
understood and experienced in their contemporary 
d o rn inant capitalist intellectual culture. Within this 
distorted perspective Miranda could then easily proceed, 
as he does, to deny that the economic_factor is decisive 
m  determinig history, and more specifically,
22. K. Marx, _The_Poverty_of_Phi1osophy, p. 109.
23. Faith_and_Ideologies, p. 179
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intei I actual 1 i f e 2 4 and human actions
In the following section of this chapter we will 
review the meaning of determinism as applied in
historical-materialism, and how this is also related to 
Marx’s specific understanding of the process of 
production (economics). We shall then see how it
specifically differs from the use of the concept as 
often deployed in criticisms of Marx’s theory of history 
as being "deterministic". We shall carry out this 
discussion as an investigation of Miranda’s
interprétât ion of the philosophic structure of 
historical materialism as flowing from a distorted
conceptualisation of the use of the term "economic", as 
we saw above.
6.3 THE MODE OF PRODUCTION AS A DETERMINING ELEMENT
Based on a conceptual framework which has failed to 
grasp the novelty of Marx"s conception of the "economic" 
factor as an element which determines social being,
Miranda proceeds to offer an interpretation of Marxism
whose thesis is encapsulated in his assertion that:
It is the personal conduct of human beings that
determines socio-economic circumstances, not
vice versa.25.
2 4. O p . cit., p . 60 
2 5. O p . cit., p . 57
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I n appra i r;u I of this , we observes tiiat according to 
Marx, historical development prosecutes itself through 
an interaction of three theoretically identifiable 
factors. These are: the mode_of_production (the system
of production as a socio-historical entity), productive 
foroes_or powers (means of production) and relations_of 
production (social relations). Miranda goes beyond this 
triad, and over and above it posits the element of the 
dynamics of the "personal conduct of human beings".
According to him, the fact of the relationship between 
the human labourer and his interaction with productive 
forces, his improvement of tools of production, reveals 
itself, primarily as the indication that the first actor 
here is the human being who acts upon his environment. 
The "mode of production" for him is a functional 
concept, it refers to the activity of the labouring 
human being within a society. He claims that "the mode 
of production . . . includes production forces and
relations of production"26. It is not a distinguishable 
entity and thus not the determining structure. There is 
no determining substructure in history, according to 
him. Human beings are free and self-determinant. He 
emphasises the fact that the development in productive 
forces which is the results of voluntary human activity, 
is what: constitutes the motive force of history. In 
addition, he emphasises that the complementary part of
2 6. Op c i t . , p . 100
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this triad - production relations (social relations),
are also a product of human conduct. To this effect he
quotes as evidence, from  The_Poverty__of_Phi1osgphy,
drawing attention to the fact that Marx stated that
social relations are by men,
P J Proudhon the economist understands very well
that men make cloth, linen, or silk materials in 
definite production. But what he has not
understood is that these definite______social
r e l a t i o n s  a r e _ j u s t _ a s _ m u c h __E T o d u c e d _ b y  m e n _ a s
1 i nen^_ f IaXj._e t c . 2 7 (emphasis ours).
Miranda commits the serious error of failing to note 
the triadic nature of the elements constitutive of 
Marx’s theory of historj^, the importance of each of this 
to the whole, and the explicative significance this has 
on the logical structure of historica1-materialism. His 
analj^sis of the constitutive elements of M a r x ’s 
conception of history, starts off with productive
forces - the arena of human activity. His entire
interpretation is locked around this element. It
deliberately refuses to take account of the mode of 
production: Of the fact that the human actor, as
Labourer, even though working as the initiator onto
Nature and thus being forced to contribute to the
development in productive forces, is working within the 
limits of the preconditions of the mode of production 
that he found in existence.
27. Quoted in, t_ the_Marxist§. , p. 58
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1 n contradiction to Miranda, we find that according to 
Marx, the mode of production provides the designated
scope of human sel f--expression through production
(labour) and the development of his means for this 
production (productive forces), and as such it is the 
basis, the foundation upon which the entire activity of 
social production takes place. Productive forces and 
social relations are closely related and in the course
of the operation of this structure, are theoretically
distinct from the mode of production.
This point, which Marx reiterated in numerous
instances, also appears in _The Pqyerty_of_Phi1osophy,
i ii u sentence immediately after the end of the above 
quoted citation w'hich Miranda has provided as evidence 
for his interpretation. The continuation of this reads:
social relations are just as much 
produced by men as linen, flax, etc. Social
re 1ations_are cl osely_bound up_with_productive
forces. In acquiring new productive forces men 
change their mode of production; and in changing 
their mode of production, in changing the way of 
earning their living, they change all their
social relations. The hand-mill gives you 
society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, 
society with the industrial capitalist .
There is a continual movement of growth in 
productive forces, of destruction in social 
relations, of formation in ideas; the only 
immutable thing is the abstraction of movement- 
Q3PPI_i|D!DQr tali s . 28
This explains both the unity as well as the
28. In, D McLellan, _Kar1_Marxy_Se1eçted_Writings,
P . 202
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independence of each of the factors at play here. But
still, the productive forces are explained in relation 
to the relations of production as a set of factors whose 
dynamism is independent of what is signified by "the
mode 0 1 production". The mode of production is accorded 
a special emphasis, and is correctly seen as belonging, 
theoretically, to a class of its own in that it is the
framework and context within which the interaction
between the means of production and consequent pattern
of social relations occurs.
Note that the signification of the "mode of 
production" does not imply an accent of an empirical 
vision of an identifiable entity called, "mode of
production". Perhaps Miranda is reacting against such an 
inference. The mode of production, we maintain, is both 
the context as well as the result of historical
activity. It is the cont ext with whi ch the result is 
realised. By virtue of this, it determines its result
(this what Miranda fears in giving a categorical
distinction to "mode of production"), and, in turn, the 
result determines it. The conglomeration of the
Efocess of relations of production and forces of 
production manifests itself as a social reality within 
history. This process is actually what the mode of
production is (system of production !). Hence Marx
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ref t'ered to :i t a:.; a social formati_on29 . À Social
format ion, thorcfore, refers to the concrete dynamism of 
the interaction of all the factors involved in social 
production. For Marx, history is social reality in
process. A progressive generation of social formations.
This triadic dynamism of a "social formation", of the 
interaction between productive forces (PF), relations of 
production or social relations (PR) and mode of





The significance of the positioning of each of this 
factors is crucial. Firstly, let us note that this is 
not graphically represented as, MP - PF - PR, nor as, 
PF - PR - PR = MP as Miranda's interpretation does. For 
Miranda, "mode of production", is a category meaning 
the relationship between the PF and the PR, where
emphasis for the sake of extracting a humanistic point, 
^3 laid on productive forces (P F ). Communicating this
29. In, Pr§f§çe_to the_Çqntribution_to_a_Çritique
9Î_Politiçal_Eçonqmy
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view, ho said: "the first step in trying to understand
Marx's thought is to understand this equation: the_mode
oi_E£oduction_is_the__mode__of__production"30. A deeper 
understanding of this, as he further develops it, comes
to a blatant, claim that the "mode of production" is the
activity of a development of productive forces,
primarily and exc1usive1y 31.
Our appraisal of this, depicted through the diagram we 
supply above, and the one below, is a statement of the 
fact that the continuous movement of history, as Marx 
puts it, is an occurance of the dialectic_between 
productive forces (P F ), and social-productive relations 
(PR). It is the interaction of these two factors,_within 
§li_a£eii»_E£®S£i:ibed by the mode of production - which
is what these two resolve themselves into that create a 
revolutionary event32. A revolutionary event, ad 
fdef ini turn, is a change in the mode of production, a
socio-economic transformation with cultural
consequences, the emergence of a new "social formation". 
Until there is a change in the mode of production, the
real revolution, the one Marx is supremely and
30. Marx_Against_ the_Marxists, p. 57.
31. Ibid., p.58
32. "No social formation ever perishes before all
the productive forces for which there is room in it have 
developed; and new, higher relations of production 
never appear before the material conditions of their 
existence have matured in the womb of the old society."
A • Marx, Pr e f aco_ t o_a_Cr i__t j_que_of _Po 1 i_ t i cal _Economy .
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exclusively concerned about, has not yet taken place.
This revolutionary event, or rather its results
( progressively new social formation) in its total 
effect then serves as the underlying structure upon 
which, and within whose contraints the further interplay 
between the development in productive forces (wherein
human actors have by nature of their being homo
fecundus, producing animals, are playing a main role) 
and the socia1-productive relations, takes place.
The quotation on Proudhon which Miranda advances
above (p.156), is specifically addressed at pointing out 
the limitation of Proudhon's conception of economics. It 
is not an intentional exposition of the theoretical
structure of historical materialism. Even within the 
ambit of Miranda’s use, the message of this passage is 
that definite social relations are produced by men, but 
how? And this where the crux is located: They are
produced by "men", because "men" develop productive
forces within_limitat ions_and £ieconditions_set by_the
Q?qde of production. As such, the actual pattern of
social relations they produce is not depended, in an 
absolute sense, on their designs and will:
Is man free to choose a form of this or that 
society? By no means. If you assume a given 
stage of development of production, commerce, or 
consumption, you will have a corresponding form 
°f social constitution, a corresponding
organisation, whether of the family, or the
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estates or the classes - a word, a corresponding 
civil society.33
Social relations, like the intellectual and cultural
institutions oi a society, are admittedly, on a prime 
rucpe consideration creations of humanity: What Marx
added was that all these are but a superstructure which 
is resultant from the "economic" substructure of a given 
epoch.
There isn’t a denial of the fact that individuals
create "existing circumstances” , what is at issue is 
that this act of their creation is pre-determined and 
pre-conditioned by the process of their meeting of their 
necessities for life, that is, is conditioned by the
conditions of production they find in a given epoch.
Our point of departure from Miranda and other emphases 
that o v e r -state the role of the development of 
productive forces to the marginalisation of the role of 
the mode of production, is our emphasis that the 
incidence of the mode of production has a substantive 
value to the theory of historical-matrialism. That, this 
value is borne out of an insistence that recognition of 
ihe influential role of the mode of production is a 
factor which introduces the notion of determinism in the
33. K. Marx, letter to A. Annenkov, 28 Dec. 1846,
Jn, L'pilected_Works , Vo] . 38, p. 96. See also, F. Engels,
- ^ y c r b a c h _ a n d _ t h e  _End t_ i n x _ § e l e c t e d _ W o r k s _ l 0 n e _ V o  1_^1 , p .
612.
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entire system of historical-materialism. Without this 
notion of determinism, we think, historical-material ism 
would be mere philosophical theory, signifying no
notable advance from Feuerbach.
There is a determining and conditioning base; it is
called the mode of production. And the process of the
dove i opinen i of productive forces as well as the
attendant social relations, is a superstructural
phenomenon. The two factors themselves, as such, are
superstructural entities or activities. Marx adds this
equation of social relations, the correspondent of
Productive forces, with ideas ( which are indisputably
admitted to be superstructural phenomena);
These same men who establish their social 
relations in conformity with their material 
productivity, produce also principles, ideas,
and categories in conformity with their social 
relation .
Thus these ideas, these categories, are as
little eterna], as  the_relations_they_express.
They are historical and transitory products.34
To argue that PF - RP = M P , that is, that the mode of 
production simply means the combined interaction of the 
the development of productive forces and social
relations, is to say that all reality is
superstructural, is an epiphenomenon. It is to claim 
that history is a baseless cycle of uncaused
causations. The establishment of the theoretical place
34. The_Poverty_of_Phi1osophy, in, D. McLellan, op. 
°it, p. 2 0 2
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ol' modo of production secures the notion of causation 
(inductive effect of the rupture of the tension between 
the PF and P R ) , and determination (the fact that this 
tension between the latter occurs within a pregiven
route:'. I 1 in the theory.
Miranda is wide of the mark from the Marx he is
purporting to be defending from misrepresentations in
his assertion that:
Production relations [PR], forms of ownership
^______   constitute____the__basis because when the
group m  question materially produces its 
nourishment and other means of subsistence, it 
also reproduces the same forms of property and 
ownership that it already has. . . The mode of
production of the means of subsistence is the 
mode of reproduction of the individuals
themselves. And in reproducing themselves 
through the process of reproduction, the 
individuals reproduce the same social
relationships in which they found themselves 
before.35 (emphasis ours)
Tin.' first mistake committed here is the statement that 
production relations (social relations) form the 
material base of historical development. The second, 
which is more serious, is the claim that in the cycle 
of self-production, human beings produce the same social 
formations, wi thout improving on them.
To summarise: The overall relationship between M P , PF
and PR, as presented in our argument, communicates and 
explains a specific kind of a contention on the mutual
3 5. Op c i t . , p . 100
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interaction between the base and the superstructure.
Even though we argue below that that the two factors are
not mechanistically isolated from each other, that
there is a cyclic movement from the base to the
superstructure, and vice versa, we seek to register the 
fact that, the general form of Marx’s theory does not 
leave us with a sense of an equality in preponderance 
between PE and PR as set, and M P . Ther is a clear sense 
in which the mode of production distinguishes itself, 
through the power it exercises on the interplay between 
the PF and the P R 3 6 .
6.4. MEDIATION OF DIALECTICAL LOGIC
A vital point which awaits highlighting on the issues 
of the reciprocity between the base and the
superstructure, is the specific philosophical nature of 
the conception of the movement that takes place
between these elements, which according to Marx, causes 
and explains the movement of history. This movement 
between productive forces and productive relations, and 
mode of production, is a dialectical one. Each of these 
elements inter-act on each other in a cross-contributory 
fashion.
The development of productive forces produces a
36. Our conclusion is grphically representable as: 
(PF »PR) t=Z>(MP)
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cotiï !. jc1 with the relations oi production within a given 
system of production. This means that a given nature of 
productive relations interacts with productive forces 
seeking to contain them. This tension, insofar as it is 
triggered by development in productive forces or the 
means of production, is primarily prescribed by the 
obtaining mode of production, On the other hand, the 
development in productive forces, reflects the level of 
development at which a particular mode of production is 
in. Therefore, a correct and complete graphic
illustration of Marx's theory of "history" will be the 
foilow i n g :
The most remarkable thing about the visualisation of 
the factors involved in this explanation of history is 
the. fact that this dialectic interaction of this triad, 
does not necessarily and exclusively explain the overall 
general movement within a single epoch or social 
formation. In addition, it explains that within an 
epoch, every moment is a historical moment within which 
this dialectical activity is taking place. That there is 
a myriad of incidences of historical development within 
Q moment just as there is a microscopic activity of the
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development of new cells within a tissue. As with atomic 
activ.il> in a piece of matter, this takes place with 
such speed that what meets the eye and brain is an image 
of singular and whole entity. When we cast our eyes on 
society, we have an immediate perception of simultaneous 
interactions of social production and the social system 
operative in tandem with this, and what we see is
c ap i  tali E ' . m , whereas a series of minute cyclic
dialectical interactions between the process of the
acquisition of the means of livelihood and environment 
are tailing place. Besides being a perceptual
complication, tills does explain why in Marxist language, 
the term history, means principally, concrete_reality, 
for indeed, it is in reality as we see it, that we see 
the interaction between our acquisition of means of 
livelihood within particular tailored social relations 
and in conformity with the larger socioeconomic system.
We contend that even though it is posited that the
primary motive of M a r x ’s theory is an explication of the 
process of the self-realisation of human being in a 
context whore his s e l f - d e f m i t o n  as a labouring being is 
freed from its commodification by a system such as 
capitalisms?, and this suggests the initiatory 
significance of a process of productive forces, it is 
the factor of the mode of production which is cardinal 
since it prescribes the context of this activity. This
3"- Capital, I, p. 173 ff.
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is what leaves M a r x ’s thought as being materialistic. 
That is, it notes the initiatory and regulative role of
a given socio-economic status quo_in determining_human
behaviour^ But this materialistic affirmation emerges 
from and is grounded onto a doctrine of dialectics. 
Therefore, there is a dialectical relationship between 
this initiatory material base and its epiphenomena.
i'ii i s. is cwrroborat ed by the following summary of
historica1-materia 1ism which Marx and Engels give in The
Uerman_Xdeg1o g y :
This conception of history thus relies on 
expounding the real process of production-
starting from the material production of life 
itself and comprehending the form of
intercourse connected with and created by this
mode of_production, i.e civil society in its
various stages, as the basis of all_history;
describing it in its action as the state, and
also explaining how all the different
theoretical products and forms of
consciousness, religion, philosophy, morality, 
e t c . , arise from it, and tracing the process of 
their formation from that basis; thus the whole 
thing can, of course, be depicted in its 
totality (and therefore, too, the reciprocal
action of these various sides on one
another).38
A recognition of the import of the influence of Hegel 
in Marx's philosophy, particularly as showing itself in 
this respect, plus a rigorous understanding of the 
meaning of the dialectic, should dispell fears and 
accusations about how M a r x ’s theory of history is 
deterministic, and logically detrimental to the
38. Colleçted_Works, V o l . 5, p. 53
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promotion of human freedom. Miranda’s work is a case in
point of an attempt to present an interpretation of Marx 
without taking M a r x ’s dependence on the form of Hegel’s 
thought seriously. Hence his theory of a strict 
opposition between productive forces (which he confuses 
with social relations), which he sees as the area of 
human self-determination, on the one hand, and the mode 
of production on the other. Even if these were distinct 
from each other, as to their temperospacial occurance in 
1 h i : h i s to v i. ca 1 process , wi t hin the context of the
meaning of the dialectic  this should be no cause for
controversy since in a dialectic, as Sidney Hook
r ern j. lids us:
A genuine synthesis [results of the contact 
between the elements in a dialectical process] 
is more than a simple destructive_ process which 
removes the possibility of further development 
and conflict (as when a community goes doom to 
common doom as a result of c1ass-strugg1e ). But 
neither is it a simple additive process which by 
fusing and compromising opposing elements
produces a new situation - one in which the 
original elements can still be discerned and, 
by some inverse operation, precipitated out 
again (as when we mix a white sand heap with a 
black sand heap to get a grey sand heap). Nor is 
it a simple transformative process in which the 
qualities of the different elements are no 
longer discernible in the new quality created 
was when water emerges form the union of oxygen
and hydrogen). Nor is it finally, a simple
rope t i _t j_ve process in which the elements
remain unchanged. A DIALECTIC synthesis is all 
these and more. Thesis and antithesis are 
resolved in such a way that the pretentions of 
each to constitute the whole of a relationship 
are denied; yet aspects of each are retained or 
conserved in every new whole or situation; and 
are reinterpreted or elevated (aufgehoben) as 
subordinate moments in a more inclusive whole38.
38. From_hege1_to_Marx, p. 68
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In tins respect. G.A. Cohen falls into the same 
error as Miranda in his Kar 1 _Mar x_[s_Thegry_gf _Hi s t oryu 
A_Defence. He bases his work on an argument that seeks 
to show that productive forces are not an "economic 
relation" since they do not denote any particular
relation like relations of production (social
relations), and that they are therefore merely 
explanatory of M a r x ’s theory39. Like Miranda’s extreme 
vie« of over-valuing productive forces because of the 
fact of the role of the human person in them, Cohen’s is 
¡.he an extreme which is borne out of a f ai lure to 
appreciate the dialectical tension between the mode of 
production and productive forces.
This debate would be rendered unnecessary by the 
awareness of the fact that, the element of the
productive forces establishes one essential aspect of 
the dialectical triad in that it isolates the role of 
the human individual whose development is dia 1 ectically
connected with the purely material economic structure,
it ensures the establishment and recognition of the role 
°t the human being within its proper context - as a 
determined being who is part of a process.
bottlied Stiehi.er explains, in h i s  Dialectical,
Depositions Forms_and Functions, that in dialectical
39. Cohen, pp. 28-29.
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1 il i nking
. negation and affirmation are inseparably 
combined. The phenomenon of negation and 
affirmation are mutually combined solidly
Loge thru by the instrumentality of a given
objective systematized relationship - (for 
example, a close tie between the proletariat
and the bourgeoisie through the instrumentality 
of the means of capitalist production).
Therefore, as far as these particular phenomena 
of affirmation and negation constitute
essential factors to build up a systematic
relationship such as the means of capitalistic 
production, they are essentially in accord with 
each other.40
According to this submision of Stiehler, we would
inifc] t ha I since ail of three individual factors 
constitutive of the Marxian theory of history as an
observation emana r. ing from experience , are all bound
together by the "objective systematized relationship" 
of being an explanation of a one whole "philosophical" 
system. The questioning of the prerogative of any one 
of the three elements above others should not be 
considered as of any significant explicative value so 
long as this does not compromise the theoretical
objective of this very system. It should be possible to 
concede that the human labourer as acting with 
Productive forces is indispensable to history, without 
recanting the fact that this human being, together with 
the process of the growth of productive forces, is a
40. Cited in, Y. Deguchi, "Logiccal Relationships 
between Productive Powers and the Relations of 
Production", in John Cunningham Wood ed . , _Karl_Marx_L§
Économies j__Çr _L t i ça 1 Assesments , Vol IV. (London: Croom
Helm, 1988) p.  105
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p r o m K  i o t  h i s t o r y  h i m s e l f .
At the risk of submitting evidence which would
contradict his argument, due largely to a lack of the
exercise of the level of a philosophic rigour which a
reading of Marx requires, Miranda cites the following 
passage, taken from the Theories_of_Surp1us_Va1u e :
Man himself is the basis of his material
production, as of any other production that he 
carries on. All circumstances, therefore, which 
affect man, the subject of production, more or 
less modify ail his functions and activities, 
and therefore too his functions and activities 
as the creator of material wealth, of 
commodities. In this respect it can in fact be
shown that §ii human relations and functions,
however' and in whatever form they may appear,
i nfluence material production and have a more or 
less decisive influence on it.41
The key to understanding a passage like this lies in
understanding the mode of reasoning that Marx so capably
employs. This Leads to a recognition of the apparently
se 1 f-contradictory dialectical model of the interaction
between the mode of production as well as productive
forces and the relations of production. Hence a fully
rounded interpretation of this is found in the following
passage from the _The_German_Ideology which we submit as
a resume' of our discussion in this section:
History does not end by being resolved into 
self consciousness’ , but that each stage 
contains a material result, a sum of productive 
forces, a historically created relation to 
nature and of human individuals to one another, 
which is handed down to each generation from its
41. Cited in, Miranda, p. 104
172
predecessor; a mass of productive forces, 
capital funds and circumstances, which on the 
one hand is indeed modified by the new 
generation, but on the other also prescribes for 
it its conditions of life and gives it a 
definite development, and a special character. 
It shows that circumstances make men as much as 
men make circumstances.42
6.5. ECONOMIC DETERMINISM AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM.
It is necessary to be fair to Miranda and point out
that besides a number of theoretical presuppositions
which we have isolated as determinant of his
conceptualisation of Marxist philosophy, the primary
factor which directs his interpretation of the latter,
is his concern as a liberation theologian who is
committed to social change and is engaged in the
mobilisation of the Church in Mexico towards this.
When it reveals itself to be a system of the nature we
discovered above, Marxism appears as a theory which is
not helpful to the immediate aspirations of the victims
of the capitalist system. This Miranda aptly
articulated in his statement that:
The revolutionary import of M a r x ’s thesis 
lies in its anti-reformism. All efforts and
philanthropic reforms are able to be absorbed by
the system until and unless they change the mode 
of production. And to change the latter is to
change the socio-economic system itself and to 
replace it with another.
However, this message could not possibly be
revolutionary if extra-economic factors, the
ones directly within our grasp, could not alter
42. Collected_Works, Vol 5, p.54
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the mode of production or direct the revolution 
against the prevailing mode of production. To 
maintain that those factors cannot alter the 
mode of production is to preach a message that 
is as anti-revolutionary as any message could 
be. It is to succumb to fatalism. We would then 
have to sit and wait, hoping that the mode of 
production will change on its own - or not
change at all. In either case it would not 
depend on us at all.43
This is the issue we shall confront in this section. 
We will do this by way of commenting on the often cited 
letter Engels wrote to Joseph Bloch, dated September, 21 
1990. In that letter Engels makes the startling 
statement that Marx and himself are "partly to blame for 
the fact that the younger people sometimes lay more
stress on the economic side than it is due"44. Miranda 
makes use of this passage, and presents it with the
interpretation that Engels disclaimed the fact of the 
determining power of the economic basis45. The overall 
context of Engels intimations in this letter, however, 
we find, contradicts this opinion. We start by quoting 
from a paragraph preceding the passage we referred to 
above :
According to the materialist conception of
history, the ultimately determining element in 
history is the production and reproduction of 
real life. More than this neither Marx nor I 
have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists 
this into saying that the economic is the only 
determinig one, he transforms that proposition
43. Marx_Against_the_Marxists, p. 105
44. K. Marx, F. Engels,  Selected WorksJ._0ne
, P. 683
45. Op. cit, p. 72
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into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. 
The economic situation is the basis, but the 
various elements of the superstructure-
political forms of the class struggle, 
juridical forms, and even the reflexes of all 
these actual struggles in the brains of the 
participants, political, philosophical theories, 
religious views and their further development 
into systems of dogmas - also exercise their 
influence upon the course of historical 
struggles and in many cases preponderate in 
determining their form46
This is a summary of the view we have presented above 
in appraising the view held by Miranda. It is first and 
foremost an affirmation of the fundamental
preconditioning effect of the pre-existent system of 
production, and at the same time an admision, based on 
the dialectical reasoning that the superstructure also 
does have an effect on determining the shaping of the 
new mode of production, the formation of a higher 
social formation. In qualifying this and bringing it to 
the gist of our discussion, namely, the extent to which 
human volition is involved in the process, Engels 
proceeds,
We make history ourselves, but, in the first 
place, under very definite assumptions and
conditions. Among these the economic ones are 
ultimately decisive.47
However, this does not lend itself to an 
interpretation and fear that this means that people have 
no contribution whatsoever to make to social change, and
46. Op. cit., p. 682 
47. ibid.
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all their efforts have no bearing on the progress of 
social development and freedom as conceived in Marx’s 
conception of history. The point being made is that even 
when so engaged, the human person is never certain of 
the results of his actions as he is unconsious of a 
power or law that is operative within history, namely 
that of the self-productive process that occurs in the 
human community’s development of systems of acquiring 
its means of subsistence. Again, Engels explains this:
In the second place [read with ’in the first 
place’ used in the quotation above], however, 
history is made in such a way that the final 
result always arises from conflicts between many 
individual wills, of which each in turn has been 
made what it is by a host of particular
conditions of life. . . This may again itself be
viewed as the product of a power which works as 
a whole unconsciously and without volition. For 
what each individual wills is obstructed by 
everyone else, and what emerges is something 
that no one willed. Thus history has proceeded 
hitherto in the manner of a natural process and 
is essentially subject to the same laws of 
motion. But from the fact that the wills of the 
individuals - each of whom desires what he is 
impelled to by his physical constitution and 
external, in the last resort economic
circumstances - do not attain what they want, 
but are merged into an aggregate mean, a common 
resultant, it not be concluded that they are 
equal to zero. On the contrary, each contributes 
to the resultant and is to this extent included 
in i t .48
In his conclusion of this grappling with the problem
°f reconciling the reality of the ever-felt need by 
human beings to actively engage political struggles that 
transform their social enviroment,on the one hand, and
48• ibid., p.  683
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the self-revelation of the logic of the materialist 
conception of history as tending to discount this human
self-motivation, Engels refers Bloch to Marx's The
Eighteenth Brumaire of__ Louis_Bonaparte, the "most
excellent application" of historical materialism.
In the Eighteenth_Brumaire - a series of articles Marx
wrote during early 1852 - Marx offered a declaration
which conjures the dialectical roots of the logic of
hi storical-materia 1 ism vis a vis the role of the human
person, he wrote:
Men make their own history, but not of their
own free will; not under circumstances they
themselves have chosen but under the given and
inherited circumstances with which they are
confronted. The tradition of the dead
generations weighs like a nightmare on the
minds of the living . . .  49
Throughout the E i g h teenth_Brumaire Marx highlights the 
role of past political events in influencing social 
change. This bears out Engel’s emphasis that besides the 
economic circumstances, the role of other factors has to 
be recognised. Even in the above quotation, the 
circumstances" Marx refers to, as the body of the text 
indicates, are political circumstances. For example he 
offers the following uneconomic account of the emergence 
°f the capitalist mode of production,
But unheroic as bourgeois society is, it still
49. David Fernbach, ed , Kar 1 _Marxj__Surveys_From 
~-ii§x_Political Writings_Vol 2 (Hammondsworth: Penguin
Books , 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 147
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required heroism, self-sacrifice, terror, civil 
wars, and battles in which whole nations were 
engaged, to bring it into the world.50
The mistake would be to read this in isolation of the 
entire body of Marx theory, and to take this emphasis, 
as a negation of some other emphasis he makes at some 
occasion. The point we establish out of this is the 
resolution of the question we raised in our introduction 
through Miranda’s articulation of the fear that, in 
accepting the preponderance of the economic process, the 
oppressed would succumb into fatalism, in the hope that 
an autonomous change in the mode of production, if it 
can ever happen in their life time, will change their 
lot .
Having said that Marx emphasised past political
history in playing a part in effecting current
developments, it is important to note the following
statement from the same text:
The social revolution of the nineteeenth
century can only create poetry from the future, 
not from the past, it cannot begin its own work 
until it has sloughed off all its superstitious 
regard for the past. Earlier revolutions have 
needed world-historical reminiscences to deaden 
their awareness of their own content. In order 
to arrive at its own content the revolution of
the nineteenth century must let the dead bury 
their dead. . .51
50. Ibid., p. 148
51. Ibid., p. 149
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In this Section we bring to a conclusion our 
hi storico-phi 1 osophica 1 evaluation and location of 
liberation theology. As stated before, our intention has 
been to test the authenticity of liberation theology’s 
claimed genetive relationship with Marxism, as well as 
the extent to which the philosophy of Marx serves as 
its culturo-philosophical source and inspiration. We 
demonstratively declare our findings on the
compatibility of liberation theology’s formative 
conceptual presuppositions, as well as thought 
categories constitutive of its method and content, with 
Marxism.
The conclusion we develop is that, insofar as it 
relates itself to the thought of Marx, in the 
historical sense, as well as in its deliberate attempts 
at employing the Marxist analysis of society and way of 
thinking, liberation theology is firmly operating with 
the philosophy of the young Marx. As we proved in our 
preceeding discussion, the Marx of 1842-1844 (22-24 
years old) did not have an independent and original 
philosophical position; that as a young Left-Hegelian, 
he was a Feuerbachian. His philosophy, particularly in
1-ts fundamental epistemology, was essentially a 
Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach precisely because of the 
Preponderance of a humanist framework in serving as a
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point of departure of all his formulations. The clear 
evidence of this philosophy is the Economic__and
EbilosPEhical_Manuscripts of_1844 which serves as both
the apex of its development as well as Marx’s own self­
clarification which marked the disintegration of his 
dependence on the methodological framework which this 
philosophy necessitated.
We therefore argue that to this extent, liberation 
theology is in its philosophical presumptions and 
structure more related to Feuerbach’s philosophy than 
to that of Marx, so-called Marxism or dialectico- 
historical materialism. But, even when this is granted, 
our polemic further reveals that most of the themes and 
conceptual presuppositions of liberation theology 
places it on a pre-Feuerbachian side of the historico- 
philosophical spectrum of the post-Hegelian
reformulation of materialism. This becomes most 
explicit in liberation theology’s "philosophy" of 
history. We drew attention tto this in our conclusion 
on Miranda’s reaction to Althusser’s assertion of 
Marx’s notion of history as being a process without a 
Subject. This point is further developed in in Chapter 
10. As such, to any extent that liberation theology 
has tried to move into theoretical problematics which 
are distinctly identified as of Marx, and where this 
could be posited as its post-Feuerbachian shift, we 
remain holding that this leaves it as being at least a
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neo-Feuerbachiamsm since the humanist epistemology is
retained in its basic system. However, in order to
substantiate this, we
reconstructive reflection 
Feuerbach. This is the 
chapter .
need to engage in a
on the philosophy of
subject of our following
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CHAPTER 7
THE HUMANIST MATERIALISM OF LUDWIG FEUERBACH’S 
PHILOSOPHY
7.1. INTRODUCTION
Earlier, (in Chapter 3) we pointed out how the post- 
Feuerbachian specificity of Marxism is located in 
Marx’s reconceptualisation of Hegel’s notion of the
relationship between Subject_and Object - a theme which 
has dominated German philosophy since Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte (1762-1814). In this chapter we propose to delve 
deeper into this, demonstrating how the differences in
the nature of the conception of the relationship between 
human Subject and the Object of Nature as the Subject’s 
environment and immediate object of his cognitive
faculties is what lies at the root of a differentiation
between the materialism of the young humanistic Marx and 
ihe older "theoretically anti-humanist" one. For us, 
this forms a paradigm for an evaluation and judgement on 
the consanguity, or otherwise, of the humanist





At its matured stage, Feuerbach's philosophy, is
singularly an instigation for the reform of classical
Western philosophy as it had developed up to the 
Hegelian system. Feuerbach’s thesis, or rather,
mission he undertook, was to expose that Hegelian 
philosophy, the then undisputed zenith of all Western 
thought, is in its epistemological structure nothing 
but an abstraction of speculative theology, and that 
speculative theology, "which is the reflection of 
religion upon itself" 1 , on the other hand, is actually 
the alienated product of the self-projection of the 
human subject’s consciousness. By so basing itself on 
theology, Feuerbach maintained, philosophy can only 
repeat, inexorably, the dehumanising effects that 
religious epistemology with its concentration on the 
idealistic suprahuman notions, has on humankind.
Further to our crystallisation of the self­
distinguishing character of M a r x ’s epistemology, and 
towards the location of the historico-philosophical 
relationship of liberation theology to this, we shall 
give an outline of the salient and relevant aspects of 
Feuerbach ’ s philosophy. This shall be on the nature of
L. Feuerbach, _The_Essence_of_Re1igion, p. xxv
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the materialism that is being proposed and enacted in 
his philosophy. A tracing of this, as we show below, 
reveals the extent to which Marxism critically 
supersedes Fe u e rbachianism. This serves as a backdrop, 
as well as a major premiss, to our argument that there 
is an essential epistemological affinity, as well as 
other systematic similarities, between Feuerbachianism 
and liberation theology which render the latter pre- 
Marxian .
7.3. FEUERBACH’S CRITIQUE OF HEGEL’S CONCEPTION OF
SUBJECT-OBJECT RELATIONSHIP
7.3.1 _Subject_and_Object_in_Hege1js_Phi1pspphy
In his Leetures_pn_the_Phi1pspphy of_Religipn (1831),
one of his very last philosophical works, G.W.F Hegel 
had taught - basing this on the Christian conception of 
God - that,
the Object exists solely through itself and for 
its own sake. It is something that is 
absolutely self-sufficient, unconditioned,
independent, as well as being the supreme end 
unto itself 2
By Object, what is assumed, and in fact, is directly 
referred to here, is Concept, or the externalised forms 
°f the thinking process, the Idea or Spirit_jGeistj
2. Hegel G.W.F.,  Leeture_in__the_Phi1psophy pf_Religion
> ed., P. C. Hodgson (Los Angeles: Univesity of
lfornia Press, 1984), p.84
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which is in the process of self-realisation,
paradoxically (dia1ectica1Iy) through the Subject
(human consciousness) whence it originated. The point
we need to note at this stage is Hegel’s radical
assertion of the independence of this Object. This, as
his lectures on the philosophy of religion reveal, he
had derived and based on the peculiar view that :
Since God is the principle and goal, the truth 
of each and every deed, initiative and effort, 
all persons have therefore a consciousness of 
God, or of the absolute substance as the truth 
of everything and also of themselves, of 
everything that they are and d o .3
And that, God was "not an infinite phantom far 
removed from our consciousness",4 The Geist iAbsolute 
Beason/Spir i tj. , and the dynamics of its phenomenology, 
as a reality immanent as well as creative of all 
Nature, as conceived by Hegel, was in no way different 
from what he conceived of G o d 5 . Therefore, in reading 
the foregoing, one just needs to substitute for the 
words "God", Absolute Reason.
Out of this emerged a complex series of intricately 
linked assertions which form the core Hegel’s 
philosophy, namely, his conception of the dialectical
unity between Subject, as the thinker, and Object, the 
Product (active product) of the thinking process. The
3• Ibid.■p . 8 8  
^• Op. c i t .
m . See, Q. Lauer, Hegeljs Concept (New York: State
1Versity of New York Press, 1982)
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first of these assertions, as we note above, is a
postulation of the absolute independence of the Object 
of human thought from the human subject himself. At the 
same time, on the basis of a formula on the rational 
conception of the Christian God, there is a claim of a
unity between the Subject and this Object. However, 
since in Hegel s system God, as Geist, is not merely a 
concept which is exclusively restricted to the religious 
sphere, but subsists in and through the whole of 
historical reality, it meant that in all situations the 
Subject and Object were one. Geist or Absolute Reason, 
is Subject and at the same time is Object. It is Subject 
because the thinking being, the Subject, is part of the 
reality, of which the Geist is the summum_bpnum. On the 
other hand the products of this thinking being, are 
Object, which is Reality, Nature - the self­
manifestation of the very Geist^
The gist of this postulation appears at the point of
explaining that, in this state of being one, or in
unity, Subject and Object are such only as an 
externalisation - the se 1 f-objectificat ion of the 
Qeist - therefore, as Object. Absolute Reason,
manifests itself out of itself, that is it becomes 
reality, as Object. All reality, the self­
objectification of Absolute Reason, is an alienated 
form of the existence of the former. This means that, 
since this self-realisation of the Absolute Reason or
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Geist, is what all Nature is about, Nature is nothing
but an alienated  form of the existence of Absolute
Reason.
Absolute Reason though, could not remain forever in 
this state of s e 1f- e s trangement (alienation). It, in an 
esoteric of H e g e l ’s thought, has to negate itself; and 
the locus of this self-negation of the alienated
Absolute Reason, which in its alienated form is only
Reason or Idea (Concept), happens in the process
whereby the human subject gets to know (becomes 
conscious) of Nature (object of thought). In this way 
the self-realisation of the Idea (Object) happens
through the Subject. In this way, nature, reality, is 
left in the form of being only a rational abstraction 
of the inter-action between the thinking process of the 
Subject and its self-realisation thereby.
In the way that thinking as a process active on the 
object remains the predominant aspect, the objective, 
or rather the Object assumed primacy over the Subject. 
It needs to be noted though that this was not the 
objective as the concrete historical reality as such, 
but the objective as thought, as an activity of the 





Feuerbach found this monistic, objectivistic and 
idealist, view of the contradiction between Subject and 
Object flawed and "harmful" to the value and self­
perception of the human being. In 1839, in his "Towards 
a Critique of H e gel’s Philosophy", he declared his two 
premisses of his contention against this. In the first 
place, he declared a rejection of the unity of subject 
and Object as found in Hegel:
The unity of the subjective and objective as 
enunciated and placed at the summit of 
philosophy by Schelling, a unity that is still 
basic to Hegel . . .  is both a fruitless and a 
harmful principle because it eliminates the 
distinction between "subjective" and
"objective" even in the case of particulars, 
and renders futile the genetico-critical 6  
thought, indeed, negates the very question 
about t ru th7
In further development of this, he noted that this 
unity has as its accent the perpetuity of the self- 
externalising Reason, and that as such it puts much 
emphasis on the Ojective - the thinking process. 
Against, this he alerted that .
from the extremes of hyper-critical
6 - "A genetico-critical philosophy", defined Feuerbach, 
one that does not dogmat i cal l5r demonstrate or apprehend an 
0 Ject given through perception, but examines its origin; which 
CiUestions whether an object is a real object, only an idea, or 
Just a psychological phenomenon; which, finally, distinguishes 
'1tli utmost rigour between what is subjective and what is
° jective." In< L_ Stepelevich,  The__Young Hege 1 i ans j__An
-Glhology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 120.
 ̂ • I b i d . , p .121
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subjectivism [of post-Kantian German
philosophy], we are, in Hegel’s philosophy, 
hurled into the extremes of uncritical
ob j e c t i v i sm 8 .
In contradiction of Hegel, he argued for a 
recognition of a distinction between Object and Subject 
as per the genetico-critica 1 method, which method, he 
maintained, reveals that it is the Subject which is 
primary, and not the Object as Hegel taught. This 
contention arose from Feuerbach’s concern that, the fact 
that the Subject in this context is the human being, 
and that the Object remains merely the ideas of the 
human person, and that to affirm the latter to the 
neglect of the human person will not only be to relegate 
what human being is all about, but to leave the human 
person in the state of perpetual alienation. Alienation 
was for Feuerbach an absolutely negative experience and 
state which had to be combat ted (For Hegel and Marx, it 
was viewed as "positive” , or necessary, on the basis of 
the "law” of dialectics). In the process, he had 
developed a view that, anyway, "the object to which a 
subject essentially, necesarily relates, is nothing else 
than the subject’s own, but objective nature"9, which 
means a concentration on the alienated object, will mean 
an entrenchment the self-alienation of the human being.
8 ■ Ibid. , p .127
L . Feuerbach, TheEssence_of_Christianity, p. 4
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We therefore note that whilst Hegel’s philosophy 
consisted in an affirmation of the primacy of thought 
over that of Being, or Nature as the products of 
thought, which even his doctrine of the dialectic could 
not efface, Feuerbach’s aimed at reversing this order: 
of affirming Being over thought. The fact that the 
thinking activity cannot happen without the thinking 
human being, he felt, provided a validation for his view 
for the need of a cognitive, as well as theoretic 
distinction between subject and object so that the 
primacy of the subject can adequately be accounted 
f orlO.
Developing this in "Towards a Critique of Hegel’s 
Philosophy", he took up for analytic criticism Hegel’s
view of empirical existence where inter alia, in the
Logic, Hegel asserts that: "Being merges into
Nothingness; it disappears immediately into its 
opposite: its truth is the movement of its disappearing
• Becoming is restlessness, the restless unity of 
being and nothingness; existence is this unity come to 
rest"ll. He contradicted this with a proposition that 
since the essential categorical relationship between 
being" and "nothingness" is one between determinateness 
and indeterminateness, as the opposite of Nothiness, 
B§ing, can only be a determinate category. That is, that
10- See, Ibid., p . 1 1 0
11- Cited in, op cit, p. 108
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it can only be conceived of in terms of its sensuous
perceptibility within time and space. Therefore,
Feuerbach insisted that, when talking about being,
particularly in "human being" whose consciousness Hegel
had identified as the locus of the self-realisation of
Absolute Reason, one ought only do this in terms of an
empirical e p i s t e m o l o g y . And for this reason, the
epistemological point de depart and summum bonum of
philosophy ought to be the human being, and not the
phenomenology of Absolute Reason, as in Hegel. In
consequence of this reflections, Feuerbach concluded:
All speculation that would go beyond nature and 
man is therefore futile - as futile as the kind 
of art that would like to give us something 
higher than human form, but gives only 
distortions. . .12
7.3.3 _The_Bane_of_Re 1 igious_Episternology
Feuerbach was resolute that the culprit for this 
feature of H e g e l ’s thought, was Christian religious 
epistemology which is distinct by its peculiar and 
complete assimilation of the human subject and the 
religious object, and Hegel’s failure to be sensitive 
to developing a philosophy that is not grounded on this 
religious epistemology. Even though the demonstration of
this fact constituted the differentia specifica of
Feuerbach’s thought, it is important to realise that its 
development was entirely at the service of building a
l2- Ibid. p.  127
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philosophy of "Man"
Through The Essence__of Christianity (1841/43), he
devoted himself to explicating the nature of human
consciousness, the Hegelian Objective, via one of its
objects which most reveal where the human subject
stands vis a  vis the objects of his thought - the
Christian religion. He wanted to prove that insofar as
religion can be regarded as an object of the thinking
human subject, and he can demonstrate that
"consciousness of God is se1f-consciouness", so is the
fact established that, "the object of any subject is
nothing else than the Subject’s own nature"13. That,
In the object he contemplates, man becomes
acquainted with himself since consciouness of
the objective is the self-consciousness of
man, consciousness of God is self-
consciousness, knowledge of God is self-
knowledge . . . whatever is God to a man, that
is his heart-soul; and conversely, God is the 
manifested inward nature, the expressed self of 
a manl4
Thus the conclusion was that, theology - the self-
reflection of religion - is essentially a theoretical
objectivism: The resolution of the human species-being
(We s ensga t u n g ) into the realm of thought (a self­
objectification) , which, to make matters worse, is an 
estranged thought, which in fact is the abstraction of 
the predicates of the concrete human subject, which are
13- Feuerbach L., _TheEssence_of_Christianity, p. 12
14- ibid. p. 5 , 1 3
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mistaken as attributes of a divinity which, as
conceived, returns to act back in an authoritative 
manner on the human subject. Theology, Feuerbach found, 
according to Wartofskyl5, is esoteric psychology.
The point to note here, nevertheless, is the
criticism that theology, like all theoretical
objectivism, takes the concrete, empirical reality, and 
explains it away into abstractions, and then proceeds to 
accord these abstractions with an authority which in the 
process obliterates the independent existential value of 
the concrete. Against this "objectivism", Feuerbach
proposed a "subjectivism", which would be a 
concentration on the human person: a philosophical
anthropology. For as his reflection revealed to him,
"Theology” , anyway, "is Anthropology . . . there is no
distinction between the predicates of the divine and 
human nature, and consequently, no distinction between 
the divine and human sybject"16. The perverted nature 
of theology, like all abstract objectivism, had to be 
reversed.
"Speculative theology", he wrote in 1839, "has its 
ghosts , . , in non-sensory abstraction."17. "To
15. Max W. Wartofsky, __Feuerbach (Cambridge: Cambridge
niv- Press , 1977) , p. 139
16. The_Essence_of_Christianity, Preface, p. xxxvii
I?- "Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy", in, 
aWrence Stepelvich (ed.) _The_Young_Hege 1 iansj__Anthology , p. 159
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abstract" he explained, "means to suppose the essence
of nature outside nature, the essence of the human
being outside_the human_being, the essence of thinking
outside the thinking act"18.
In the "Provisional Theses for the Reformation of
Philosophy", written as an article for a journal in
1843 while he was revising The_Essence_of_Christianity
for its second edition, Feuerbach turned to Hegel again 
and summarily pointed out:
The secret of theology is anthropology, but the 
secret of philosophy is theology . . . Whoever
fails to give up the Hegelian philosophy, fails 
to give up theology. The Hegelian doctrine, that 
nature or reality is posited by the idea, is
merely the rational  expression of the
theological doctrine that nature is created by 
God, that the material essence is created by an 
immaterial, i.e, abstract essence.
The Hegelian philosophy is the last place of 
refuge and the last rational support of 
theology. As once Catholic theologians became 
de_facto Aristotelians in order to be able to 
combat Protestantism, so must Protestant
theologians now become de jure Hegelians in
order to combat atheism."19
We can therefore see that Feuerbach’s primary 
intention in his criticism of Hegel as well as the 
attendant exposure of the true nature of theology, was
to contend that " the summum_bonum of philosophy [ought 
to be j human bei.ng"20 by pointing out that, in basing
13■ Loc. c i t .
19 • in, Lawrence S. Stepelevich e d . , The_Young_Hege1iansi_An
-21 Q o  l o g y ,  p p .  1 5 6 f  1 6 7
p. • L. Feuerbach, "Towards a Critique of Hegel’s
tlososophy" (1839), in, Ibid., p.127
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 ̂a r t o f 
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c i t,
itself on theological thought-forms, philosophy was 
incipientiy adulterated by theology's essential
tendency to diminish the importance of sense 
consciousness which is what is important about being 
human21. "The essence of theology", he argued, "is the 
transcendent essence of the human being, placed outside 
human beings", just as, "the essence of Hegel’s Logic, 
is transcendent thinking, the thinking of the human 
being supposed_outside_human_beings"22. On the basis of 
this, he could conclude that, "In that its entire
system rests upon these acts of abstraction Hegelian 
philosophy has estranged the human being from_its_very
self ” , 2 3
7.4. THE NEW MATERIALISM
7.4.1. _A_Humanist_Material ism
Beyond merely decrying this intellectual tradition 
which fosters the tendency for the human person to
locate his essence, his self-consciousness outside of 
himself, Feuerbach systematically attempted to work out 
a "reformation of philosophy” which would introduce an
epistemological perspective which is based on an
1- For a more detailed development of this theme see, 
shy, op. Cit., pp. 110-134, 196f.
2. "Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy", in, op.
P. 159
8 • Loc. cit.
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at f i rnmtion of: the human Subject . To the extent that
this reversal of Hegel’s Idealist objectivism, 
concentrated on an emphasis of the Subjective, the 
materially primal, which for Feuerbach is specifically, 
the human person, this new epistemological perspective 
proposed by Feuerbach was to be a materialism with a 
humanist content; a humanist materialism. It is 
materialist in the sense of its emphasis on the primacy 
and relevance of the empirical subject; and because this 
subject is essentially and by emphasis the human person, 
it is humanist.
What is important for our overall discussion is that
Feuerbach did not only advocate this humanist
materialism, that he went further and claimed that his
work, m  particular, the second revision of The_Essence
of _Chr i st iani_ty , was a demonstration and genus of this
new materialism, "a specimen of this philosophy"24.
Stating its characteristics, he wrote in the preface:
This philosophy is essentially distinguished 
from the systems hitherto prevalent, in that it 
corresponds to the real, complete man; but for 
that very reason it is antagonistic to minds 
perverted and crippled by a superhuman, i.e,
anti-human, anti-natural religion and
speculation . . .  it does not identify the
idea of the fact with the fact itself, so as to 
reduce real existence to an existence on paper, 
but it separates the two, and precisely by this
separation attains to the fact itself; it
recognises as the true thing, not the thing as 
it is an object of the abstract reason, but as 
it is an object of the real, complete man, and 
hence as it is itself a real, complete thing.
24 • The Essence_of_Christianity, p. xxxv
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This philosophsr does not rest on an
Understanding per se, on an absolute nameless 
understand j rig , belonging one knows not to whom, 
but on the understanding of man . . . i t
declares that alone to be true philosophy which
is converted in s u c c u m e t  sanguinem, which is
incarnate in Man .
This philosophy has for its principle, not the 
Substance of Spinoza, not the ego of Kant and 
Fichte, not the Absolute Identity of Schelling, 
not the Absolute Mind of Hegel, in short, no 
abstract, merely conceptional being, but a real
being, the true Ens realissimum - man; its
principle therefore, is in the highest degree 
positive and real25
l’his New philosoph 3r though, continued to base itself 
on using religion, or rather, its critique, as the 
paradigm of its theoretical structure. According to
this new stage, religion was portrayed (exposed) as
essentially being feeling. This was based on the 
observation that when God is rejected rationally, as a 
result of the exposure’s made on the critique of Hegel, 
what remains is the justification of religion on the
basis of feeling26. Because people feel it, religion 
cannnot just be dismissed.
"In feeling", wrote Feuerbach, "God’s existence is
thought to be secure. And doubtless this is the safest 
refuge; for to make feeling the essence of religion is
25. Ibid. , pp. xxxiv, X X X V
2b. Xhe_Essence_of_Christianity, p.283
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to make feeling the essence of God"27. In a deliberate
inversion oJ the elaboration of Rene Descartes’ 
rationalist principle of, ” 1 think, therefore I am", he 
counterposed: "And as certainly as I exist, so
certainly does my feeling exist; and as certainly as my 
feeling exists, so certainly does God exist"28. 
However, Feuerbach quickly adds an interpretative 
notion he had developed earlier on: "The certainty of
God is here nothing else than the self-certainty of 
human feeling, the yearning after God is the yearning 
after unlimited, uninterrupted, pure feeling."29
He developed this concentration on feeling so as to 
buttress his theory of the paramountcy of the human
subject by showing that, since it is the human being,
as a sensuous being, who feels, religious consciousness, 
as objective feeling, is secondarily derived. It is an 
attribute of the human subject and this confirms the
primacy of the material Subject which has feeling
(Sensuous materialism).
However, there is another important element to his 
conception of feeling and his employment of it as a 
category constitutive of his new materialism. This is
fhe fact that this feeling expresses itself supremely in
2 1 ■ Lo c . c i t .
28. Loc. c i t .
2 9. Loc. c i t . .
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interpersonal relations. It is the locus of an "I" and
"Thou" reality, which reality is definitional to human
existence. This was an improvement in the assertion made
in "Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy" about the
dialectical interaction between two persons, the
thinker-philosopher and his audience, as being
imperative for a discovery of truth30. In 1843 an
addition of the theme of love was made to this. Love as
a feeling expressed between persons, was introduced as a
substitution of Faith:
Love identifies man with God and God with man, 
consequently it identifies man with man .
FaiLL separates God from man, consequently
it separates man from man . . . God is the
human being; but - in Faith - he presents
himself to the religious consciousness as a 
d .1 stinct being .
Faith produces in man an inward disunion, a
disunion with himself, and by consequence an
outward disunion also; but love heals the 
wounds which are made by faith in the heart of 
ma n ."31
In this way a humanist element was again successfully 
tucked underneath a crude materialistic, sensuous 
conception of feeling- In addition, as we show below in 
reference to the critique of this by Karl Marx, this 
mediated another dimension of Feuerbach’s epistemology, 
which is, the tendency of reducing social reality or the 
ethic of social relations (Sitt 1 ichkeit) into a 
lheol.ogi.co religious riddle. The only extent to which
'h-1 - in . op cit., p. 104, 113
^  • ibe_Essence_ of„Christinaity, p. 247
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Feuerbach ventured into a sociology, was to the point of 
lamenting the depletion of love in society by religious 
faith and how this, according to him is the result of
social tensions and disintegration. And, as Frederick
Engels was to critically observe:
Vvith Feuerbach love is everywhere and at all 
times the wonder-working god who should help to 
surmount all difficulties of practical life-
and at that in a society whi ch is split into 
classes with diametrically opposite interests.
At this point the last relic of its
revolutionary character disappears from his
philosophy, leaving only the old cant: Love one
another - fall into each other’s arms
regardless of distinctions of sex or estate - a 
universal orgy of reconci1iation!32
The fact of the conditioning of ethical systems and 
the nature of human relations by Nature - the non­
human empiria, was not an issue for Feuerbach.
Therefore, instead of what can simply be called 
’empiricism” , an affirmation of the primacy of the 
®!DEir ia , Feuerbach affirmed and called attention to a
recognition of human sensuality as a methodological
factor as well as a matter of content in philosophical- 
epistemological activity. Sensuality, as used here, 
means the human being's sense of himself and of others- 
species-consciousness, rather than merely an operation 
of the five biological senses. His prime concern, which 
dictated the structure and content of his philosophy, 
was the manner in which this human_sense_of_being was
v . 32- F. Engels, Feuerbach__And_End, in, Selected Works_{one
P. BOG-7
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turned into an abstract negligibility by Hegelianism (a 
transient and passive arena of the Idea returning to 
itself after it had alienated itself in Nature), and the 
manner in which it was distorted and even obliterated 
b\ religious cone iousness (in that, in conceiving of 
God as matter of Faith, man is taking what is actually 
his own sense of himself, turns it into a phantasy of 
his most basic wishes, and bestows upon it a superiority 
which is infinitely beyond himself, thereby making it to 
stand as a lording alien above him: robbing him of his
self which is the faculty of sense of others).
7.4.2. A_Transcendentalist„Material ism
Furthermore, we observe that Feuerbach's materialist 
philosophy is not. only unique with its humanism: it is
at the same time a kind of materialism and empiricism 
which refuses to completely do way with the dimension 
of transcendence. It retains a notion of a dualistic or 
hi-dimensiona1 view of Nature. While claiming to be 
materialism, it decidedly retains an Idealist image. 
Spirituality, or an idealist relation with nature is 
viewed as; being perfectly harmonious with being_human.
In this "Neueren_Phi 1 osophie” , the nexus of idealist 
materialism is located in its refusal to challenge the
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spirituality that religion facilitates and its 
retention of religion as a framework of analysis. This
Feuerbach explicitly declares in the Preface to The
fecsence_gf_Christianity in the statement:
Certainly, my work is negative, destructive; 
but let it observed, only in relation to the 
unhuman, not to the human elements of religion 
I by no means say (that were an easy
task!): God is nothing, the Trinity is nothing,
the Word of God is nothing, etc. I only show 
that they are not that which the illusions of 
theology make them, - not foreign, but native 
mysteries, the mysteries of human nature; I show 
that religion takes the apparent, the
superficial in Nature and humanity for the
essential, and hence conceives their true 
essence as a separate, special existence: that
consequently, religion, in the definitions which 
it gives of God . . only defines or makes
objective the true nature of the human word.
Hence I do nothing more to religion - and to 
speculative philosophy and theology - than to
open its eyes, or rather to turn its gaze from
the internal towards the external, i .e , I 
change the object as it is in its imagination
into the object as it is in reality33
He then declares that even in his criticism of the 
anti human service of theology, he is doing more than 
merely turning it into a materialist "science" : "I .
while reducing theology to anthropology, exalt 
anthropology to theology."34 In other words, an
idealist  element or dimension is added to
anthropology. Anthropology is apotheosised. The same 
could be said about what he does to sociology with his 
doctrine of love. This attempt at the combination of
33. l h e _ E s s e n c e _ o f „ C h r i s t i a n i t y , pp. xxxviii, xxxix 
3 4. Ibid p . xxxviii
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idealism with naturalism or materialism is not
incidental. Already in 1839, in, "Towards a Critique of
Hegel’s Philosophy", he had declared the problematic of
his thought through the following analytic question:
For the philosophy of nature it is nature
alone that exists, just as for idealism it is 
only spirit. For idealism, nature is only 
object and accident, but for the philosophy of 
nature it is substance, i .e , both subject and 
object, something which only intelligence 
v. i thin the context of idealism claims to be. 
However, two truths, two ’absolutes’, is a 
contradiction. How do we find a way out of this 
conflict between a philosophy of nature that 
negates idealism and an idealism that negates 
the philosophy of nature?35
Tiie answer, which Feuerbach found himself impelled to 
work out, was a way of seeking a synthesis of the two 
opposite postulates. This he maintained is found 
"Only by turning the predicate wherein both concur into 
a subject and the subject into the predicate."36
Therefore, his subjectivism, the core of his philosophy, 
is deliberately not a materialism_or a naturalism as 
such, but a deliberate synthesis of the two whereby the 
idealist format is inverted into a Materialist one while 
the perceived importance of the former is preserved.
However, it is important to note that, in making this 
accent away from absolute materialism, Feuerbach was 
specifically seeking to steer away from the mechanical
35. In, Stepelevich, op. cit., p. 118
3t>. Loc. cit.
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— — iSDD eighteenth century European philosophy
(Ludwig Buchner, Karl Vogt, Jakob Moleschott) which was 
singularly informed by French materialism, emanating 
from Cartesian metaphysics, and Humean empiricism37. 
Against this, Feuerbach had crusaded, in defence of 
Hegelian idealism in the inid-1830s. Through his 
writing:; _Cr i t i gue_of _ t he_An t i yHege 1 ( the 1835 review
article <'.1 Bachman's criticism of Hegel), the Critigue 
9 L_Em£>ir j_c i sm (1837 review of F. Dorguth's Critigue_of
iiieaiism) and Philosophy and Christianity (1839 - a
defence of of Hegel against the charge by Heinrich Leo 
that Hegelian philosophy is un-Christian) - he mounted 
spirited arguments for Hegel against the criticisms of 
scientific-naturalist materialism, particularly its 
denial of the Spirit38.
In his Exposition^ Development and Critigue of
ibnizian_Phi1osophy, published in 1836, he declared 
concerning empiricism:
Woe to the philosopher who hasn't appropriated
empiricism as an instrument, who bypasses the 
realm of mediate powers and causes; who comes 
with so-called philosophical deductions, which 
are presented as if they had divine necessity, 
to the place where rational empiricism alone 
would suffice . . . But empiricism fails to
recognize its limits when it presents itself as
- 37. See, F. Engels, Feuerbach_and_the_End, in, op. cit., p.
, ’ and, Z.A, Jordan,  The Evolution of Dialectical
-§t§rialism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1967), p. 22f.
38. Vid. Marx Wartofsky, op. cit., pp. 145-167, and
,. olln E ■ Toews , Hege li an ism y The__Path Towar d__Di al ec t içal
-y^§nismi_i805y1841 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980), pp.jJb- 3 4 4
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self sufficient , and claims validity as a 
philosophy . . . Empiricism remains at the
apparent, at the individual. The concept of 
unity, totality, essence, substance escapes 
i t . 3 9
When declaring in "Towards a Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy" that, "All speculation that would rather go 
beyond nature and man is futile", he did not leave the
matter there, he hastened to add:
futile, too, is the speculation of a
speculative philosophy that has risen against
Hegel and is in vogue now -the speculative 
philosophy of the positivists. For instead of
going beyond Hegel, it has actually
retrogressed far behind Hegel insofar as it has 
failed to grasp precisely the most significant 
directions suggested by Hegel and his
predecessors - Kant and Fichte in their own
characteristic ways. Philosophy is the science
of reality in its truth and totality. However, 
the all-inclusive and all-encompassing reality 
is nature (taken in the most universal sense of 
the Word)40 . . It is wrong to look upon
nature as contradicting ethical freedom. Nature 
has built not only the mean workshop of the 
stomach, but also the temple of the brain.
Nature opposes only fantastic, not rational, 
f reedom.41
Nature - as it exists in the external, sensuous form
of existing "appearences" is rational in the sense
that it is the objectification of the Geist, a mere 
phi)osoph iea11y comprehended form, an Idea. Its own 
essence or "being" is not adequately expressed. In this 
form of concept it remains alienated from itself, until
39. Cited from, Marx Wartofsky, _Feuerbach. p. 107
40. Brackets Feuerbach’s
41. In, Stepelevich, op. cit., p. 127
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it dialectically returns to its original true self as a 
concept that human mind is conscious of - Absolute 
Reason. This is how Hegel leaves it. The empiricists, on
the other hand, by regarding Nature, the objectified
reality as being all that is there about it as far as 
the sense have provided, leave nature for ever estranged 
from the human mind - the locus of its conceptualisation 
even if it be as an "appearance" - thus in a state of 
seif-estrangement. This is how Feuerbach saw the
weakness of empiricism vis a vis that of Hegelian
idealism, it is, however noteworthy that he is using
Hegel’s framework of reference in analysing empiricism.
Feuerbach held that an empiricist epistemology was 
to be used merely as an instrument to apply an Hegelian 
idealist philosophy. It was with the the form, it
appears, and not necessarily the content of Hegel’s
philosophy that he querrelled with. Hence his
philosophy, remained a philosophy. Its empiricist-
materialist dimension only reached as far as adopting 
"Man" as an epistemological principle. It was a
l’eplacement of Hegel’s Phenomenology of_Reason, with a
Phenomenology_______of_______Human______Self-consciousness .
(Interestingly, John Toews indicates that the original 
title in which Feuerbach submitted the original 
manuscript of __The Essence__of Christianity to the
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publishers wilit, was, "Know_Thyself"42).
In retaining the other part of the synthesis (Hegelian 
Idealism), Feuerbach in the end, as Toews ably
explains!!, maintained Hegel’s doctrine of the Identity 
of Thought and Being, Reason and Reality. In a further 
elucidation on how Feuerbach retained the import of 
Hegelian Idealism, we note the following explanation of 
Frederich Engels:
. during the long period from Descartes to
Hegel and from Hobbes to Feuerbach . . . the
idealist systems filled themselves more and 
more with a materialist content and attempted 
pantheistically to reconcile the antithesis 
between mind and matter. Thus ultimately, the 
Hegelian system represents merely a materialism 
idealistically turned upside-down in method and 
context.44
Richard J. Bernstein makes a similar observation in his
t'l§2ii2 _yod_Ac t i on :
Hegel’s philosophy might just as well be called 
a form of ’materialism’, for it is just as true
and basic to his view of the world to realize
that our access to Geist and its dynamics is in 
and through its concrete manifestations in the 
world. We do not want to deny that Hegel’s 
Ayfhebung of the materialist/idealist dichotomy 
is heavily weighted in the direction of seeing 
matter as the seIf-alienation of Geist. Hegel 
means or intends to be an idealist. But we do 
want to insist that to think of Hegel as a 
traditional idealist is drastically to
misconceive his position.45
42. John E. Toews, _Hegelianism:_The_Path_Toward_Dialectical
sm^_ 1805- J_84 1 , p. 347
43. Ibid., p . 348
44. In, op cit., p. 596
45. R. j Bernstein, Praxis_And Action (Philadelphia: Univ
4 ennsylvannia Press, 1971), p.35
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materialism which refuses to disavow idealism, is
merely extending a tradition which is implicit in
Hegel’s system. H e gel’s system is "materialist" in the 
sense of its recognition of the se 1 f-externalisation of 
the Idea, but this materialism immediately cancels 
itself (supersedes itself, Aufhebung) in that, this
idea quickly negates itself and realises itself in 
human thought. Thus remaining merely an Idea.
7.5. CONCLUSION : IN REFERENCE TO MARX
Feuerbach wanted the purveyor of the Idea, the human
subject to be clearly delineated and recognised as the 
primal actor. Marx went further and locked the self­
externalised Idea into its state of material self-
obectification, substituted the alienation of the Idea 
for concrete social alienation, and saw the process of 
Ayfhebung as taking place in time and space, and not in 
the mind. Out of this wrestling with Hegel’s
conception of the dialectical self-realisation of this 
alienated objective, he created a theory of the history 
of societies. As we elaborate in the following chapter, 
unlike Feuerbach’s over-assertion of the division
between Object and Subject and a grudging concession of 
the unity of these two taking place only at the level of 
the Subject, Marx appreciated Hegel’s notion of the
Accordingly , therefore, Feuerbach with his supposed
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unit.’ oí ¡in. two, but took over Feuerbach’s methodology 
of genetico-analysis whereby he delineated the 
i <3 lot i ons hi p between subject and object. But, in direct 
contradiction of Feuerbach, he placed an accent on the 
unity of the two (in a radical dialectical relationship) 
at the level of the Object. At the objective level, like 
in Hegel, is where alienation, the self-estrangement of 
the Subject, is located, and the vicissitude of the 
resolution of this alienation he conceived as being the 
actual movement of human history which is motored by the 
interaction between the subject-human labourer and the 
ob jeclive -produce of labour.
Marx’s own critical intellectual se 1 f-c1arification
after 1843 was grounded on Feuerbach’s premise that 
only the concrete and sensuous was real; he however, 
went further and defined this concrete as being the 
activity of social production of means of subsistence, 
rather than as the human individual’s feelings and 
desires. Feuerbach, in the words of M. Wartofsky,
stopped at, "the psychology and phenomenology of
conscious experience"46, and, as Engels adds, "the
science of society, sociology was terra incognita to
him"47. The correction of this was to be the foundation 
°f dialéctico-historical materialism.
46. Marx Wartofsky, _Feuerbach, p. 255
47. feuerbach_and_the_End, in, op. cit., p. 603
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CHAPTER 8
HUMANISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF KARL MARX: 
A DIALECTICAL-MATERIALIST ANTHROPOLOGY
I. MIRANDA AND SEGUNDO’S PROPOSITION OF MARX’S
HUMANISM
Humanism is traditionally defined and variously taken 
as meaning a disposition of thought and life (a 
philosophical attitude) which takes as its central
concern the assertive affirmation of the significance
and capabilities of human earthly existence. It is an
instigation for the realization of the optimum
potential that human beings are capable of in their
earthly life. It is a protest against any mode of
thought or system of belief or form of authority which 
is perceived not to be serving the liberation of the 
latent potentialities of human nature. It is a
philosophy of the human being. According to Max C.
Ottol, humanism may be traced at least to the fifth 
century B.C.E, in the saying of Protagoras, "Man is the 
measure of all things, of those that are, that they are,
°f those that are not, that they are not".
 ̂• In, Collier js_EncycloEedia , Vol. 12, Crowell Collier & 
cmillan, Inc. , 1967, V. Humanism, p. 348
2 1 1
Against this, Miranda imputes onto his reading of 
Marx, a definition of humanism which is primarily 
established by his tracings of conceptual and semantic 
coincidences between aspects of Marx’s thinking and
those communicated in the Bible. In _Marx Against_the
Marxistsy_The Christian_Humanism_of_Karl_Marx_he mainly
builds his argument on the fact of the incidence of 
references to words such as "humanity" and "human 
nature" in M a r x ’s writings without taking sufficient 
critical consideration of the epistemological framework 
within which this words are expressed and the immediate 
message that is being communicated2. It is true, however 
that he also includes in his identification of M a r x ’s 
Humanism, the latter’s criticism of the manner in which 
the capitalist system unjustly*- exploits the labour power 
of the workers by treating them as only a means to the 
self-enrichment of the owners of capital. The problem is 
the ontological status he accords to this criticism 
within the epistemological structure of the self­
definition of Marxist theory, whereby he draws a 
conclusion that M a r x ’s is a humanist philosophy without 
showing the sensitivity of the imperative need to 
distinguish such a characterisation of Marxism from 
Feuerbachian philosophy.
Even though his work is based on arguing for the
2 • See, e.g, op cit., p. 1 1 2
2 1 2
humanism of Karl Marx, in no place does Miranda offer 
a systematic definition of humanism, as he, at least, 
understands it. All that he means by the "Christian 
humanism of Karl Marx" is only deducible from his 
polemics which in summary, is a syllogistic polemic 
expressed in the following premisses:
"Any good materialist is logically obliged to 
reject human freedom."3
and
"If materialism is to be logically consistent 
it must reject all humanism"4
Thus for Miranda, humanism is essentially synonymous 
with human freedom; and all forms of philosophical
materialism, including that inferred from Marx’s
thought, is an antonym of both human liberty and 
humanism. Hence his rejection of Louis Althusser’s 
concept of the "theoretical anti-humanism" of Marx’s 
methodology, which as we demonstrated in our earlier 
discussion, he had erroneously taken to mean literal 
"anti-humanism". This view also accounts for his 
rejection of historical-materialism where this is 
presented with an accent on the deterministic power of 
the economic mode of production. He sees the thesis of 
his work as being an excavation of the centrality of the 
theme of human freedom in Marx’s philosophy against what
3. Myrx_Against_the_Marxists, p. 53 
4 ’ Ibid., p. 106
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he perceives as a concealment and distortion of this by 
materialistic interpretations of the former.
In this way, we note that Miranda, lands into a
confusion whereby he looses the import of the meaning 
of materialism as used in the doctrine of historical^ 
materialism, and the way in which this operates as a 
singular structure of the entire philosophy of Marx, 
wherein the theme of human freedom is fundamentally 
implied, and consciously introduced with a radically 
unique meaning.
Together with the misappropriation of the term 
"economics" as used by Marx which we noted earlier, as 
well as on the concept of "materialism" as used in 
Marx’s philosophy, the confusion Miranda enters on 
Marx's theory of the human person (anthropology) as 
conceived within the epistemological context of 
dialectical-materialism5 (namely, the fact of the 
centrality of the meaning of labour as an activity in
5. Our use of "dialectica1-materialism" is here 
used in the context of our view that the fully developed 
theory of Marxism consists of a system of general 
epistemological assumptions, rationalisations as well as 
Procedures which can be applied to an analysis of 
whatever phenomenon. This is an aspect we identify as 
dialectical materialism". Historical-material ism is an 
application of this epistemological procedures - of 
dialectical materialism - to the study of society and 
history, hence we had referred to it as dialectico- 
historical materialism in preceding sections of our 
work. In Anti-Duhring, for instance, Frederick Engels 
applies dia1ectica1-materialism to the study of Natural 
Science .
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forcing the development of productive forces and the 
extent to which this in turn creates a structure which 
conditions the formation of human nature and forms of 
society) is the most crucial in accounting for what we 
maintain as being his misrepresentation and
misunderstanding of Marxism.
Miranda is not the only theologian of liberation to
confront these entanglements of the subject of Marxist
materialism and humanism. From a slightly different
angle, Juan Luis Segundo well betrayed the concern
which drives liberation theology to emphasise the
humanism of M a r x ’s thought when he wrote:
There is a real advantage in dealing explicitly 
with the theme of M a r x ’s humanism . . .  it will 
enable us to frame more clearly the whole issue 
°f YSlyes and faith in M a r x ’s thought 6
Segundo’s prime intention is to corroborate a thesis 
that there is, generally, an affinity between faith and 
ideology which enables the two to complement each other. 
Marxism for him is an ideology. As an ideology, "a 
system of efficacy", it shares a necesary
complementarity with the "realm of meaning and 
values", i.e faith7 .
6 - E®iih_and_Ideologies, p. 238 
7 • Ibid. pp. 241, 8 7 f .
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Taking on Erich Fromm 8 ’s interpretation of Marx as
his paradigm and framework, he asserts that there is no
discontinuity between the "philosophy of the human
being" of the younger Marx and that of the older Marx.
In this persistent humanism of Marx, Segundo finds a
basis for a claim that M a r x ’s epistemology retained a
il§QScendent core throughout the whole of M a r x ’s
intellectual development:
Marx brought to all his writings the ideal 
concept of the human being . . . [He] talks
about the ’real human needs’ as opposed to 
’imaginary’ ones, about ’ se1f-estrangement’ of 
human beings who are deprived of the direct 
fruit of their labour as opposed to the 
’appropriation of the human essence’ by human 
beings who are ’complete', ’independent’, and
’ f ree ’
The essence of the human being, as a criterion 
for ideal human fulfillment and satisfaction, is 
a transcendent_datum_ par excellence. It is far 
removed from empirical verification as is the 
existence of G o d .9
What Segundo fails to address is the question of the 
relationship between this "transcendental" nature of 
Marx’s epistemology, and the transcendental epistemology 
of Feuerbach and Left-Hege1ianism which Marx criticised 
and disavowed in 1845.
The first mistake of Miranda and Segundo, in this 
regard, is to perceive the need for extrapolating from 
Marx’s system the theme of freedom as arising as a norm
8 - Reference is made to Erich Fromm, Marx]_s_Concept _of _Man, 
jT • 1-83, epecially the section entitled "The Continuity 
arx’s Thought" , in, pp. 69-79
9■ Op. ci t ., p.  240
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towards being human, as if this is extraneous from 
Marx’s theory of materialism itself. In Miranda’s case 
this leads to the second mistake whereby in a 
desparation for sustaining such a desputation, he takes 
the controversial step of constructing a systematic 
argument to the effect that Marx’s extra-ordinary 
instigation for human freedom was borne out of his 
Christianity, or more precisely, "the Gospel roots"10 of 
his thought. Marxism, he is led to argue, is a 
"conscious continuation of early Christianity"11.
Before we enter- into a detailed discussion of what we 
will identify as a Marxist anthropology vis_a_vis the 
issue of human freedom, we shall engage in a
preliminary investigation of Miranda’s claim about the 
Christian roots of Marx thought, which he claims is a 
basis for his argument that the latter was a humanist. 
For Miranda, humanism as a normative advocacy for human 
freedom, has only one source, namely, the teachings of
Jesus of Nazareth. "It was from Jesus Christ that the
West learned that a human being is an end in itself, and 
the rest of the world learned it from the West"12, he 
wrote .
In the end this enquiry should also be an assessment
10- See, ibid., p. 197 ff
11  ■ ibid. p. 224ff .
12. _Marx_Against_the_Marxist, P- 197
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of the substantiatory value of this paradigm to a claim
such as that Capital "is one of the most deliberately
and explicitly humanist works ever written"13, in
c o n tra-position to Althusser’s claim that Capital is the
apex of M a r x ’s attainment of a scientific theory and a
classic demonstration of his "theoretical-antihumanist"
methodology. In addition it should illuminate Segundo’s
anxiety, namely, the statement that:
Quite apart, then, from the fact that the 
mature Marx of Capital continues to talk about 
'human nature’ in normative terms, we must also 
note here that in renouncing any ideal of the 
human being as such, one also renounces any and 
every value-judgement that might orient the 
practice and theory of Marxist scientific
thought, not to mention concrete politics.14
8.2. M A R X ’S THOUGHT AND THE CHRISTIAN GOSPEL
One of Miranda’s fundamental submissions is made at 
the stage of his argument where he attempts to
substantiate his claim of the "Christian humanism" of
Marx. The submission he makes is a polemic - against 
the claims "of those who think that the origin of 
capitalism lies in some mode of production"15 - that 
according to Marx, "the cause of the historic birth of 
capitalism is the god money"16.
13. Ibid. , p . 113
14. Faith_and_Ideologies, p. 241
15- Ibid. p. 201
16■ Loc. c i t .
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Miranda notes that M a r x ’s work is principally a 
critical analysis of capitalism, as a social system and 
an historic epoch. Having identified this as being the 
material point_de_depart of Marx’s system, he goes a 
step deeper and isolates the fact that what spurred Marx 
into his critique of capitalism was his intial 
observance of the role of money in a capitalist system. 
Marx's perception of the role of money, maintains 
Miranda, was not only used by him as an argument that 
the capitalist mode of production as an historic epoch 
was inaugurated by the introduction of money as a means 
of circulation, but this perception in so far as it 
originated as being a critique, was raised as a
conscious advance of what Jesus had said about money, 
as recorded in the Bible. To this effect Miranda draws 
attention to the historical connection betweeen M a r x ’s
frequent use of the w o r d  Mammon in his writings, and
Jesus’s saying, "You cannot serve God and Mammon"(Matt.
6 : 24 and Luke 16:13).
Further on, in an explanation that Mammon is an idol, 
a false god, Miranda points out how Marx’s statement 
that, "as in religion man is governed by the products 
°f his own brain, so in capitalist production he is 
governed by the products of his own hand”17, centrally 
refers to the "cultic" power that money exercises in a
7 • S'ilPi t P. 621, qouted in, ibid. p. 197
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Jesus, says Miranda, "is the first human being in 
history to denounce money as the real object that is 
the true rival of the one and only God"18; and, on the
other hand, "Marx offers a genetic analysis of the
phenomenon that Christ was the first to formulate in 
such striking terms”19. Also, Miranda continues,
snipingly,
Reading Capital and Grundrisse, a materialist 
would scarcely imagine that Marx is dealing
wi tli the history of the god of Mammon, that
his work is a commentary on Jesus Christ’s 
denunciation of the worship of money20
The point we wanted to highlight here, is that
according to Miranda, the cantus firmus of the whole
of the philosophy of Karl Marx is derived from an
ethical passion for the denunciation of money which the
latter directly received from the teaching of Jesus. As
such, therefore, M a r x ’s entire thought is rooted in
Christian philosophy, where the main feature of this
"philosophy" is humanism - the notion that a human being
is an end in itself. Futhermore, on this same point, we
read from Miranda:
In another context [Jesus] voiced this
subversive statement: 'The sabbath was made for
ma n , not man for the sabbath’ (Mark 2:27). In
Ibid. p. 198 
ibid. p.205 
20- Ibid. p.201
c a p i t a l i s t  system.
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making these remarks Christ was formulating the 
very same value judgement that constitutes the 
essence of M a r x ’s humanism . . .  It was in the 
name of this humanism and its attendant value 
judgement that M a r x ’s whole economic message
revolted against capital ism.21
8 . 2. i . .Conclusion
 Miranda’s claim that Marx derived the basis of the
construction of his theory from Jesus’ denunciation of 
money wherein he points out that capitalism originates 
from monetary circulation, leaves very pertinent
questions unanswered. The answers to these questions, 
or the incapacity to address them, bears serious 
implications on the affinity of Miranda’s theology to 
the doctrine of historical-materialism.
If capitalism started off primarily because of money, 
as Miranda asserts that Marx maintained, how could Jesus 
have preached against money in the year 32 C.E (circa)? 
Did Jesus live in a capitalistic society, since, 
according to Miranda’s view the being of money as means 
of exchange necessitates a capitalist system of 
production? Was first century Palestine a capitalist 
society, since evidently it had a money economy against 
which Jesus was preaching?
Even if Miranda’s argument would stand, it still has 
21• Loc. c i t .
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to confront. the second challenge: Namely, how an
anthropology which emerges throughout the thread of 
Marx’s theory - dialectical materialism - can be
reconciled to a Christian anthropology which has 
emerged from the religious teachings of Jesus of 
Nazareth himself. Prima.facie, it is evident that the 
former is a product of a "post-Christian" protest 
against idealistic epistemology, while the latter is 
decidedly transcendenta1ist and mythological in its
conceptions of the Christian view of human life. It is 
this last question which Segundo attempted to confront 
(We readdress it in our following two chapters).
What is most noteworthy for our purposes, however, is 
that the humanism which is derived from a denunciation 
of a worship of money, as Miranda posits, is a humanism
which is a protest only to the extent it it rejects
man’s "worship of false_gods". Worship itself is seen as 
not hostile to human freedom and self-consciousness. 
Only the nebulous objectivisation of the power of money 
is what is perceived as negative. The corrective is the 
worship of the "only true god" - the God of
Christianity. The fact that even the worship of this
God is an alienating se1f-objectivisation of the human 
self, as Feuerbach has proved, is not an issues for 
Miranda. If capitalism is rooted in the worship of the 
eod" of money, and Marx was spurred into criticising 
this so as to instigate the advent of communism the
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opposite of capitalism, does it mean that with communism 
being the correlative of capitalism, in communism there 
shall be no worship of money, but of the only true god, 
the god of Christianity?
8.3 HUMAN FREEDOM IN MARX
8.3.1. A_Paradigmal_Shift_from_"Money"_to_”Labour"
Miranda’s interpretation, as well as polemic
reconstruction of Marx's philosophy is conceptually
predetermined by his obsession with emphasising the 
incidence of the theme of human liberty in Marx’s 
works. He over-emphasises this to the extent that it 
creates an impression that this theme appears as an 
exceptional element at isolated points of Marx’s
thought.
This emphasis on freedom, in part, comes as corollary
to his view, explained above, that Marxism originates
from Marx’s Jesus-like denounciation of money.
Accordingly, the only angle from which Miranda can see 
the oppressive element of capitalism, is capitalism as a 
system underwhich the human being is mysteriously held
under the sway of money - the product of his hands
turned a god. This nebulous regard for money, and thus
1fs domination is what dehumanises the human person.
Therefore, freedom, in this context, consist in ridding
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human society of capitalism as a system which causes 
this form of dehumanisation where society lives under 
the sway of the phantasm of money, and the preservation 
of the injuction of the Judeo-Christian god: "Thou shalt
have no other gods but me".22
He laments that this aspect is not generaly
highlighted by materialist interpretations of Marx.
We, on the other hand will argue that the fact of 
human liberty is expressed throughout and through the 
actual structure of the entire of M a r x ’s philosophy. It 
is not a theme external to historical-materialism, nor 
is it denied by an interpretation of the latter which 
emphasises the deterministic power of extra human 
(economic-material) forces. We will instead draw 
attention to the fact that contrary to Miranda’s
concentration on M a r x ’s discussion of the "cult of
money", the cantus.firmus of Marxist anthropology and 
humanism is located on M a r x ’s discussion of the labour- 
process, and not on money as such. Money enters the 
picture as a symbolisation of the commodification of 
labour. It is "abstract labour".
In the first section of Capital H l _  Marx summarises
his discussion of money and commodity, which he 
seminally introduced ealier in Contribution of to_the
22. Exodus 2 0 : 2
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Cr itigue_of_Po1 itical_Economy, with an explantion that: 
The body of the commodity serves . . . as the
materialisation of human labour in the abstract 
In tailoring, as well as in weaving, human 
labour-power is expended. Both therefore, 
possess the general property of being human 
labour, and may therefore, in certain cases, 
such as the production of value, have to be 
considered under this aspect alone. There.is 
nothing_mysterious ¿D_íbis.23 (emphasis ours)
A static emphasis of the mys terious subjective power of 
the products of the human mind and hands, is 
Feuerbachian, and is not part of the thinking of the 
matured Marx. It is the commodification of labour-
the division of the value of the products of labour 
(which is labour itself in a converted form ) into use 
Y§ik<§ and an e x change_ va 1 u e with a surpl us_ val ue_- that 
Marx found most horrendous about capitalism as a system 
of a private ownership of the means of production.
Like religion which was demystified by an exposure 
that it is an epiphenomenon and reflection of
historico-material conditions of the worshipper, and 
the State which was demystified in the demonstration 
that is an organ of class antagonisms, so money was 
demystfied. It was shown to be an abstraction of human
labour. Money*, Marx explained in Capital I, is a
derivation, a value. of a commodity in a system where 
commodities are produced for their exchange.value. This 
led to the conclusion - which focuses on commodities
23 • QaEital_j.il, p.  64
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iproducts__of labour] rather_thanmoney (indication of
value, an abstraction) - that: "As value, all
commodities are only definite masses of coagelated 
labour time" .2 4
The admission of the primacy of the theme of human 
liberty in M a r x ’s thought does not contradict our 
rejection of an interpetation of Marxism which fails to 
realise that there is a significant and discernible 
epistemo1ogica1-methodo1ogica1 variation in the course 
of Marx’s assertion of this fact of human liberty in the 
process of his own intellectual development. This 
epistemologica1 variation, we maintain, is expressed in 
his shift from the identification of human freedom in 
terms of the Feuerbachian notion of the emancipation of 
the human being’s species-being (se1f-consciouness) from 
misappropriation in m a n ’s objectivisation of divinity, 
the State and money (the latter two are Marx’s
addition), to a latter recognition of this freedom as
fundamentally being the attainment of the free self-
expression that has its domain in the field of the 
labour process.
The study of the vissicitudes of the labour_process, 
which Marx had then identified as the locus and 
definitional axis of human freedom, is what formed the 
Gist of his labors after work on The_German_Ideglogy^
24- Qapital_I, p. 66
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Writing to Engels on the publication of the the first
volume of Capital, in a letter of 23 August 1867, he
conf i ded that,
The best points in my book are: (1) the two­
fold character of labour, according to whether 
it is expressed as use-value or exchange- 
value. (All understanding of the facts depends 
on this.) It is emphasized immediately in the 
first chapter; (2) the treatment of surplus- 
value will come out especially in the second 
volume. The treatment of classical economy, 
which always mixes them up with the general 
form, is a regular harsh".25
8.3.2. lhe_Material_Condition_of.Freedom
The struggle for human freedom and self-realisation 
has a necessary relation to a theory of history where 
the latter is presented as a process and locus of
self-conditioned human self-development. Frederick
Engels encapsulated this in the AntirDuhringj as
fo11owsp
Freedom . . .  is necessarily a product of 
historical development. The first men who
separated themselves from the animal kingdom 
were in all essentials as unfree as the animals 
themselves, but each step forward in
civilisation was a step towards freedom26.
As the goal of the evolution of socio-historical 
formations, which Marx theorised, the issue of human 
liberty is intrinsically at the core of historical-
25' -Qsliected Works, Vol 38., p. 257
26 ■ F. Engels, Anti:Duhring^_Herr_Eugen_Duhring]s_Revolution 
"--§cience_|New York, International Publishers, 1939), p. 125
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materialism. Marx never thought of it as even
warranting an explicit theoretic treatment. As Eugene
Kamenka well observes,
For the social conditions that would produce 
the free man Marx was to struggle for the next 
forty years. In the intensity of the struggle 
he never again turned to ask what the 'realm of 
freedom' means. That problem, he thought, he had 
solved before the struggle began. From 1844 
onward, M a r x ’s primary interests was not on the 
nature of freedom, but in the developments by
which it would come about27.
In the corpus of his writings we only find this done 
with an apparent se1f-c1arifying finality in the
article Qn_the Jewish_Question of October 1843. The
theme is again incidentally taken up in 1875 in The
Critigue_of_ the_Gotha Programme_(Marginal Notes to the
Programme of the German Workers Party).
In On the Jewish Question, which was a series of
review articles of Bruno Bauer’s __The_Jewish_Questiorij,
where he was discussing the issue of religious freedom
in relation to religion-State relations in Prussia as 
affecting the Jewish people, Marx fundamentally
established two contrasting kinds of liberty. The first
he identified as "civil liberty" which is short-term
political freedom which is securable through
constitutional rights and legal enactments, and the 
second, as "universal human emancipation”28. He drew 
attention to the fact that while the former referred to
21. TheEthical Foundations_of_Marxism, P- 30
K . Marx, "On The Jewish Question", in D. McLellan,
-Mar2i_SeIected_Writings., p. 42
a securing of civil liberties within a given social 
system, the latter denotes a radical (from the roots)
transformation of human reality which has the impact of
changing humanity’s very mode of being, as well as
self-consciousness.
His proposition was that although political
emancipation - the enjoyment of certain human rights-
is a sign of progress in itself, it had to be seen as
only an embryonic and incomplete form of freedom. "It 
is not the final form of human emancipation in general" 
29, he maintained. It is essentially only "the final 
form of human emancipation inside the present world 
order [epoch]"30.
After the experiences of 1844-45 - the discovery of a 
historical-materialist analysis - plus a further self­
clarification during work on "The Critique of Political 
Economy", Marx went further and added to this
fundamental observation the dimension of the
restrictiveness of human freedom by a given mode of
production within which this freedom is attained and 
excercised. Human freedom was now perceived as only
realisable in its most authentic and enduring form when 
realised as a result of a transformation from one 
system of production to the other ( from capitalism to
29• Ibid., p .47
30• Loc. c i t .
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communism, to be precise)
Given the considered nature of capitalism (class- 
antagonism), true human freedom could not be seen as 
realisable within this system. Based on this, a 
principle was mooted that the mode of production of a 
given epoch preponderately conditions the
possibilities and quality of human freedom achievable 
therein. The relative quality of freedom is dependent 
on the event of the change in a mode of production. 
Contextually, only a transformation that alters the
class basis of capitalism to a system of production of 
a commom ownership of the means of production and 
consequent classless society, can usher authentic human 
unconditioned self-expression. It is class
distinctions, as well as the tendency at the
institutionalisation of partisan interests, which is
inherent in capitalism that generates political and
social oppression. This principle, developed in 1848 in
Ihe_Çommun i s t _Mani f e s t o_ was a quantum leap from what
was opined on on human freedom by even Left-
Hegelianism31.
31. As corroboration of the fact of the 
transformation that Marx's conception of "political 
freedom" underwent between the pre 1845-46 period and 
thereafter, we submit as evidence the following two 
comparative statements which are respectively taken
from the two periods: In On The_Jewish_Question, Marx
makes the following cardinal Feuerbachian submission 
regarding the State:
"When man liberates himself politically, he 
liberates himself by means of a detour, through 
the medium of something else . . . the State is
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In a textual criticism of the Gotha Programme’s
allusion to the establishnemt of an "equal right" to
the proceeds of labour, Marx wrote - adding a new
dimension to the isolation of civil liberties which he
made in _On_the_Jewish_Question,
Equal__right here is still in principle,
bourgeois right . . . equal right is still
constantly stigmatised by a bourgeois
limitation . . . Righ_t_ can_neve r_be_higher_ than
the economic structure of society and its
cultura^__ deve 1opment____ conditioned___ thereby3 2
(emphasis ours)
In a further criticism of the Gotha_Programme’s
demand for "freedom of conscience" from the Prussian 
state, he added,
If one desired . . . to remind liberalism of
its old catchwords, it surely could have been
the intermediary between man and his freedom. As 
Christ is the intermediary on to whom man 
unburderns all his divinity, all his religious 
bonds, so the state is the mediator onto which 
he transfers all his Godlessness and all his 
human liberty". (In, D. MacLellan, Karl_Marxy 
Gelected_Writings, p. 44)
G.r i t ique_of _the_Gotha Programme, this is not only
improved upon, but the whole perpective is different: 
"Freedom consists in converting the State from 
an organ super-imposed upon society into one 
completely subordinate to it Between
capitalist and communist society lies the period 
of revolutionary transformation of the one into 
the other. Corresponding to this is also a
political transition period in which the State 
can be nothing but the___
die tator ship of the proletariat. (Selected
Works_L_Vgl^3J__PE^_25J__26l
32. Critique of_the_Gotha_Programme, in, Marx K . , Engels F . ,
-Elected Works (in three Vols.), Vol. 3, Moscow, Progress
ubl ishers, 1970, pp. 18, 19
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done only in the following terms: Every one
should be able to attend to his religious as 
well as his bodily needs without the police 
sticking their noses in. But the workers’ party 
ought at any rate in this connection to have 
expressed its awareness of the fact that
bourgeois "freedom of conscience" is nothing
but the toleration of all possible kinds of 
religious_freedgm_of.conscience, and that for 
its part it endeavours rather to liberate the
conscience from the witchery of religion. But
they choose not to transgress the ’bourgeois 
1 e v e 1 ’ . 3 3
Also, in repetition of the proclamation made in The
Communist Muuifesto , namely that the realisation of
complete freedom is only possible in the trans-epochal
attainment of a classless communist society, Marx
corrected the authors of the Gotha_Programme:
Instead of . . . 'the elimination of all social
and political inequality’, it ought to have been 
said that, with the abolition of class 
distinctions all social and political
inequality arising from them would disappear of 
itself.34
In terms of this theory, it is impermissible for one 
to discuss and analyse an incidence of a repression of 
human liberty or liberties without taking cognisance 
of the particular historical epoch or system of 
productions within which this takes place. All forms of 
political repression and suppression of human self- 
expression are machineries of a historically particular 
Political infrastructure. Marx has abundantly drawn
33. Ibid. p. 29
34. Ibid. p.24
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attention (mainly in The Poverty_of_Phiiosophy) to the
fact that the political and juridical structure of a
given society arises as epiphenomena of the material
basis of the system of production obtaining in that 
particular society.
Also, each form of repression, being a
superstruetura 1 occurance, is conditioned by the 
related system of production within which it emerges. 
For example, the political repression of intellectual
freedom of the combined institutions of the Church and 
State in the feudal European Middle Ages, is in 
practice and motive different from the solitary 
oppression of the eighteenth century slave-owner of his 
slave; and these two forms of a denial of freedom are 
different from the repression of a contemporary 
capitalist State which is in the service of defending 
the material interests of its ruling class.
Since the suppression of human freedom takes forms
which are historically transient in their practical
nature and immediate purpose, and are modelled on the
nature of the relations of production in vogue, in 
dealing with this repression within an epoch without 
changing the very mode of production, one has left the 
roots which will continue to produce the same sort of 
repression. Besides, such a concession of "liberties"
within an intrinsically exploitative and dehumanising
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social system does not achieve the progressive change in 
society and human nature which is normally accompanied 
by the change in productive forces et_cetera . Hence
M a r x ’s marginalisation of political emancipation,
putting it below that of the more fundamental change 
that comes with an alteration in productive relations 
which occurs in tandem with a development in the means 
of production:
Slavery cannot be abolished without the steam- 
engine and mule-jenny, serfdom cannot be 
abolished without improved agriculture, and
that in general, people cannot be liberated as
long as thejr are unable to obtain food and 
drink, housing and clothing in adequate quality 
and quantity. ’Liberation’ is a historical and 
not mental act, and it is brought about by
historical conditions, the level of industry, 
c. ommerce, and agriculture . . .3 5
8.3.3 Labour_and Freedom
This identification of human freedom with the
development of productive forces is more systematically
pronounced in Frederick Engels’ article, The_Part
PIayed_by_labour in the Transition from Ape to_Man
(1876). There Engels provides an account of the
emergence of the human species on the basis of the
theory of Charles Darwin (1809-82) by grounding this in
the view that the development of homo sapiens beyond
other species of the animal kingdom, is definitional of
^35. From,_The_German_Ideology, in Collected_Works, Vol. 5,
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human emancipat ioniib . According to this view, the human 
being s transition trom a "four-legged" primate to an
homo eroctus - a development to walking erect on two
legs and having hands freed to fashion tools, and from 
there, to the development of speech and the change from 
an exclusively vegetarian diet to a more varied one, is 
all a series of stages within a single act of freedom. 
The attainment of humanhood is an act of freedom. Being 
human is being free. However, the point being made here 
is that, this act of human beings is facilitated by 
laboyilj- Labour, Engels submitted, "is the prime basic 
condition of all human existence, and this to such an 
extent that, in a sense, we have to say that labour 
created man himself ”37.
In an elucidation of this point, Engels wrote that at 
the attainment of the stage of homo_erectus, the value 
of the hands was discovered, and this established "the
decisive step in the transition from ape to man". From
there "our ancestors gradually learned to adapt their 
hands" to the tasks of meeting needs of their
subsistence. At this stage, he declares:
the decisive step had been taken, _the
hand__had___become free and could henceforth
attain ever greater dexterity; the greater
flexibility thus acquired was inherited and 
increased from generation to generation. Ihus 
the hand is not only the organ of labour, it_is
36. See, K. Marx, F. Engels, Se1ected_Works, (One Volume),
P ■ 359.
3 7 • I b i d . ,  p . 3 5 4
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also the product of labour. Labour, the
adaptation to ever new operations, the
inheritance of muscles, ligaments, and, over 
longer periods of time, bones that had 
undergone special development and ever-renewed 
employment of this inherited finesse in new, 
more and more complicated operations, have 
given the human hand the high degree of 
perfection required to conjure into being the 
pictures of a Raphael, the statues of a 
Thorwaldsen, the music of a Paginini.38
But the story does not end there, because, "the hand 
did not exist alone, it was a member of an integral, 
highly complex organism. And what benefited the hand, 
belief itted also the whole body it served "39. "The body 
benefitted” , Engels explains, "from the law of
correlation of growth, as Darwin called it. This law 
states that the specialised forms of separate parts of 
an organic being are always bound up with certain forms 
of other parts that apparently have no connection with 
them"40. Thus the whole evolution of the human organism, 
with its highly complex faculties, took place on the 
influence of the development of the hand - the organ of 
labour. "Mastery over nature began with the development 
of the hand, with labour, and widened m a n ’s horizon at 
every new advance"41, Engels concluded.
The same point was also made earlier in The_German
38. Ibid. p. 357 
3 9. L o c . c i t .
40 Loc . c i t .
41 • Ibid. , p . 356
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1 d g o J_ o s Y : Men , wrote Karl Marx with Engels, "begin to 
distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they 
begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step 
which is conditioned by their physical organisation .
. ."42
Therefore, human freedom, and Marx’s concern with 
this, to whatever extent that it could be identified as 
"humanism", is strictly perceived and interpreted 
within the context of historical materialism whereby 
the conditioning role of the economic development
process on human nature is central. Within this, is 
proclaimed the fact that human freedom is depended on 
the process of' changes that occur in the historical 
interaction between development in productive forces 
and social relations, in which process the role of the 
human being is significant only to the extent of its 
manifestation in the domain of the labour activity. 
This is an aspect we will now focus on, showing how 
Marx’s concept of the human being is interlinked and is 
inseparable from his view of man as being essentially in 
the process of being free where, however, this freedom 
is essentially presented as a feature of a revision of 
the human being’s relation to and participation in 
economic production. This view we find encapsulated in 
the following statement made by Marx in the _Gotha 
Programme :
42 • o p  c i t . p. 3 6
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In a higher phase of communist society, after 
the enslaving subordination of the individual 
to the division of labour, and therewith also 
the antithesis between mental and physical
labour has vanished; after labour has become 
not only a means of life but life’s prime want; 
alter the productive forces have also increased 
with the all-round development of the
individual, and all the springs of co­
operative wealth flow more abundantly - only
then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right 
be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe 
on its banners: From each according to his
ability, to each according to his needs!43
This is radically different from Feuerbach’s 
philosophical anthropology which merely saw the freedom 
of the human person as securable in the reformation of 
philosophical discourse, where "Man" would be made the
central point of departure and concern. Correlative to 
this, Marx’s assertion is that "Liberation is a
historical and not mental act, and is brought about by 
historical conditions".44
b.4. THE LABOUR-PROCESS AS THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN BEING
The process of labour in Marx’s analysis acquired a 
radically vital signification of the process of human 
se1f;creation as well as self-expression. Our following 
discussion exposits these two concepts.
Marx. with Engels, introduced a philosophical 
reconceptualisation of labour, whereby this became an
42 ■ §§le.Qf§d_Works (One Volume), p. 19
44 ■ Xb®_German Ideology, in, Collected Works , Vol. 5, p. 35
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activity which is indicative of the fact of the
separation of freedom, or the urge for it, from what is 
del ini live ot being human. iri addition, they
demonstrated how, in turn, the process of labour, the 
human person's production of his subsistence and
ordering of his environment, is an act of freedom.
Besides introducing a new conceptualisation of work, 
this also suggested a new meaning for social liberty.
As developed seminally in On The Jewish_Question,
authentic human freedom was to be seen as being
something more than just political freedom, but a 
process of self-expression that brooks on the seams of 
an historical epoch (a mode of production). Grounded on 
labour, this related the fact that in working and
having in the process to improve the tools of his work,
the human person is unleashing a chain reaction which
induces a change not only in the environment he is 
fashioning but also in his own very nature. Through 
labour, a development occurs in productive forces, as 
these productive forces develop within a mode of
production, they, of necessity, result in an antagonism
between themselves and the obtaining social relations 
(relations of production). This antagonism between 
productive forces and relation of production resolves 
itself, scientifically speaking, into a social
'evolution which results in a movement from one system 
°f production or social formation to the higher one. A
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newly created socio-economic environment in turn forms
the new material basis which conditions m a n ’s further 
social activity, and thus his very nature, forms of 
thought and behaviour. In working, man produces
himself. "By producing their means of subsistence, men
are indirectly producing their actual material life”45 
wrote Marx and Engels. Human society is a product of its 
own creation (under predetermined conditions).
To this effect, Marx wrote in Theories pf_Surplus
Value (1863):
In the same way the existence of the human
race is the result of an earlier process which 
organic life passed through. Man comes into
existence only when a certain point is reached.
But once man has emerged, he becomes the
permanent pre-condition of human history,
likewise its permanent product and result, and 
he is pre-condition only as his own product and
result . 46
The human person is the pre-condition of history
because he is the only labouring agent in history. It
is his labour, the inescapable need for subsistence and
survival, which is the immediate motor of historical
development. But at the same time, he is also the object 
of this very historical development of which he is a 
subject. (This is one of our crucial points of dispute
with Miranda. He would emphasise only the first
4 5 • 1b i d . ,  p . 31
,, 43. K. Marx, Theories of_Surplus_Value: Capital_Vol^_IV,
!°Scow, Progress Publishers, 1971), p. 491
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proposition which refers to labour as human activity as
being the motor of history, while neglecting the 
attendant proposition that this man carries out this 
activity within pregiven conditions of the system of 
production within which he comes into existence47).
Contraposing this view of the historical role of
labour against that of the Political Economy of Adam
Smith. Marx goes further. He wrote in the Grundisse:
It seems quite far from Smith’s mind that the 
individual, ’in his normal state of health,
strength, activity, skill, facility’, also
needs a normal portion of work, and the
suspension of tranquility. Certainly, labour
obtains its measure from the outside, through 
the aim to be attained and the obstacle to be 
overcome in attaining it. But Smith has no
inkling whatever that this overcoming of
obstacles is_in itse1f_a_liberating_activity-
and that, further, the external aims become
stripped of the semblance of merely external
natural urgencies, and become posited as aims
which the individual himself posits - hence as 
a se 1 f -- real ization , objectification of the
subject, hence as real freedom, whose action, is 
precisely, labour.48 (emphasis ours)
The points raised in the above quotation are very 
pertinent to an undertanding of Marx’s conception of 
the ontology of human being. However the most important 
lies in the last sentence which making reference to the 
"objectification of the subject” . Here lies the key to 
this aspect of M a r x ’s philosophy. The same is also
47 • See, Miranda, op cit. , p. 57,58
. 4o • K. Marx, Grundrissej Foundations of fhe Critique_of
-9-iiiçgI_gçonomy (New York, Vintage Books, 1973), p. 611
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contained in the above quotation on the human being ’s 
existence as the "producer and product of history".
Marx conceived of a human being or society as being 
in a perpetual process of freedom. This freedom, is 
continually manifested as a practical self-realisation 
as the human being unavoidably employs his human hands 
and mind. The produce of this hand and mind, the social 
onvi I'oment , stands as a mirror of what the human being 
actually is. It is the imprint of his will and plan. We 
read f rom_Capital{Ij:
What distinguishes the worst architect from the
best of bees is this, that the architect raises 
his structure in imagination before he erects it 
in reality. At the end of every labour process, 
we get a result that already existed in the 
imagination of the labourer at its commencement.
He not only effects a change of form in the 
material on which he works, but he also realises 
a purpose of his own that gives the law to his 
modus operand!, and to which he must subordinate 
his will . . . the process demands that, during
the whole operation, the workman’s will be 
steadily in consonance with his purpose.49
The subject , the human person, externalises his being 
(the seJ f-exertion of his will and purpose) in labour; 
the products of his labour are the object, and this 
object is himself, his own self-expression.
It is Ludwig Feuerbach who initiated - after an 
intellectt.ua] struggle with Hegelianism dating from 
1830 - this critical isolation and application of this
Qapital_VolJL_l , p. 174
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'-It.
originally Fichtian conceptualisation of the 
relationship between Object and Subject with his, The
Essence_of Christianity of 1841 , as we observed in our
previous chapter. And it can safely be surmised that it 
is from him that Marx received the critical structure of 
l.iiis pa j 1 itii La r 1 ly fundamental aspect of his theory50 . 
Below we discuss the extent to which Marx critically 
reversed the conceptualisation of the relationship 
between Subject and Object from the way Feuerbach had 
originally conceived of it, and how lie converted this 
into a category which informed the materialism of his 
conception of human nature and society.
8.4.1. Marx on the Conception_of unity_between_Subject
stnd_Ob jec t
The schema of Marx's theory of an objectivisation of 
tne human "essence" (which in Marx is the material 
existence and not contemplative consciousness) is the 
same as that of Feuerbach's . However, in Marx, the 
"essence" of the self that is being objectivised is not 
a contemplative consciouness, as Feuerbach saw i t , but a 
hypostasis of human material existence which manifests 
it se1f in 1abour.
Marx’s break with Feuerbach's humanistic analysis,
50- See, F. Engels, Ludwig_Feuerbach and_the_End, in, op.
P . 592
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is essentially based on his realisation of what is
codified in the Sixth of the Theses_on_Feuerbach: "The
human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single 
individual . 111 its reality, it is the ensemble fo social
relations". This is further amplified in The German
Ideology:
The suin of productive forces, forms of capital
and social forms of intercourse, which every 
individual and generation finds in existence as 
something given, j s the real basis of what the 
philosophers have conceived as "subsistence" and
' ess enca oi man"51
Labour, Marx maintained, "is the necessary condition 
for effecting exchange of matter between man [subject]
and Nature [object]; it is the everlasting Nature- 
imposed condition of human existence"52. Therefore, Marx 
perceived his task as being two-fold: firstly he needed
to go beyond Feuerbach’s application of this theory of 
converse seIf-objectivisation restrictively to religion; 
secondly, as being to expose and criticise, as he does
in  The German Ideology, the epistemological
preconcept ions, of Feuerbach's res trie tiveness .
Also, unlike in Feuerbach’s conception of
Siienation, in Marx. the object (the externalised), 
the product of human labour is - by virtue of being 
the result of m a n ’s creativity which is aimed at
51 • Ibid., p .2 8
52. Capital_I, p. 179
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crenting a condiI ions for a livelihood - necessarily 
not estranged 1rom man the subject. Instead it stands 
out in a proces of mutual development. It acts back on 
him and contributes in the formation of his nature:
by thus acting on the external world and changing 
it. he at the same time changes his own nature"53. There 
is a dialectical interaction between subject and object. 
For it is the cardinal character of labour that, "it 
uses up its material factors, its subject and its 
instrument, consumes them, and is therefore a process of 
consumption. in so far then, as its instruments and 
subjects are themselves products, labour consumes 
products in order to create products, in other words, 
consumes one set of products by turning them into means 
of production for another set."54.
Within this context, the production of human being
where the human actor is the subject which becomes the 
object in the produce of its activity, and in turn as an
object becomes a subject again so as to engage in 
further production, is a notion of the unity of subject
and object, par fxc t H e n c c  . It is a combination of
t eue i'bac h s gcn e t. i co-analysis , and the basic f orm of 
Hegel's dialetics.
In Marx, the conception of "alienation” in the
■ C a p i t a l _ V o l _ l ^ , p. 17 3
5 4 . i b i d ,  p. 1 7 9
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i IK! I' i C.IUJ . j : i j ■ model which describes what occurs in 
the individual s psyche, as presented by Feuerbach, is 
eschewed. Concentration, or rather a point of
deparLure, is the interrogation of how the materially 
existent system of production of the time of his
writing inhibits and frustrates human development and
self-expression. It is from this angle that the
capitalist mode of production is immediately discovered
as being a gross cause of dehumanisation. Man is not 
i'rcp in I he capitalist system because according to the 
functioning of this system, the product of human
labour (his self-realisation; is given a dual character 
of use-vaiue and surplus-value, where the latter is 
consumed by another person, the owner of productive 
forces - the capitalist. Besides this anthropologically 
assaulting practice , man is also forced to bring "his 
labour power to the market for sale as a commodity"55. 
This in terms of the philosophical roots of M a r x ’s 
exposition, is equal to the human being selling himself 
to another person, The cardinal evil of capitalism is 
its commodification of labour - human self­
object ifioation - and the reduction of this to a factor 
of production which is part of the property of the owner 
oi i. he means of production,
This goes beyond simple Feuerbachian "alienation" in
that even if it could be explained as an alienation, it
5 5 • Ibid. p.  174
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canno t be so I ved by u simplt! r edit ini tion of the role 
of man as being either solely a subject. The sort of 
anthropological assault .Like the one unleashed on the 
human race by capitalism, according to Marx, as is 
principally an occurance that is taking place in social 
reality, can only be resolved through a social 
revolution which is essentially precipitated by the 
development of productive forces conjured by capitalism 
itself .
Broadly, this uniquely Marxist view of "alienation" (
and tiii way it is to bo overcome ) was introduced as
follows in the Preface:
The bourgeois relations of production are the
last antagonistic form of social production- 
antagonistic not in the sense of individual
antagonism, but of one arising from the social
conditions of life of the individuals; at the
same time, the productive forces developing in
the womb of bourgeois society create the
material conditions for the solution of the
antagonism. This social formation brings,
therefore, the prehistory of human society to a 
close.56
Robert Tucker perceived this quite rightly (even
though he holds to the view of perennial humanism in
Marx) when he sumbmits that, in his counter-vision to
capitalism. Marx envisaged a future whose .
definitive features were that man in the mass 
would achieve mastery of his surroundings and 
collective life-process, and ’labour’ in the 
historic sense of the drudgery, would give way 
to productive self-expression of fully
56- K. Marx, "Preface to The_Çritique_of_Politiçal_Eçonomy",
Ir> ^IS£ted_Works_iVol^_3Ji , p. 362
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developed human beings seeking exercise of 
ineir diverse and many sided talents 
instead of sacrificing themselves in order to 
create the material prerequisites of an
authentically human existence, future
generations would actually experience such an
existence. The species’ arduous growth-process 
would terminate in its maturity. Human being 
would take the place of historical becoming .
ho envisaged collective man as master of his 
circumstances and living in a developed society 
at the end of history."57
This point is related to our conclusion (in chapter
3) on the centrality of Marx's reworking of Hegel’s 
philosophy, in giving a meaning to the structure of his 
theory . ¡here. wo made reference to Charles Taylor’s 
exposition of how H e gel’s philosophy is linked to the 
the pe s I Enl ightenment epistemological concern with the 
duality and conflict the human being suffers in the 
epistemo1ogical process as he has to be both a subject 
and an object of knowledge, and how in Hegel this was 
solved in the theory of self-expressivism (the unfolding 
self-expression of the Idea)58. In Hegel’s system, the
object of the Idea or Geist, is at the same time the 
reality of the Idea’s own se1f-externalisation.
Alienation, which is a state of the negation which 
induces a dialectical development to higher forms of the 
reality of the Idea, lies "positively" within the innate 
self-contradictory nature of the product of self- 
e?'' e m a  1 isati.cn , The same sense of the "positivity" of
° 1 ■ Robert Tucker, Phi losophy_and_My th_in._Kar l_Marx_1._p . 234,
J8. See, Charles Taylor, Hegel, pp. 3, Ilf.
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t.j i j, e 11 a i. i < 11 i . o i1 a j i i a g- o n .i. s ui a :. u s e d in the Preface, is 
,j i i udcci tf in Murx t lieory . I i i the antagonism
between the arena of human labour (development of 
product i vo 1 orces i and relations of production within 
which this is exercised that induces a social 
revolution.
The following resume of this notion by Charles
fay .Lor, though faithfully put in Hegelian "speculative- 
ra t i onalist" terms (which is the only thing Marx
changed) should further clarify the philosophical 
history of Marx's anthropologjr as we sought to present
i í fciuovc;
Human life is both fact and meaningful
•ex p m  no ion ; and its being expression does not 
reside in a subjective relation of reference to 
some thing else, it expresses the idea which it 
expresses . . . life is seen as self-
expression also in the sense of clarifying what 
we are. This clarification awaits recognition 
by a subject, and man as a conscious being 
achieves his highest point when he recognizes
his own life as an adequate, a true expression
of what he potentially is - just as an artist 
or writer readies his goal in recognizing his 
work as a fully adequate expresión of what he 
wanted to say59.
Marx "materialised” this sense and concept of being
human. and radically went beyond Feuerbach with his
inclusion of the category of labour  as an arena and
process of the unity of human subjective self-
consciousness and objective self-expression. However,
Ibid. p . 17
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in' i rla m o d  hegels ' pot; 1 i i vo " oonc opt ion of alienation 
(a:; a dynamic of a dialectical re 1 a t i onshi p6 0 ) .
Ac cord i m:., I o Ma r a , therefore , to be free is to be ; 
that is, to be a labouring human being who is an
ensemble of the productive relations obtaining within a 
particular epoch. This is freedom within the limits of 
an obtaining mode of production, and a freedom which is 
a p r ocees of becoming insofar as every epoch is 
transient (rendered thus by the fact of the labour 
activity which con t inously contributes to the
development of productive forces).
r...., ■ ■' J.OA : MAH a t ST I'UEUftl AND ETHICS
In reading our emphasis on the centrality of human 
freedom and labour in M a r x :s thought it is important to 
note that this is presented in deliberate
contradiction of an emphasis like that of Erich Fromm, 
when he states in his, Marxis_Concept_of_Man, that:
It must be noted that labour and capital were
not all for Marx only economic categories; they
were anthropological categories, imbued with a 
value judgement which is rooted in his
humanisti c position61.
The same goes for Miranda’s elaborate discussion of 
60. See, Capital_IJ__p^_.29
61- Erich Fromm,, Marx ’ s Concept of Man^_p_^_40
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1 .lit' moral Gonlenl of Marx economic analysis ”62 , as
we ]J as Eugene Kamenka's thesis that:
a i ter Mu r x s discovery o* the materialist 
interpretation of history in the spring of 
i file , we i i rid a cer tain change in style and a 
growing socio-historical concreteness. Marx’s 
concern shifts from the philosophical nature of 
freedom to aver-deepining studies of the social 
and historical conditions that produce
alienation, but we do not find a change of 
theoretical structure or a major revision of 
his philosophical premisses63
Marx s philosophic point of departure, which took him 
through the rigours of a demand for a critique of Hegel 
and Feuerbach, and ultimately into a study of Political 
Economy, was a quest for a post-Feuerbachian and "post­
ed! I. osoph j a i " (scientific) analyses of being_human .
V. ho i hi engaged in, and the theoretical system he 
produced, is a description of modes of human life, whose 
description is normative only to the extent that it
critically announces a programme of human self- 
realisation in contra-relation to the existing social 
circumstances. He was not interested in working out a 
sermon-like moral-diatribe against capitalism. His work 
is a description of the formation of social formations 
from a perspective which had discovered the crucial role 
of the economic activity in influencing this 
development, and on the basis of an observation of the 
Pattern that this process has taken in the past,
*»2. Title, of Chapter 6 of, "Mar x_ Against __the_Marxist" (p.
• i he Ethical_ Foundat ions_of _Marxism , p . v i i
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proceeds to oiler hints on the way the present shall be 
end. It is a replacement of speculative and
i' r ; ! : I •* oria ! I'iii I usopliji with an economico -historical
science of social formations. Thus, it is a Theory, and 
no I an phi iosoph i co -e tluca 1 sys tern . It is primarily
descriptive, and is normative only in the dynamic sense
that it can be used normatively. (Theory seeks to base 
itself more on empirically verifiable premisses than is 
the case with an ethical system).
The very first principles of this theory are located
in the realisation codified in The German_Ideology and
i’ho____Poverty_of___Philosophy , on the material basis of
human i i1 e : an that, in producing the means of their
subsistence, out of an operation of natural necessity, 
and on I ho basis of the circumstances produced by 
previous generations, human beings are producing a 
socio-economic infrastructure, of which they become a 
part, and which in turn proceeds to regulate how they
produce their further subsistence. "Circumstances make
men just as men make circumstances"64, and "all history 
is nothing but the transformation of human nature".65
In a letter of 28 December 1846 to Annenkov, Marx
re i leraxed in his conclusion of a summary of his
G4. 1 he_Ge r ma n_ j. d eo 1 ggy , in, op cit . , p. 54.
G5 . The __Pgverty _of __.Phi losophy (New York: International
ul;dishers, 1975), p. 165
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Proudhon’s :
. it can only be concluded that the social 
history of man is never anything else than the 
history of his individual development, whether 
he is conscious of it or not. His material 
relations form the basis of all his relations. 
These material relations are but the necessary 
forms in which his material and individual 
activity is realised66.
In distinction from the normativity alluded to by
Erich Fromm (that the ethical import of Marxism lies
exclusively on the fact of its humanistic objective),
and the theological Humanism preached by Miranda, 
Marx’s theory as we understand it, and as summarised in 
the above quote from the letter to Annenkov, is a twin 
affirmation of both the cardinal feature of human self­
development as natural characteristic of history and not 
the result of some moral advocacy. The second is an
affirmation of the fact that this development is 
occurring within the conditioning strictures of
material reality, since it has as its locus the 
productive process (labour). The balancing of these two 
facts and a conceptualisation of them into a single 
idea, is what marks out Karl Marx’s concern about
humanity from a general humanistic philosophy. He
affirms the struggle for human freedom, at the same 
time he asserts the determining value of material 
factors on this.
materialistic conception of history as opposed to
h6 . Collected_Works, Vol. 38, p. 96
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The motif of Miranda’s argument - that Marx’s thought 
is principally about human freedom - can thus be shown 
as being a misplaced emphasis which is theoretically
unnecessary, and at the same time, fallacious. This is
"theoretically unnecessary"67 , since, as we saw, a 
concern with human freedom is implied in the main motif 
of historical materialism and permeates the whole of 
Marx’s thought.
Marx's work may be humanistic in its impact and goal, 
but it is "anti-humanistic" in its philosophic method. 
The goal is humanistic in the sense that the work is
intended at contributing to the subversion of 
capitalism - a system which happens to embody the 
oppression of human self-realisation. The method,
however, is a deliberate employment of the
dehumanistic epistemology which is formulated from a 
critique of Feuerbach.
67. This is a fallacy equivalent to a justification 
of a subject of a simple, a__Eligr statement. When 
applied in theory, it is like, for example, arguing 
about the political theory of liberal democracy by 
emphasising the role of the people in the political 
Process described by this theory without recognising 
that, in any case, the theory will be meaningless
without this particular fact.
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CHAPTER 9
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE PHILOSOPHY OF FEUERBACH AND 
LIBERATION THEOLOGY
9.1. AN AFFIRMATION OF THE CONCRETE HUMAN SUBJECT
According to Jon Sobrino in  T h e T r u e  Church_and_the
Poorl, Latin American theology of liberation signifies 
a consciously initiated "epistemological break" with 
the methodology of European theology, which, as 
characterised, has as its hallmark, an employment and 
veneration of abstract thinking and Idealism. Liberation 
theology, he explains, came about, and remains a 
negation of this Idealism2. It is a conscious attempt 
at a materialist (practical) epistemology in the sense 
of this being a negation of Idealism, and a speculation 
which fails to issue in action.
It is on an accentuation of this quest and drive for 
a practical-material basis for theology that
liberation theology goes further and pins itself 
critically against European political theology which
1- Jon Sobrino, The__True_Church__and_the__Poor (London, SCM 
Press, 1981 )
2- Ibid., p p .  35-38
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may be taken as the historical precedent and a genus of 
the same process of the "materialisation" of theology3. 
The episiemoLogical self- defini tion of liberation
theology reaches to the extent of finding the
existentialist basis of European political theology
inadequate!, Whereas the latter has restrictive1y 
focussed on drawing attention to the imperatives of 
reappropriating traditional Christian dogma in terms of 
historical consciousness, liberation theology critically 
goes beyond this and aims at working out actual 
strategies for the participation of the theological
effort in political struggles for revolutionary social 
change5 . In other words, the aim is to render theology 
a facilitator of practical commitment for the
liberation of the "poor". According to Jose Miguez
Bonino, it is this "revolutionary commitment"6 which
has been the inspiration and continues to be the basis 
of a theology of liberation.
Of note though, is the fact that, this revolutionary 
commitment, is conceived of as chiefly being aimed at
3. See J.L Segundo1s criticism of Harvey Cox, in _The
-i-Spa tion_of Theology. (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1977 ) pp.
|0-13; and, Hugo Assman, Theology__ for__a _Normad Church.
'■Maryknoll, N . Y : Orbis, 1976)
4- Jose Miguez Bonino,_Revolutionary_Theglggy_Cgmes_gf_Age,
pp' "9,8U
5. See, Duncan B. Forrester, Theology_and_Politics (Oxford:
5asU Blackwell, 1988), pp. 57-82
9- Jose Miquez Bonino, Revolutignary_Theology_Cgmes_of_Age,
pp’ xxv, 3 8 f.
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realising a kind of J liberation which is perceived as
n .1 i .1 roa t e 1 y aimed at redeeming the human being from his
alienation at the historico-structural level by
political injustice, as well._____as the personal-
psychological level7. As Gustavo Guttierrez
just i fyingly puts it,
Modern m a n ’s aspirations include not only 
liberation from exterior pressures which
prevent his fufillment as a member of a
certain social class, country, or society. He 
seeks likewise an interior liberation, in an
individual and intimate dimension; he seeks 
liberation not only on the social plane but
also on a psychological one. He seeks an 
interior freedom understood however not as an 
ideological evasion from social confrontation 
or as the internalization of a situation of 
dependency. Rather it must be in relation to 
the real world of the human psyche as 
understood since Freud.8
As another example: in describing the "historical
project" which liberation theology has set for itself
in Latin America,__vis_a_vis the plight of the poor,
Bonino explains that in liberation theology,
Development is not seen as merely economic or 
structural change; rather, there is a strong
emphasis on the human dimension
liberation is the process through which and in 
which a ’new m a n ’ must emerge, a man shaped by 
solidarity and creativity over against the
individualistic, distorted humanity of the 
present system.9
This is a clear adumbration of humanism, primarily as
n‘ • _A_Theol ggy_of _Li ber a t i on , p. 30
8• Loc. c i t .
^■ Op c i t . , p . 40
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an adoption of f.he problematic of the human condition 
as a point of departure and goal of theology.
I he combination o 1 these two characteristics - a
methodic di savowal of the tradition of abstract-
speculat ion in theology, and a move toward a 
materialism which is essentially humanist in the 
specific sense of evoking the urgent need of practical 
revolutionary commitment for the liberation of the 
materially poor, which is what differentiates
liberation theology from European political theology- 
is encapsulated in the following statement by
Gut ierrez:
A goodly part of contemporary theology seems to 
take its start from the challenge posed by the 
Qon-believer. The non-believer calls into
question our religious world, demanding its
throughgoing purification and revitalization. 
Bonhoeffer accepted that challenge and
incisively formulated the question that
undelies much of contemporary theological 
effort: How are we to proclaim God in a world
come of age? In a continent like Latin
America, however, the main challenge does not 
come from the nonbeliever but from the nonhuman 
-i.e, the human being who is not recognized as 
such by the prevailing social order. These are 
the poor and exploited people, the ones who are 
systematically and legally despoiled of their 
being human, those who scarcely know what a 
human being might be. These nonhumans do not 
call into question our religious world so much 
as they call into question our economicx_socia 1
Eyiiiicai^ and cultural_world. Their challenge
impels us toward a revolutionary transformation 
of the very bases of what is now a dehumanizing 
society. The question then, is no longer how we 
are to speak about God in a world come of age; 
it is rather how we are to proclaim him Father 
in a world that is not human and what the 
implications might be of telling nonhumans that
258
they are the children of GodlO
The foregoing, we maintain, bears a striking
resemblance to what. we saw as the unique kind of 
materialism which Feuerbach formulated, v i z . , an
affirmation of the concrete subjective  over against
the conceptual objective which translates itself into a 
rejection of speculative epistemology in favour of an 
assertion of the significance of the human subject. In 
similitude to the "reformation" which Feuerbach
effected upon Hegel’s philosophy, which may well be 
called an "epistemological break", liberation theology 
claims to be born out of a new epistemological- 
methodoLogical framework which affirms the significance 
of concrete reality and human existence, while 
consciously and sj's t ema t i ca 11 y contradicting
speculative rationalism. Against traditional theology’s 
exclusive focus on spirituality and the conceptual
clarity of dogma, here there is a decided affirmation of 
the concrete environment of which the human being is 
seen as being a sine_qua_non, a Subject.
Even though liberation theology affirms this notion
of the primacy of the concrete human subject like
Feuerbach, and evidently edges beyond him in that it 
tries to take the sociological factor much more
1°- Quoted in, Rosini Gibellini, e d ., _Frontiers_of„Theology
tf-Ls 11 n_Ame r i c q  (London: SCM Press, 1980), p. x
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seriously, we maintain that, the introduction of the 
personal-psychological plane as the ultimate dimension 
of liberation, situates its philosophical
presuppositions - within the spectrum of a post- 
H'..sc i ¡an phi I osophy - firmly within Feuerbachian
philosophy. It is this very fact, that it takes the 
social context and analysis significantly more 
seriously than Feuerbach, which created a perception
that by virtue of this step, it is Marxist. We now
proceed to investigate the actual nature of the
relationship of this ( the taking of the social- 
concrete as a point of departure) by Latin American 
liberation thelogians to Marx’s epistemo1o g y .
9.2. THE MATERIALISM OF LIBERATION THEOLOGY: ON PRAXIS
Sobr j no ’ work (referred to above) is important in
that it seeks to specifically register the argument that 
the entire motif of liberation theolgy derives its 
justification from a castigation of "speculative 
thought", and focuses on the importance of the social 
context of the thinking being as the_point_of_departure 
of the theological process. The same theme is
repeatedly taken by other protagonists of liberation
theologyll. Throughout, they emphasise that it is
11- See, Jose Comblin, "What Sort of Service Might Theology
render?" i n , p Gibelinni, ed . , Fr on t i er s__of __Li be r a t i on
-L'Splogy , pp 58-78; J.L.. Segundo , The Liber at ion__of
^SSiosjr, pp. 8i9
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conditional to the self-authetication of whatever can be 
equated with Christian theology that it begins its 
activity with an analysis of the social conditions of 
those who are involved in the theological process (not 
necessarily professional theologians, but ordinary 
believers and others). This injunction for the need to 
engage with the social and historical context of the
locus theologicus12, is then transformed into a
methodological category of praxis.
The arrival at a formulation of praxis as an
ep i s t.omo i ogi ca 1-me t hodo 1 ogi cal framework brings
liberation theology into a dramatic affinity with the 
historic materialist tradition of Western philosophy,
as Nicholas Lobkowicz's study, Theory and_Practicey
iiistory_of illP_Qoncegt f r om_ Ar i s t o 11 e_ t o_Mar x , reminds
us!3. This matter has also been brought succinctly
within the field of theological debate by writings such 
as A. Nicholas' article, "The Story of Praxis, 
Liberation Theology’s Philosophical Handmaid"14. We
12. Gustavo Gutierrez identifies the locus_theologicus as 
being exclusively the activity of the Church (A_Theology_of 
Liberation., p,12). Jose Miguez Bonino, on the other hand, is 
readily inclined to include the extra-ecclesial liberation
movements as also constituting the locus theolpgicus (A
lLiiYglut i onary_Theo 1 ogy_Come s_of _ Age s . , pp. 53f). This may have to 
do with the fact that Gutierrez thinks from within his Catholic
ackground, whereas Bonino thinks as a Protestant (Methodist).
13. N. Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice^. History of_the
-9Qcept_form_Aristot 1e_tg_Marx (Notre Dame: University of Notre
bame Press , 1984).
j, ■ in, Religion_in__Communist_Lands , 17:1 (Spring 89), pp.
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will want to question this assumption of the 
materialist affinity of liberation theology to the 
thought of Karl Marx by enquiring on how is the concept 
of praxis actually understood within the context that it 
is being used in liberation theology and to what extent 
does it differ from M a r x ’s conception of the same.
, as defined by Gustavo Gutierrez in the now
classic, A_Theology of Liberation (1971), means, the
methodological imperative on taking account of the 
social, economic and political context in which the
believer lives, which context happens to be (as 
primarily, as is the case in Latin America) riddled
with conditions which demand a struggle for
I iberation 1 5. Hence for him, the accent for the primary 
context or material from which liberation theology arose 
and continues to rise is the context of, "Christian
participation in the liberation process"16. In the 
course of the emergence of liberation theology, observes 
Gutierrez, "revolutionary activity simply became a new 
field for the application of theological reflection"17.
Further to this, Sobrino’s assertion is also 
illuminative: that, unlike in "European theology", in
15. Op. cit., pp. 10-13
16. "Liberation Praxis and Christian Faith", in,
1 be 11 ini , Op^_cit^_, p. 2,
17. Ibid., p.7
Latin American liberation theology, it is the demands 
arising out of life experience that provide material 
for theological work, and not reasoning and logicl8.
Not even the demands of living according to the 
injunctions of this reason as ecclesiastical orthodoxy,
is the point de depart and objective of liberation
theology. Instead, and in negation of this, the main 
preoccupation is PPthopraxis. The employment of 
"orthopraxis". Gutierrez had already explained, is "to 
recognize the work and importance of concrete 
behaviour, of deeds, of action, of praxis in the 
Christian life. "19
We proceed to critically distill some of the features
of this theological appropriation of praxis.
9.2.1, A_Humani s t_Pr axi s_and_Marx_^
In liberation theology, the extra-rational reality 
(the extended) which is affirmatively encapsulated in 
the category praxis, is wholly and primarily conceived 
of in humanistic terms. Leaving aside what we have 
already noted on Miranda in the preceding sections, we 
find this wildly humanistic definition of praxis from 
Enrique Dussel:
Eiaxis or pratice denotes any human act
!8. Op C i t ., p . 20 




addressed to another human person; further, 
praxis denotes the very relationship of one 
person to another. Praxis is both act and 
relationship: ’those who believed lived at one
(Acts 2:44) 20
This is praxis as differentiated from its original 
Aristotelean meaning of human activity as being
activity vis a vis the socio-political fabric of the
human being’s environment, the polis21. It is praxis 
specifically and restrictively as a normative concept 
of the dynamics and vicissitudes of human activity 
towards another human being. "A practical relationship 
between persons is called praxis"22, asserts Dussel.
In order to distill this meaning, Dussel draws 
attention to another Greek word related to "practice"
from which _praxis  has to be differentiated. This is
BQiiiis. Poeisis, he explains, unlike praxis^ refers to 
the human being’s relationship with nature: "a
fashioning, a making, a producing with or in something, 
a working with nature. It denotes the person-nature 
relationship."23. This leaves praxis as a concept 
restricted to use only in reference to inter-personal 
relations.
20. Enrique Dussel,  Ethics_and_Community (Maryknoll, N.Y
1 1986), p . 8
21. See, Richard J. Bernstein,  Praxis and_Action
Q!Eprary_Philosoghies_of_Human_Activity, pp. ix, x.
2 2. O p . c i t . p . 8
23. Ethics_and_Community, p9
Among Latin American liberation theologians, Enrique 
Dussel distinguishes himself as one thinker who has 
sought. to subject liberation theology to the scrutiny 
of philosophical rigour24. We therefore take this view 
of his on praxis as being a well considered one.
One other noteworthy aspect of praxis as employed in
liberation theology, which tallies with Dussel’s 
emphasis, but adds the epistemological dimension, is 
ottered by Leonardo and Ciodovis Boff in their 
Introducing JLiberation Theology. There we read:
. if we are to understand the theology of 
liberation, we must first understand and take 
an active part in real and historical process 
of liberating the oppressed. In this field, 
more than in others, it is vital to move beyond 
a merely intellectual approach that is content 
with comprehending a theology through its purely 
theoretical aspects . . . We have to work our
way into a more biblical framework of reference, 
where "knowing" implies loving, letting oneself 
become involved body and soul, communing wholly 
being committed . . .25
Praxis, therefore, is not only having to do with the 
dynamics of human inter-personal relationships as a 
pespective of viewing economic and political structures 
(Dussel, Gutierrez), it also refers to the need of a 
Personal, humanistic commitment from the theologian. It
. See for e.g., his, Philosophy__of__Liberation
*aryknolli N.Y.: Orbis, 1985); Ethics and the Theology_of
j-ib§rat ion (Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis, 1978). For an extensive
1 biography of his writings, see, Ethics_And_Community, p. 253.
25. __L^__ Boff^__CG__Boff_L__ Int roducing_Li berat ion_Theology
6nt: Burns & Oates, 1987), p. 9
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has to do with the ethics of both the method of social 
engagement and propounding of a certain quality of 
social relations. As Dussel conclusively explains, the 
theme of praxis
furnishes an occasion for an explanation
of the radical. principle of Christian ethics
and of liberation and community ethics (which 
is the central aspect of basic theology) in 
particular. that radical principle operate!s] 
as the light that illumines, the horizon that 
criticizes, the root from which we must nourish 
all our subsequent ethical discourse .
I he radical principle of Christian ethics is 
the face-to-face of the person-to-person 
relationship in the concrete, real, satisfied, 
happy, community, in the gladness of being one 
with God and one with our brothers and sisters, 
members o f the communi ty.26
in the "post-Hegelian" milieu from within which Marx 
formulated his thinking, the concept of praxis re­
entered the philosophical arena with a decidely new 
import, as a criticism of Hegel’s philosophy of history 
or rather, a right-wing interpretation of this by the 
Old Hegelians. This was initiated by Marx’s
contemporary, the Left Hegelian August von Cieszkowski
(1814-1894) with his Prolegomena to Historiography,
which was published in 183827.
While David Strauss is credited with being a pioneer
of the demystification and eventual "decomposition" of
2^■ -i±hics_and_Community, p.16
2i. A.V Cieszkowski, Prolegqmena_zur_Historiosophie (Berlin: 
1838). English translation of Chapter 3 of this, published 
^ L a w r e n c e  Stepelevich, _The_Young_Hege 1 i ansy_An_Anthol ogy , pp.
2 6 6
Hegel’s philosophy with his  Life of__Jesus (1835),
Cieszkowski is credited as having introduced a 
reinterpretation of the concept Eraxis into the
critical language of the Left Hegelians, which concept 
was to become the most instrumental category in the 
eventual reworking of Hegel’s philosophy.
Cieszkowski worked out a complete re-orientation of 
Hegel's philosophy by highlighting, out of Hegel’s 
phenomenology of the Geist, a notion that this Geist's 
se1f-externa1isation cannot be staticaly understood in 
terms of the past of history, but as an extension to
the future. That is, that there is in history a
teleology. In proclaiming this "teleology of world
history"28, within a Hegelian context, Cieszkowski 
stumbled on the truth that this telos can only realise
itself in reality, as the practical life of the self-
externalising Geist. Therefore, all reality is an 
active and practical life of the Geist with a definite 
telos as its driving force. In explication of this, he 
refered to the famous statement from Hegel’s Lectures 
2H_the__Phi j_gsgphy_gf _Hi story , namely: "World history is
the progress in consciousness of freedom - a progress 
which we have to perceive in its necessity". Out of
this he proposed that instead of being an "aesthetic of
history"29, history according to Hegel is a patently
28. in, Stepelivich., p. 57
29._lbicL, p. 62
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I u 1:.u j’('• orientated and constantly self-determining 
realisation of freedom. For this reason, he proclaimed 
that philosophy, one of the Volksgeistes of Hegel’s
Geist (others being art and religion), had "to become a 
practical philosophy or practical activity, of praxis, 
exercising a direct influence on social life and
developing the future in the realm of concrete
activity"30.
It was left to Marx to protestingly state against all 
liis Left-Hegel ian colleagues that this teleological
movement of the Geist to freedom via stages of
Volksgeistes, its praxis, is actually taking place as 
concrete social formations and not abstract
Lolksgeistes or collective human consciousness. Hence, 
after Feuerbach had unmasked the deliberate self-
mystification of Hegel, Marx’s first act on his turn at 
the Master, was to focus on the latter’s Phi 1osophy_of 
Right - Hegel's propositions on the forms that the
Geist realises itself in political life. Through this 
process Marx developed a praxis of the uncloaked Geist 
(conflicting human group interests which necessitate
Political instititutions, principally the State) which
was congenially based on the breadth and depth of social 
and political reality as an arena where human groups 
were in action in pursuit of diverse interests. From
60. Cited in, David McLellan, The__Ypung_Hege1ians__and_Kar1
(London: Macmillan, .1969), p. 10
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he re at ter 1.84 4 . a communist analysis was added to
this, and eventually with the formulation of historical 
material ism, this £I§xis , deliberately assumed a non­
persona I i s 11 c and anti -i euerbachi an-humanist ic meaning. 
It became class struggle, as the schema of a society 
whose mode of production has divided into conflictual 
relations of production.
'this differs from a notion of praxis_ as being merely 
an eudaemonia 1-epistemo1ogical principle, that is, as a 
categor5r whose employment is seen as essentially 
exhausting the normative implications of human 
relations, as used in liberation theology (Cf. Dussel, 
above) , Against Dussel ’ i; praxis of a vision of a 
"community in the gladness of being one with God", Marx 
sees in the now, a society riddled with class 
antagonisms and in the travails of class struggle. 
Also, as part of the philosophical element of the 
thought of the post-Feuerbachian Marx, this is grounded 
on a conception that seeks to go beyond anthropology and 
Psychology31 to a sociology which views the human person 
only as an "ensemble of social relationships” .
As __praxis, reality, for Marx is singularly an
61. Besides, Gutierrez, __A_Theo1ogy_of_Liberation, p.32, 
See’ Juan Luis Segundo ’ s proposal for the uses of Freud’s 
Psychology of the consciouness to a theological understanding of 
J-he human condition", in his, Grace__and_the__Human_Condi t ipnj._A 
;'®QÌ9ey_f or_ a_New__Humani ty (Dubllin: Gill and Macmillan Ltd.,
i0i ■ PP. 35-37
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empirical reality which is sociologically cognized, as 
it is a theatre where the actors are human beings who 
arc ensembles/ representations of productive interests 
which are necesarily in conflict in a class society; 
and for this very reason it is historical (in the sense 
Cieszkowski suggested) - it is in constant movement 
towards a certain goal (fuller realisation of freedom in 
a classless society).
The conception of praxis within a historical
materialist context of change and sociological movement 
Is the touch-stone of Marx’s critique of Feuerbach.
Iil§ses_XI , "The philosophers have only interpreted the 
world in various ways, the point is, to change it"32. 
praxis does not consist. in establishing the principles 
of interpreting the world, nor in "reflecting" on what 
is going on in the world, even if such a "reflection" is 
laden with normative humanist intentions. Neither does 
it consist in adding the themes of sociology and 
politics to an intractably idealistic system, even if 
this be called an introduction of a "historical project” 
into theology, as Jose Miguez Bonino does33.
On the contrary, it consists in doing, in living,
in labpyring, and thereby being part of a life which is
62. Karl Marx, Theses_on_Feuerbach , in Nathan Rotenstreich, 
?-Prqblems_gf Marx/_s__Phi lospphy , 26
66- Be YP1 u t iona ry„. theology Come s_ of _Age , pp. 40-41.
under the historical eventuality of change34. The 
labour process, the materialistic mediation of human 
existence, life and self-production, contributes to a 
development. ol forces of production which result in 
corresponding forms of social relations, a further
development in the area of labour induces a tension
with the social relations, leading to social
revolution. This is what Marx’ in Thesis_I calls " 
revolutionary’, practical-critical activity"35.
Labour. How is labour the definitive of this "sensuous 
human activity, practice" which is at the same time 
"practical-critical"? Does it not include intellectual 
labour as well; and the development of productive 
forces, does not this involve the development of skills, 
know how, science? Is the "interpretation of the
world", theoria, not labour? Is it not therefore part 
of the reality, praxis? It is. If it is, does it mean 
that liberation theology, as theory, is praxis? Yes, it 
is, but, as we demonstrate below, it is not a
£§Y2lutionary_theory, a mater|al_force.
The foregoing answers the question on as to how the
34. The Communist_Manifesto_ declares that the material 
force of change in the epoch of capitalism is the social class of 
bu: exploited workers (ensemble of relations of production), who 
ln turn have been produced by the development of the capitalist
-S'stem itself. This production of the proletariat, and what the 
M o 1 r;: tar i a t does in isolated skimishes against capitalism, 
)])oiuding the plethora of competing ideologies and behavioural
tp-M<ionci os accompanying tills, is praxis^
33. in, Rothenstreich, p.23
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world can be changed without there being an act of 
explaining the reason (interpretation) and mechanisms 
of changing this - theoria. Marx addressed that
quest 1.on at the neight oi his Feuerbachian haze, as it 
were, in the "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s 
Philosophy oi Right: Introduction" (1844), He had to.
Because of his understanding of Hegel according to 
Cieszkowskie, the fact of Feuerbach's prononcements on 
the end of philosophy (which only proved to be 
hypocritical in the end), could not allow him to totally 
ignore the question of theory. Strictly speaking, this 
question of the relationship between theory and praxis, 
is a feuerbachian problematic (In the 1850’s Marx
discovered the scientific method as an adequate 
synthesis of theory and praxis since science seeks to 
describe phenomena objectively and faithfully, in a
e: up r a- ideological manner, and recognises the progress of 
knowledgedB). Nevertheless, even in his state as a 
Feuerbachian, the direction of his eventual position, 
which we attempted above, was visible. He wrote (in 
1844 ) :
In the struggle against this state of affairs 
[Prussian politics] criticism is no passion of 
the head, it is the head of passion. It is not 
a lancelot, it is a weapon. Its object is its 
enemy, which it wants not to refute but to
exterminate . . The weapon of criticism
cannot, of course, replace criticism of the
weapon, material force must be overthrown by 
material force; but theory also becomes a 
material force as soon as it has gripped the
36. See, "Preface to the Second German edition of Capital
'•U' and, f. Engels, _Anii_Duhr i ng
272
mass. Theory is capable of gripping the mass as 
soon as it demonstrates __ad_hominem, and it
demonstrates ad hominem as soon as it is
radical. To be radical is to grasp the root of 
the matter . .. theory is fulfilled in people
only insofar as it is the fulfillment of the 
needs of that people
for revolutions require a passive 
ei emonl , a material basis37
theory remains secondary to what Marx,
i 1 luminatively, merely calls the material. This 
material, includes the masses who are brought into 
being, mobilised, by theory. However, Marx, goes
futher and stipulates the proviso under which theory 
can become a material force. This incites the question, 
which we touched upon above, as to liberation
theology's fulfillment of this proviso, as a
"reflection on liberation praxis" (Gutierrez)
To summarise, and to highlight the fact that M a r x ’s
understanding and use of praxis (practice) is what sets
a point of difference between Feuerbach’s humanist-
materialism and his historica 1 -materialism, we reproduce
the following pertinent sections of the _Theses_on
Feuerbach (numbers, I, VIII, and XI, consecutively):
The chief defect of all materialism up to now 
(that of Feuerbach included) is that the 
object, the reality, sensibility, is conceived 
only in the form of the the object or of 
PPPiempiation, but not as sensuous human 
activity, practice [praxis], not subjectively.
Hence it happened that the active  side, in
contradistinction to materialism, was developed
37. From the volume, Marx K., Engels, F .,_ _ O n _ R e l i g i o n
•Mus*cow: Progress Publishers, 1957), pp. 40, 45, 46
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by idealism - but only abstractly, since of 
course, idealism does not know real, sensuous 
activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous 
objects substantially differentiated from the 
thought objects, but he does not conceive human 
activity itself as objective reality. Hence, in
the Essence of Christianity, he regards the
1 heoi't- 1  i raJ a1 ti tude as the only genuinely
human attitude, while practice is conceived and 
f i xed only in its dirty-judaical form of 
appearance. Hence he does not grasp the 
signiJ icunce of revolutionary’, ’practical-
critical’, activity’.
Ail sooial life is essentially practical. All 
mysteries that induce theory to mysticism find 
their rational solution in human practice and 
in the conception of this practice
The highest point that contemplative
materialism reaches, that is , the materialism 
that does not conceive of sensibility as 
practical activity, is the perception of the 
single individual in ’civil society’
We therefore note, in a provisional conclusion, that 
Marx’s notion of praxis - a philosophic
conceptualisation of reality, is firmly grounded on his 
post Feueibachian development, and that insofar as this 
development is supremely characterised by a rejection of 
Feuerbach s humanism, the extent to which liberation 
theology centers its analysis on the human condition 
does not readily fall into place with this Marxism. In 
order to further support this conclusion we need to 
consider the following two issues which are in part a 
continuation of the points we raise in this section.
9.2.2. The Production__of Theo1ogy__and__the__Mode_of
Production
Secondly, in comparing liberation theologjr's
conception oi ppnxig with Marx’s thought, we note
i iii' 1 in I i be ra t ion theology . the "concrete" is 
exclusively given primary affirmation and turned into a 
polemic against traditional theology only on its
importance as the starting point and main subject of 
theological reflection, i.e, as a methodological 
imperative. It is not seen as a historical activity of 
a conglomeration of socio-historical and economic 
factors, which according to a historical materialist 
episternology, should have an influence on the
development of theology, insofar as it is an 
'intellectual systciri38 . The same applies to the
seriousness of an awareness of the influence that 
>«i c tor i c.o - ma !. o i• iai cond.it ions have on the locus 
Iheoiog j. cus . the church, insofar as this is a social 
i n sf.it u t. i o n 3 9 ,
38. The closest that liberation theology comes to this 
'®cogn:ition is only at noting the influence of ideologies current 
thin the historical context from which the activity of 
theoiogising occurs. This is the issue which Juan L. Segundo has 
brought as as his main preoccupation and challenge to his fellow 
tlieologians . See, his The_Li bera t i on_of _Theo 1 ogy ( pp . 7 , 97f.) and
- § 1  lh_And_jdeolggies .
T 39. Leonardo Boff, Churchy Charism_and_Powery_Liberation
~_§glggy_and_the_Institutional_Church (New York: Crossroad P u b l .
0i> 1985), is a noteworthy attempt in this direction.
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lilis attitude differs from the way Marx would assert
the relationship between a development of an
intellectual system and its material conditions.
Dialectico-hiotorical materialism goes a qualitative
step further than liberation theology and would assert
Iha 1. the material subjective should not only be taken up
as a theme of a theology; rather theology itself as a
di so. ip i i ji< in both contení and form, should be taken as
nothing but a product of "men . . .  as they are
eonditioned bj a definite development of their
productive forces"40. In an annunciation of this central
principle of a Marxist epistemo1o g y , Marx with Engels
wrote in The_German_Ideology,
Men are the producers of their conceptions,
ideas, etc, and precisely men conditioned by 
the mode of production of their material life, 
by their material intercourse and its further 
development in the social and political 
structure . . .  in accordance with the 
different stages of their development, they 
make up the nonsense of substance, subject, 
se 1 f-consciouness and pure criticism, as well 
as religious and theological nonsense, and
Later they get rid of it again when their 
orveiopment is sufficiently advanced.41
At a philosophical level, within the background of 
our earlier discussion, the differences on this issue, 
reveals a more fundamental conflict. Marx’s view of the 
intercourse between theory and praxis, and the relative 
genetive dependence of the former on the latter, issues
^6 - K. Marx, E. Engels,  The_German_Ideology, (Collected
Vol.5) p. 36
41 ■ Ibid . , p .36
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t j’oiu hi;:, differences with Feuerbach on the question of 
the relationship between Subject and Object. Feuerbach
maintained the independence of one from the other, by
urging for the isolation of the (human) Subject from the
Object I of thought) . Marx, in contradistinction, went
back to the Hegelian position, concentrated on_the
dj.aj.eci.ic , and formulated a theory of the dialectical 
relationship between the two. He redefined and
broadened the Subject on the basis of Feuerbach’s
"empiricist" emphasis and replaced Feuerbach’s "Man" 
wi th historico-socini reality, and in the process showed
how the Object - thought forms, ideas, consciousness-
does not only follow the Subject but is actually 
conditioned by the Subject, This is a unique view of the 
unity of Subject and Object: historical reality is self-
productive, i.e, as Subject it is at the same time 
Object. The seeds of its future alternative are embedded 
within itself.
A failure to take full and practical note of the
genet ive relationship of theory to the material base, 
is a Feuerbachian defect. In Thesis IV on Feuerbach, 
Marx mentions that in having as the starting and 
finishing point of his philosophy the fact of the self­
alienation of man by taking, in religion, the imaginary 
world as the real thing, Feuerbach overlooks the fact 
that after this analysis, there is "the chief thing" 
which "still remains to be done". This is the fact that,
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this self projection and alienation, happens only 
because and as result of the fact that the real world 
(reality) is itself riddled with alienations (self-
con t rad i c tor i ness , class antagonism). "Thus, for 
instance, once the earthly family is discovered to be 
the secret of the holy family, the former must then 
itself be criticised in theory and in practice".
This, in an amplified application in relation to 
theology, is another way of raising the fact that
religious doctrines are inspired in their formulation 
and content by the histor ico-materia 1 conditions within 
which they are formulated, and are simply a reflection 
of these conditions. In an obituary to Bruno Bauer, 
Bruno_Bauer_and_Early_Christianity (published on May 4, 
1882) Frederick Engels applies this perspective to 
demonstrate how the growth of Christianity into a world 
religion was simply facilitated by the economic and
philosophical contradictions which beset the Roman 
empire during the first three centuries, a period during 
which the doctrinal basis of Christianity was
formulated42.
Were liberation theology to take this Marxist 
doctrine seriously, it would mean either of the two 
things. Firstly, liberation theology would be imbued 
with the task of working for its se 1 f-dissolution as a
42. See, On_Re1igion, p,173f
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theology since it is working for social change, which 
if it be in Marxist terms, is toward communism - as
Jose Miranda is bold enough to declare43 - where
according to Marx, there will be no alienation inducing 
class antagonisms and religion will naturally turn 
superfluous. Or at least, it will have to have as its 
central theme and raison__djet r e , an instigation that 
theology should be kept open toward praxis - the ever- 
moving reality, and be allowed to be constantly and 
radically moulded by these material changes. Within this 
level it also would have had to demonstrate how each 
and every dogmatic theme and notion of Christian 
theologs^ - God, Grace, Salvation, Sin, Immortality,
Kingdom of God, et cetera - in their original
formulation and deployment (not meaning given to them 
after they came into the vocabulary of the Church) has
been inspired and conditioned by certain class and
cultural interests.
The second test of the taking of Marx’s doctrine 
seriously, would have been a willingness to accept
that the mutation of classical "European theology" into 
a liberation theology should itself be taken as merely 
an event that accompanies a certain conjecture of a 
stage of development of productive forces with their 
corresponding nature of relations of production within a
43. See, J.P. Miranda, „Communism_in__the_Bible (Maryknoll,
°rbis, 1982), passim
given h i s t o r i c o  e c o n o m i c  epoch, and not a prophe t i c 
r eformation of theology as such. Within this context of 
enquiry it would raise the question as to whether there 
is a certain level of a development in productive 
forces of a given social context within which liberation 
theology can be expected to emerge. And if the answer to 
this be in the affirmative, the implication will be that 
the mystical connotations of "the prophetic" as being an 
action of the non-sensuously conceived "God", will be 
exposed as being but a s e 1 f-de 1 uding mystification of 
what in truth is only a historical-material activity,
viz, an e m e r g e n c e  of a theology of liberation as a 
result of the inducement of historical material
factors .
In an article "Theology and Production Relations: The
Case of Southern Africa"44 Matthew Schoffeleers, an 
anthropologist at the Free University of Amsterdam, 
raises the very same question and presented it as a
paradigm for explaining the failure of the methodology 
of South African Black Theology, which is developed in a 
more industrialised and urbanised part of the country, 
to be appreciated in the still rural parts of the same 
country. He argues that liberation theology in South 
Africa has been able to outgrow a fascination with the
traditional agenda of continental African theology-
44. Journal_of Theology £pr_Southern Africa, No 61, Dec.
987 • PP. 14-26
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f a i t h
Orbi s
that ol concentration on cultural emancipation from 
Anglo-Saxon cultural norms - only due to the profound 
changes in production relations that occurred as black 
people of South African became urbanised.
The view of praxis as employed in liberation 
theology, we observe, is only a restrictive one. It 
refuses to go beyond being a mere affirmation of the
epistemologically  subjective. On the other hand it
does not show a full appreciation nor assimilation of 
this aspect of M a r x ’s epistemology - the effect of the 
material in determining thought formation. Liberation 
theologians face the same criticism Marx levelled 
against Feuerbach (Thesis_VII): "Feuerbach . . . does
not see that the ’religious sentiment’ is itself a 
social product . . ."
9.3.3. Praxis_and_Transcendence
In addition, as we note from Gutierrez’s definition 
of theology as "a critical reflection on historical 
praxis"45, the rationalistic-theoretical is still
accorded a significant measure of prominence46. Even 
though it is obvious that Gutierrez’s view retains the 
value of the "reflective" more conservatively than the
A_Theo1ogy_of_Liberation, p.11
6 - See,a l s , G. Gutierrez, "Liberation Praxis and Christian
’ in _The Power_of the_Poor in_History (Maryknoll, N.Y:
1983)
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of theology as a logos, and a religious reflection, is
generally adhered to and preserved. By virtue of the
pioneering nature of his work. Gutierrez entrenched the
fact that despite everything else, liberation theology
remains "a reflection". He wrote,
Theology as a critical reflection on praxis in 
the light of the Word [of God] does not replace 
the other functions of theology, such as wisdom 
and rational knowledge; rather it presuposses 
them.47
This issue of the nature of the cognitive process 
which is employed in an epistemological process is very 
crucial to our disquition. We saw in our discussion of 
Louis Althusser48, that one of the main elements of an 
affirmation of "theoretical anti-humanism" as a feature 
of a philosophical position Marx develops after 1845, 
is his establishment of a qualitative differentiation 
between ideology and science as theoretical practices. 
As a consequence of his awareness of the determining 
influence of socio-material factors on all intellectual 
activity, and the "theoretical inferiority" of the realm 
of ideas as a realm which is derived from the material 
base, he identified "ideology” , as a theoretical 
practice - as well as products of this - which is either 
not conscious of the secondary nature of its 
formulations, or which deliberately seeks to conceal
47. Op. ci t . , p.13
48. Chapter 2 , above
way Combi in and Sobrino would, the central conception
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its awareness of this fact in order to further partisan 
interests. As a step leading away from this
petrification and corruption of knowledge of reality, he 
devoted himself to cultivating a non-ideo 1 ogica 1 ,
"scientific” way of analysis. Such a method, would have 
as its hall-mark, the adoption of an understanding of 
the socio-material basis of all life as its point of
departure. That is, instead of starting off from the
interpretative level of the superstructure, it would
focus on the genetive and "determining" infrastructure 
and adopts this as an intepretat ive key and framework of 
a superstructural phenomenon.
In Ludwig £euerbach, Frederick Engels, in a
reflective statement of how this change in method was
arrived at explains that it was
the result of a return to the
materialistic standpoint. That means, it was 
resolved to comprehend the real world - nature 
and history - just as it presents itself to 
everyone who approaches it free from
preconceived idealist crotchets. It was decided 
mercilessly to sacrifice every idealist crotchet 
which could not be brought into harmony with the 
facts conceived in their own and not in a
fantastic interconnection. And_materialism_means 
D2 ÍÍ3 Íng_more_than_this . 49
In other words, it is a denial of any other reality
beyond that which is sensuously experienced.
We have two hints of the application of this
49. Se 1 ected_Works_jOne_Vo1^2, p. 608
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materialist epistemology. The first is its announcement
as a method in a criticism of Feuerbach, in Theses_On
Feuerbach,( Thesis IV). There we read:
Feuerbach starts off from the fact of religious 
self-estrangement, of the duplication of the 
world into a religious world and a secular one.
His work consists in resolving the religious 
world into its secular base [or substratum]. But 
the fact that the secular lifts off from itself 
and establishes itself as an independent realm 
in the clouds [is not explained. And this] can 
only be explained by the inner strife and self- 
con t rad i c t o r i ne s s [Sichselbswidersprechen] of
this secular base. Therefore, the latter must 
itself be both understood in its contradiction 
and revolutionised in practice. Hence, for 
example, once the earthly family is discovered 
to be the secret of the holy family, the former 
must then itself be destroyed in theory and in 
prac t ice.
That is, in a development away from Feuerbach, "The 
criticism of heaven is transformed into the criticism 
of earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism 
of law, the criticism of theology into the criticism of 
politics"50.
The second example is the declaration that Capital 
(I), is a demonstration of this method. Indeed, 
Althusser makes a point that one just needs to compare 
the methodological style of the „ E c o n o m i  c__and 
PhiIpsophical_Manuscripts of 1844, and and that used 
in Capital to discern a radical intellectual shift in 
Marx’s thinking. The difference is not necessarily in
50. Karl Marx, "Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of
ight: Introduction", in D. McLellan, Karl Mar x_l__.Se 1 ec t ed
--itings , p. 64
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the themes: adressed, but in the way they are handled
and the operative perspective which is used as a key. 
In the preface to the second German Edition of
Capitail!1, Marx wrote: "My analytical method does not
start from man but from the the economically given 
social period."51
The analytical method which started from "Man" - on a 
jeremiad on the obfuscation of the essence of this 
"Man", the denials of his freedom, and a call that this 
Man should be the center of all philosophy, that 
philosophy should have as its supreme content "Man"-
is what Feuerbach and the Marx of 1844 were all about.
This principle was not rejected during 1845-46 because
Marx had anything against the promotion of the well­
being of "man", on the contrary, he was chiefly against 
Feuerbach’s assumption of this "man" as merely an
abtract philosophical principle ("Man") which is put 
forward as an abstract principle from which all
material reality was to be interpreted and be given 
meaning.
Moreover, within Feuerbach’s philosophy, this revealed
another element which Marx takes up in  Thesis_V^
namely, that: "Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract
Ihinking, advocates sensuous_contempiat ion . . .". That
is, in the place of Hegelian abstract idealism,
51- Preface to the second German edition of Capital_I
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Feuerbach suggested a "contemplative materialism" ( 
Thesis iX). The word that Marx used, for "contemplative" 
in the German original of the the Theses, is 
Bejrachtung. Betrachtung translates into English as 
nmdifation or reflection. Based on his awareness of how 
the philosophical principle of Man as continually 
validated by reference to religion is advocated as a 
means of unravelling reality, Marx came to the 
conclusion that Feuerbach’s epistemology is nothing but 
a meditation seeking to be materialistic.
In considering the relationship between Marxism and
liberation theology we are therefore struck by the
appearance of "reflection" as a proposition for a
revolutionary cognitive practice. What are the elements
of this "reflection on praxis in the light of the Word
of God"52? We can isolate only one, namely, what the
phrase literally means, that is, the abstraction of
theological schema, themes as well as dogma, and a use
of these as a paradigm for interpreting concrete social
reality. In affirmation of this, Guttierrez wrote:
Theology . . .  as linked to praxis, fulfills a 
prophetic function insofar as it interprets
historical events with the intention of
revealing and proclaiming their profound 
?D§yDiD/a- (emphasis ours)53.
This is, precisely, an epistemological practice
52. A_Theo1ogy_of_Liberation, p . 13
53. Loc. cit.
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whereby theology - which is a superstructural 
intellectual system - is used to "give meaning" to the 
infrastructure of natural existence. This disregards 
the fact that theology, according to historical- 
material ism , is generated and shaped by the substratum 
of the socio-economic active relations of the context 
out of which it emerges. It also contradicts M a r x ’s 
method of start ing with the materially given as the 
modicum of giving meaning to the theoretical (in its 
institutionalised forms); and therefore, by starting 
with, or basing itself on the theoretical, the "Word" 
(Logos, John 1:1-14!), liberation theology opens itself 
to the charge of being identified as an ideology, as 
understood in Marx.
In his Faith and Ideologies, Segundo offers a
spirited defence of the fact that transcendentalism or 
a transcendentalist epistemology does not of necessity 
have to preclude a materialist method of analysis54. He 
even identifies the tendency to separate the two as one 
probable mistake of Marx55. Segundo, as it can be 
expected, engages into this in a reactive awareness of 
the critique that emerges from what we present above, 
and in a bid to defend the Faith basis of liberation 
theology. Unfortunately, he is not aware that his 
proposal is not all that novel: Ludwig Feuerbach had
54. J.L Segundo, Faith_and_Ideologies, pp.238f.
55. Ibid. p .240
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worked all that out before. What Segundo does is to 
confirm our view that liberation theology is, insofar as 
its epistemology is concerned, principally a
Feuerbachianism.
But what about Feuerbach’s critique of religion? 
Isn't it a contradiction to claim that Feuerbach, who
"is regarded as the most significant critic of 
Christianity in the nineteenth century"56, has 
principal affinity with a theology of liberation which, 
as we demonstrated in our earlier discussion, is intent 
on preserving Christianity57? Without referring to our 
demonstration in the previous section on the minimal 
extent to which Feuerbach sought to see the obliteration 
of religion, we refer to the argument we present in our 
critique of Alistair K e e ’s advocacy for liberation
theology to confront Marx’s "ontological" critique of
religion58. There we argue that the development of the 
critical postulate of the reversal of reality as
Feuerbach pioneered this by explaining it in relation to 
religion, was not a substantive postulate, but a 
heuristic theory which was used to shed light and expose 
a certain reality.
56. Alistair Kee, _The_Way_of_Transcedencei_Christian_Be1ief 
Without_Faith_in_God (London: SCM Press, 1985, 2nd e d .), p.188
57. See, our Review of Alistair K e e ’s Criticism 
of Liberation Theology’s Relation to Marxism in Appendix 
A , be 1 o w .
58. In p. 346 below
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Feuerbach’s original and main objective was to show 
how speculative philosophy exacerbates the self­
alienation of "man"; and he put forward his observation 
that speculative philosophy in_its Hegelian form, falls 
into this mode because it bases itself on Christian 
theological thought patterns, he then had to go further 
and explain how and why Christian theology has this
negative influence on philosophy and by extension on 
"man". The aim was not to criticise religion for the 
sake of criticising it, or to study it for purposes of 
achieving any goal to the detriment of the continued 
practice of religion. It was for a demonstration of the 
theory of the inversion of reality. Therefore, it is 
more than logical that liberation theology can be seen 
to be related to Feuerbach’s philosophy, especially its 
expression by the young Karl Marx.
We propose to proceed to demonstrate how this 
£2 Qiefflplative materialism works, or exhibits itself in 
liberation theology.
As one example of the "reflection" method of
liberation theology and the way it reveals "profound
meaning" we find this summary definition of history
from Guttierrez:
Human history is . a political occupation
through which man orients and opens himself to 
the gift which gives history its transcendent
meaning: the full and definitive encounter with
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the Loi’d and other men. 5 9
How "profound"! Is this not a mystification of human 
history, a conversion of this into "History", a mere 
concept? Is it not the same as Feuerbach’s 
apotheosisation of Anthropology into a theologico- 
philosophical analysis concerned with "Man" , and the 
induction of the theme of love into social relations?.
In The_German_!deology, Marx provided the following
succinct analysis of Feuerbach’s transcendentalist
method, which we maintain, can well be applicable to
theologies that claim a material socio-political point
de_depart whilst on the other hand they venerate the
supernatural dimension as the framework of
interpretation:
Feuerbach’s ’conception’ of the sensuous world 
is confined on the one hand to mere 
contemplation of it, and on the other to mere 
feeling; he posits ’M a n ’ instead of 'real
historical m a n ’ . . . in the contemplation of
the sensuous world, he necessarily lights on 
things which contradict his consciousness and 
feeling . . .  to remove this disturbance, he 
must take refuge in double perception, a 
profane one which perceives ’only the flatly
obvious’ and a higher, philosophical one, which
perceives the ’true essence’ of things’.60
By applying theological categories on concrete socio­
hist orica 1 reality, and to pose this categories as
59. A_Theo1ogy_of_Liberat ion, p. 10
60. Col lected_Works . Vol . 5_̂  , p.39
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determinitive hermeneutical premisses of explaining
this reality, liberation theology is actually creating
abstract notions out of socio-historica1 reality. In 
the least, which cannot be denied, it imposes an 
interpretative mantle of religion upon its object of 
analysis, and gives to social reality purely mythical 
meanings which go beyond the acceptable role of a myth 
as being a hermeneutic tool. It reduces the process of 
human experience to ontological (theological) dogmas; 
the result being that the whole of praxis, reality, is 
then left perceived as a riddled system of dogmatic 
inconsistencies which are perpetually in search of some 
form of a logical reconciliation or another. The most
pertinent example is with the application of the
doctrine of sin, as a substantive principle, in
political analysis. For instance we find this social 
analysis in Enrique Dussel’s political ethics:
. someone may be born wealthy, a member of 
the dominant class and a moneyed, bourgeois
family. He or she is surely not responsible
for having been born there. But just as
surely, this individual  inherits this
institutional 'originary’ sin. Thus as Paul 
proclaims, it is possible for death to reign
even over those who had not sinned by breaking
a precept as did Adam (Rom 5:14).61
This is a social vision of a dominant class in class 
society, according to Dussel. The bourgeoisie, the 
ruling class, is a community of sinners, and most of
them are sinners not by their choice, but simply
• - E t h i c s _ a n d _ C o m m u n i  t y , p .  21
2 9 1
■through the misfortune of being born into families
which happen to exploit and oppress the "poor". And
about the oppressed, whom Marx within a capitalist
economic system will identify as exploited wage-
labourers are defined in the following terms:
The constitutive act of the ’poor’ in the Bible 
is not lacking goods, but being_dominated, and 
this by_the_sinner. The poor are the correlative 
of sin. As the fruit of sin, their formality as 
’p o o r ’ constitutes the poor or oppressed, and 
as such, the just and holy 
. . . The poverty or want suffered by the poor
is not the sheer absence of goods. No, the 
poverty of the poor consists in having been 
despoiled of the fruit of their labour by 
reason of the objective domination of sin."62
Ihis portrayal of victims of a negative system in
terms which makes it difficult to create a programme
for their liberation, or an analysis in which they can
see the causes of their domination in material-
scientific terms, is, according to Engels, exactly what
Feuerbach’s "neueren Philosophie" was all about. And
away from this, he and Marx had distanced themselves by
critically developing a new methodology.
[Feuerbach] is realistic [materialist] since he 
takes his start from man . . . this man remains
always the same abstract man who occupies the 
field of the philosophy of religion. For this 
man is not born of a woman; he issues, as a 
chrysalis, from the god of the monotheisitic 
religions. He therefore does not leave in a real 
world historically come into being and 
historically determined.63
62. Ibid., p . 22
63. Feuerbach__and_the__End, in, _Se1ected_Works (One Vol.), 
P. 604
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Hp i f> incapab I. e ot telling us anything
definite either about real nature or real men. 
bu t from the abs tract man of Feuerbach one 
arrives at real living men only when one 
considers them as participants in history. And 
that is what Feuerbach resisted . . . .  But the 
step which [he] did not take had nevertheless 
to be taken. The cult_of_abstract_man, which 
formed the kernel of Feuerbach’s new religion, 
had to be replaced by the science_of_rea 1 _men 
and of their historical development. This 
further development of Feuerbach’s standpoint 
beyond Feuerbach was inaugurated by Marx in 1845 
in The_Holy_Family.64 (emphasis ours)
This is what led Engels in his review to conclude
that the idealism of Feuerbach's "inconsistent
materialism" lies exactly here: "as soon as we come to
his philosophy of religion and ethics"65. To subsume
all reality into religion, is a hallmark of
Feuo r bachi an i s m .
One other trend of liberation theology’s idealist 
epistemology which goes to demonstrate the paramountcy 
of the ideal, and the extent at which this is allowed to 
pervade the entire method, is the precept that the 
church’s (1 ocus_theologicus) engagement and commitmemt 
to historical ("secular") liberation struggles is not an 
end in itself. "This commitment is the matrix for a 
discovery of the true meaning of d i s c i p 1 e shi p ’’ , informs 
Jose Miguez Bonino 6 6 .
64. Ibid. p. 607
65. Ibid., p. 601
6 6 . Revolutipnary_Theology_Comes_of_Age, p.xxv
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"Christians for Socialism" ( participants at the
conference held in Santiago, Chile, in April 1972 under
the same theme67):
The Christian committed to revolutionary 
practice discovers the liberating force of the 
love of God, of the death and resurrection of 
Christ. He discovers that his faith does not 
imply the acceptance of a world that is already 
made, or of a predetermined history, but rather 
that the very living of his faith involves the 
creation of a new and solidary world and leads 
to historical intiatives fertilized by Christian 
hopes . 6 8
Bonino goes on and quotes from the Final Document
Revolutionary participation in the evolution of 
history, is interpretatively rendered subservient to the 
higher ideal of attaining and experiencing a more 
pi’ofound religious experience. In other words, all 
forms of struggle, from the wider and the invisible 
class struggle to the very political skirmishes which 
the oppressed occasionally mount against their 
oppressors, are acts of Faith. They are ritual. As a 
matter of fact, George Pixley and Clodovis Boff, in
t h e i r  The_Biblej the_ÇhurchJ__and_the_Poor , preach that
the poor, who are in struggle for their life against 
structures of oppressive opulence, are a "SACRAMENT of
67. See, J. Eagleson, e d . _Qhristians_for_Socialism 
(Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis, 1975).
68 . O p . c i t , p . xxv
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God"69. Th i s is caught up by Bishop Moacyr Grechi in his 
validative Foreword to this book. He summarises the 
message of the book with the singular theme that God is 
using the poor to save the Church, and thereby the 
world:
Without the poor, the church loses its Lord, 
who identified with them and elevated them into 
final judges of this world. Without the poor, 
the church is simply lost70
Furthermore, we note that even the construction of
liberation theology itself is not, per__se, an
intentional development of a theoretical tool which is
aimed at being used as a weapon for social
transformation and reconstruction. There is a higher
goal beyond a construction of liberation theology, as
Jon Sobrino explains:
Latin American liberation theology is
interested in the liberating of the real world 
from its wretched state, since it is this
objective situation that has obscured the
meaning_of_faith. Its task is not primarily to 
restore the meaning of faith in the presence of 
the wretched conditions of the real world. It is 
to transform this real world and at_the_same 
1 i!D§_fecover_ t he_meaning_of _ the_f ai th . The task, 
therefore, is not to understand the faith
differently, but to allow a new faith to spring
from a new practice.71 (emphases ours)
Even the appreciation or employment of Marxism as a
theoretical tool of analysis and mobilisation is
69. C. Boff, G. Pixley,  The_Bi bl e j__the_Chur ch_and_ the
-22E (Kent: Burns & Oates; Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis Books, 1989), 
PP' 109-122
70. Ibid., p .xv
71. The_TrueChurch_and_the_Poor. p. 20
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primarily perceived as a religious artefact, a fetish. 
This is encapsulated in Bonino's epic pronouncement that 
Marxism is adoptively perceived in the programme of 
liberation theology as "the unavoidable historical 
mediation of Christian obedience"72. The theoretical 
system of dialectico-historical materialism, according 
Bonino, is the sine_gua_non of the Christian realisation 
of Jesus's Great Commission73.
9.3. CONCLUSION
In the opening sections of The German_Ideology Karl
Marx gives a review of the philosophical advance of
his Left-Hegelian colleagues, their joint concerns, 
until he himself gradually left them from the beginning 
of 1844. Below, we quote from this review, and present 
it as a fundamental conclusion of our foregoing 
discussion, as well as a corroboration of our view that 
Latin American liberation theology is based on Left- 
Hegelianism, and insofar as it seeks to go with Marx 
beyond Feuerbach, it remains a Neo-Feuerbachianism .
The entire body of German philosophical 
criticism from Strauss to Stirner is confined to
criticism of religious  conceptions. The
critics started from real religion and theology 
proper . . . the advance consisted in including
the allegedly dominant metaphysical, political, 
juridicial, moral and other conceptions under
72. Reypiutionary_Theolpgy_Comes_of_Age, p.98 
7 3. L o c . c i t .
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the category of religious or theological
conceptions; and similarly in declaring that
political, juridicial, moral consciousness was 
religious or theological consciousnes, and that 
political, juridical, moral man - ’M a n ’ in the 
last resort - was religious. The dominant role
of religion was presupposed. Gradually every
dominant relationship was declared to be a 
religious relationship and transformed into a 
cult, a cult of law, a cult of state, etc. It
was thought merely a question of dogmas and 
belief in dogmas. The world was sanctified to 
an ever-increasing extent . . . The Young
Hegelians are in agreement with the Old
Hegelians in their belief in the rule of
religion, of concepts, of a universal principle 
in the existing world.74
74. Col1 ected_Works. Vol 5., p. 29
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CHAPTER iu
HISTORY IN LIBERATION THEOLOGY: 
THE PERSISTENCE OF A MYSTIFIED DIALECTIC
10.1 INTRODUCTION
Karl M a r x ’s theory of history as an account of
comprehensive social development - historical-
materialism - is more of an epistemological paradigm
than it is a substantative account of history itself. 
It is an elaboration of an epistemological innovation 
of seeking to ground the dynamics of human cognitive
process and perspective (Anschauung) on the premiss
that the socio-economic context, the material
production of life - is determinitive of all life, in 
particular, of all theoretical mediations and accounts 
of this life.
In our preceeding discussion we endeavored to
establish the fact of the epistemological 
"inconsanguinity" of the fundamental presuppositons of 
liberation theology with Marxist epistemology, as well 
as points of discontinuity between the two. In the
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process of demonstrating this, we submitted a number of 
instances in the systematic self-definition of
liberation theology where this inconsanguinity becomes 
apparent. In doing this our primary goal was to state 
that in operating with what we exposed as being 
essentially a pre-Marxian epistemology, liberation 
theology was inevitably employing, in basics, a 
Feuerbachian epistemology as it manifested itself in 
the thought of the young Marx. We also emphasised that 
the definitional characteristic of this epistemology, 
which discloses its Feuerbachianism, is "theoretical- 
humanism" as originally defined by Louis Althusser.
In this chapter we proceed to concentrate on one 
aspect of the theology of liberation which further
demonstrates our claim, and more significantly allows 
us to bring into a comparative perspective most of the
issues we raised in our earlier discussions on the
nature and social function of Marxism. This is the
theme of "history" as it is understood and employed in 
Latin American liberation theology. Beyond a mere 
critical narration of this theme, it is important to 
remember that our objective is more to expose the 
epistemological framework which undergirds the kind of 
a formulation that liberation theologians come to on 
history. In this way it is an extension of our 
interrogation of the alleged affinity of Latin Amerian 
theology of liberation to the materialism of Karl Marx.
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The following should be read with a mind bearing our 
discussion on the chapters dealing with Miranda’s 
contention of a humanist theory of history (Chapter 4)
and our presentation of M a r x ’s theory of history in 
chapters 5 and 6 .
10.2. GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ’S THEOLOGY OF HISTORY
1 0 .2 .1 . History_and_Salvation
Central to Gustavo Gutierrez’s pioneering work of
fashioning a systematic basis for a Latin American
theology of liberation, is the reinterpretation of the
classic Christian notion of history. Towards a
rediscovery and reformulation of this, Guttierrez
worked on the theme of the Christian dogma of
§§lYyfion. It was on the basis of a search for a more
socio-practical reinterpretation of both of these
themes that a theology of liberation emerged. In brief,
this was a reflective formulation that G o d ’s supreme
activity^ is that of salvation of humanity, and that this
salvation is not restricted to the personal spiritual
plane, but that it takes place within actual human
history to the effect that human history in its
development becomes an arena of the evolution of G o d ’s
redemptive intervention on behalf of His creation.
Gutierrez proclaimed:
We have recovered the idea that salvation is an 
intrahistorical reality. Furthermore, that,
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salvation - the communion of men with God, and 
the communion of men among themselves-
orients, transforms, and guides history to its 
fulfillment . 1
A corollary of this became the reconceptua1isation of
sin - the correlative of the objective of salvation-
and the reformulation of the hermeneutic import of the
relevant dogma:
Sin is not only an impediment to salvation in 
the afterlife. Insofar as it constitutes a 
break with God, sin is a historical reality, it 
is a breach of the communion of men with each 
other . . . And because sin is a personal and
social intrahistorical reality, a part of the 
daily events of human life, it is also, and 
above all, an obstacle to life’s reaching the 
fullness we call salvation . 2
Salvation, therefore, is not only a process of
history - the locus of G o d ’s activity in history, it is
also the goal - the telos^ of history. This
intertwining of "salvation" and "history" which
eventuates in the construction of the concept "salvific 
history", was derived from an adoption of a critical
reinterpretation of the traditional Christian dogma of 
salvation which shifts the import of the meaning of 
salvation from what Gutierrez calls the "quantitative" 
to the "qualitative"3. This was a shift from a concern 
with the "salvation of pagans" to an awareness of the
A_Theplogy_of_Liberation. p. 152
2. Loc. c i t .
3. Ibid. p. 150
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"univerality of salvation"!. As a universal concept, 
salvation, "embraces all human reality, transforms it,
and leads it to its fullness in Chirst"5. In this 
unversalist terms, the doctrine of salvation then allows 
that, "man is saved if he opens himself to God and to 
others, even if he is not clearly aware that he is doing 
so"6 . This, asserts Gutierrez, "is valid for Christians 
and non-Christians alike - for all people"7. It is only 
in this unversalist mould that "salvation" then becomes 
integratable with a concept of history.
The adoption of this peculiar understanding of
salvation then, says Gutierrez,
leads us to affirm that, in fact, there are not 
two histories, one profane and one sacred,
’juxtaposed’ or ’closely linked’. Rather, there 
is only one human destiny, irreversibly assumed 
by Christ, the Lord of history. His redemptive 
work embraces all the dimensions of existence 
and brings then to their fullness. The history 
of salvation is the very heart of human
hi s tory . 8
The same point is highlighted more succinctly in 
Gutierrez’s earlier writing "Involvement in the Process
4. Lo c . c i t .
5. Loc. c i t .
6 . Loc. c i t .
7. Ibid. p. 151
8 . Ibid. p. 153
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of Li bera L ion"9. Ihere we read: "There is only one
single process of human development, irreversibly 
assumed by Christ, the Lord of history"10
G o d ’s salvific action is central to His being as an 
object of faith; and in this sense, this salvation is 
realisable in actual history of humanity. In 
demonstration of this, we are referred to Creation 
(Genesis 1) as the "first salvific act” of God. For 
Gutierrez, the story of the creation of the universe 
and humanity as narrated in Genesis, and as 
theologically applied by other writers of the Bible, 
conclusively establishes at least two postu 1 ates 1 1 .
The first is that God "reveals himself through 
historical events" 1 2 , and therefore, historical events 
are imbued with a salvific significance. Creation- 
nature and history - is G o d ’s se1f-objectification, the 
modicum of his se 1 f-dec 1 aration to humanity, "his self­
communication "13 . And He communicates himself as "God
who saves in history"14.
9. First published in 1969, reproduced as chapter 2 in,
'■ Gutierrez, _The_Power_of_the_Poor_in_History, pp. 25-35
10. Ibid. p. 31
11. _A_Theo1ogy_of_Liberation. p.154
12. Ibid p. 158
13* _The_Ppwer_pf_the_Popr_in_History. p.32
14. L o c . c i t
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Secondly, the Genesis story proves that God is the 
beginning and end of history: "God did not only create
in the beginning; he also had an end in mind. God 
creates all men to be his children"15. This end
(inclusive of end) is "salvation", which is
encapsulated by the formulation of a doctrine of the 
end (eschatoiogy). This launches into the vexed theme of 
"the kingdom of God". Across this, Gutierrez cuts 
through with a simple affirmation that in the
eschatological^ as derived from Biblical theology- 
which includes the theology of the evangelists on Jesus 
of Nazareth - the future and the present are enmershed 
together into the present as Promisel 6 . In this sense, 
"The action of Yahweh in history and his action at the 
end of history are inseperable”17.
This link between Creation, the beginning, and the 
End, is initially taken in its literal temporal (in 
terms of time) meaning ("End"). At another instance, it 
is taken in its theological meaning, as eschatology. It 
immediately assumes this theo 1 ogico-ethica 1 dimension
and meaning (end), when "Man" is brought into the
picture. This theological meaning assumes paramountcy in 
the course of Gutierrez’s outworking of his theology. In
15. Lo c . c i t .
16. A_Theo1ogy_of_Liberation. pp. 160-164 
Ibid. p. 164
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inserting the factor of the human person into his
account of G o d ’s movement through history from beginning 
to its end, Gutierrez briefly stumbles into M a r x ’s
conceptualisation of the role of the human person as a
participant in bringing about the End of history. He
submi tted:
Man is the crown and center of the work of 
creation and is called to continue it through
his labour (cf. Gen. 1:28) . . . By working, 
transforming the world, breaking out of
servitude, building a just society, and
assuming his destiny in history, man forges
himse1f18.
Gutierrez does not leave the matter there though, in
XbS-Eower_of_ the_Poor_in_History, he adds the following
provocative theological qualification:
Creation and salvation have a christological 
import; in Christ all have been created and 
saved (see Col 1:15-20). Thus when we say that 
men and women fulfill themselves by carrying on 
the work of creation through their own labors, 
we are asserting that they are operating within 
the framework of G o d ’s salvific work from the
very first. Subduing the earth, as Genesis bid 
them do, is a salvific work.19
Therefore, in principle, Gutierrez maintains that the 
motor of historical development is labour. Besides what 
we note in this passage that this takes place as part of 
God’s act of salvation, he further introduces two other 
factors. The first is that, the model for this "labour” 
which fashions out creation towards G o d ’s salvific
18. Ibid. p.157, 158
18• O p . c i t . p . 3 2
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purposes, is principally derived from the labours of the 
Biblical prophet s 2 0. It is not, essentially, labour in 
the material sense of its actual operation within an 
economic process. This is "labour" as a critical 
"building of society" through agitation as seminally 
paradigmed in Moses and the Exodus event, from which the 
Old Testament prophets incessantly drew inspiration21. 
The other emphasis, as we noted, is the application of 
the theological-ethical as an over-riding key to the 
meaning of whatever is said about labour and historical 
change, and any injustices that constitute part of this 
process:
Every obstacle that degrades or alienates the 
work of men and women in building a human
society is an obstacle to the work of 
salvation 2 2  . . . Land] the historical destiny
of humanity must be placed definitively in the 
salvific horizon.23
We thus note that in Gutierrez history is insolubly 
conceived within the context of the religious notion of 
Salvation as this has been developed as a doctrine in 
Christianity. History - the sociological, economic, and 
political interactions and development of human life on 
earth - is a singular dynamic of the vicissitudes of 
God’s salvific self-revelation. This view came to
• A_Theoiogy_of_Liberation, p. 158.
21. Ibid., p.159 
22 . L o c . c i t .
23. Ibid . , p .153
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1 0  .2 .2 . LJi2 I?i§-L A_Resplution_of_a_Contradiction_be tween
1 he_Material_and_the_I deal
Gutierrez’s theology of history bases itself on an 
affirmation of the temperospaciality of G o d ’s
revelation in actual human history. From within this 
framework of a literal-actual affirmation, proceeds a 
postulation of an actual "end" of this history. This 
inevitably induces a serious difficulty, of the same 
kind as that faced by "New Testament" theologians in 
their attempts to reconcile that Jesus of Nazareth was 
the Promise (Messiah) become actual, and the apparent 
failure of the resolution of this Promise into their 
actual political aspirations and programme. That is, in 
claiming that G o d ’s salvation, by definition, takes 
historical forms, and that history is an evolution 
towai'ds the fuller revelation of this salvation, one 
has to give both a description of the realisabi 1 ity of 
this ultimate salvation which is here affirmatively 
described in literal terms, and at the same time 
account for the contradiction between the existence of 
evil within this locus of G o d ’s self-revelation- 
history. The vision of the end, beatific as it should 
be ("the kingdom of God"), remains stubbornly 
idealistic, whilst the material present seems more and
pervade the whole oi the construction of liberation
theology after Gutierrez.
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more remote, in quality, from that envisioned end
Liberation theologians, in general, meet the same 
problem; and like the authors of the book of the Gospel 
Aççor d i_ng_ t o_Ma t thew and letters to the Thessalonians ,
they take flight into a theological rationalisation.
Being more privileged than their first century
predecessors who had to make do with Platonic
philosophy, liberation theologians have found a richer 
philosophical tradition to rely on in resolving this 
contradiction. This is the Marxism of Ernst Bloch24.
Bloch provided a resolution of this contradiction by 
his formulation of the postulate that human being is
defined by the fact of the human person’s dream and 
hope for the future. Hope in this form, is, 
differentially, an "active hope" which subverts the
existing order. In this way the ontology of "being" is
transformed and rendered equivalent to the ontology of
the "not yet"25. Out of this, liberation theology 
developed a novel concept of utopia which was 
fortuitously embraced and applied in justifying the use 
of abstract and empirically unfathomable constructs in 
attempts to contribute to giving a revolutionary
24. See Gutierrez’s discussion of Ernst bloch in,
A_1hepTogy_of_Liberation, pp. 216-220
25. See, Ernst Bloch, Man_on His Own___1A_Se1ection_of
'-22LL s_Worksl , transl. by E.B Ashton (New York: Herder and
Herder,  1970 ) ^
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utilisable concept of historical development. This is 
employed towards reaching the conclusion which Gutierrez
verbalises as follows:
The full significance of G o d ’s history is 
understood only when it is put in its 
eschatological perspective; similarly the
revelation of the final meaning of history
gives value to the present. The self­
communication of God points towards the future, 
and at the same time this Promise and Good News 
reveal man to himself and widen the perspective 
of his historical commitment here and now.26
And ,
Faith and political action do not relate to 
each other except through the project of the 
creation of a new type of man in a different 
society, through utopia.27
In 1981 George Pixley, a Nicaraguan Biblical scholar,
devoted a book, entitled,  lh§_Kingdom_pf_God28, to
this problematic , in 1985, he joined Clodovis Boff in a 
comprehensive presentation of the concept of "the poor" 
as used in liberation theology in relation to history,
in The Biblej,_the Church_and_the_Poor . There a note is
made that "indeed, the kingdom of God is an utopia"29, 
this is made while it is being acceded that an utopic 
vision is, "the vision of the world that not only does 
not exist, but that indeed, can never exist in actual 
history"30. This disclosed the crux of the matter,
26. __A_Theglggy_of „Liberat ion . p. 165
27. Ibid., 236
28. Maryknol, N.Y: Orbis Books
Xhe__BibleA_The_Churchj___and_the_Poor , p. 105
30. L o c . c i t .
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namely: "Is the good news from God a vision of the 
perfect world that does not exist?"31
it is here that a Blochian interlocution is inserted
as a rescue. Pixley and B o f f ’s argument concludes:
While it is true that Utopia, as the image of 
social perfection, is unattainable,
nevertheless, a valid utopia generates viable 
historical undertakings . . [therefore] If
the Kingdom of God, the God of the Bible it to 
be justified as a hope for the poor, it will
have to generate viable historical
undertakings.32
This attempt of liberation theology to generate
"viable historical undertakings” is subjected to an
explicative review by Jose Miguez Bonino in his,
heyglutignary_Theolggy Cgmes_of Age. Significantly, he
focuses his review of attempts at this against the
often propounded immediate ideal of the creation of a
socialist alternative to capitalism. He informs that in 
Latin America, theologians of liberation have chosen to 
use the functional notion of a Xbistorical_groject", as 
a "midway term between utopia, a vision which makes no 
attempts to connect itself historically to the present 
and a program, a technically developed model for the
organization of society"33. This in other words, is a
Political programme which, in Bonino’s perception and
3 1 . L o c . c i t .
32 • Ibid. , p . 104
03 . Reygiutionary_Theology_Cpmes_gf_Age, p.38
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themselves to. He outlines it under seven inter-re1 ated
tliemes34 which begin with a campaign for the rejection
ol "developmonta I. 1st solutions" against Latin America’s
subjugation by forces of international capital. The
unitive concept of this project, is liberation, as a
negation of deveiopmentalism. The value of the notion of
"liberation", Bonino, explains, lies in that:
It makes it possible to conceive of history as 
a process and to speak of m a n ’s relation to God 
as one and the same reality, although
differentiated in three levels of meaning:
socio-political liberation, humanization as a 
historical process of man's self-realization, 
and deliverance from sin . . .  35
1 1 is sufficient for us to note that within this 
understanding of utopia, wherein the ethical-
theological deductions seeking to explain history are 
presented as sources of utopic hope, two major themes 
which in fact are aspects of one and the same thing 
stand out. This is theme of "the kingdom of God", and 
its various elaborations in the social criticism that 
falls out in the process of liberation theology’s self­
construction, as well as the "historical project".
These two are meant and considered to serve as sources 
of inspiration to subvert the existing order. The 
"historical project", in fact, is a de-theo 1 ogised 
"kingdom of God” . This is the theoria of liberation
34. Ibid., pp. 39-40
35. Ibid. p.70
experience, liberation theologians have devoted
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t h e o i o g y
A reference we made in the previous chapter on M a r x ’s 
definition of the role of theory in relation to 
political revolution in "Towards a Critique of Hegel’s 
Philosophy ol [light: Introduction", and the
qualification of liberation theology as a theory, in 
serving as a theory which is amenable to being a
"material force" will be relevant here. We reserve a 
discussion of this for our conclusion.
10.3. THE POOR AS AGENTS OF A SALVIFIC HISTORY
10.3. 1 . l’he_Poo r_and_Gu t i e r r ezj_s_Theo-cent r i c i sm
Gutierrez’s  A Theology of the_LjLberation is most
remarkable in the marginal focus it gives to outlining 
the actual process of the resolution of the movement of 
history from an oppressive status quo to one of
freedom. Intermittent references are made to the victims
of the socio-economic system which developmentalism
sought to address, but no specific attention is given 
to developing the theme of the role of these victims in 
changing these oppressive power structures, i.e, in 
contributing to historical development. Only a few pages 
at the end of the book36 are devoted to this; but even 
there, the motif is G o d ’s salvific abhorrence of
36.  pp.  2 9 1 - 2 9 5
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poverty, and there is absolute silence on the actual 
mode of the role of human beings in socio-historica 1  
change .
The element of the historical protagonists of social 
change, which a materialist account of history will 
seek to ground focus on, is not highlighted. Instead, 
Gutierrez concentrates on God - on the mode of his
self-revelation through "salvation" and history, 
wherein the vehicle of this is mentioned as being the 
Church, the "visible sacrament of this saving unity [of 
the Trinity]"37.
Gutierrez’s "second book" is entitled "The Power of 
the Poor in History" (originally published in 1979). A 
reading of this, unfortunately, reveals that there is 
more in the title of the book than there is in its 
contents. The book is a collection of his isolated 
writing of the period 1969 to 1975, most of which are a 
repetition of the motif of A__Theo1ogy__of_Liberation. 
None of these writings is devoted to systematically 
addressing the subject declared in the title of the 
book - the power of the poor in history.
The fact that Gutierrez, throughout, concentrates on 
registering the thesis that God is active in human
37. Ibid., p. 260, Gutierrez quoting from the Papal
enc7ciical, L u m e n _ g e n t  ium_L_Para . 9
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history, and that, this God communicates himself 
thereby, while failing to highlight the role of the 
immediate historical agents of this change, betrays a 
certain deliberate conviction and epistemological 
presupposition, namely, a positively theocentric 
conception of historical change. This, as we noted 
earlier, extends to an assertion that whatever subsists 
in history is seen as only being part of the larger 
theocentric movement. It is all part of the salvific 
se1f-objectification of God. In other words, history is 
not only the locus of Divine self-communication, rather, 
since "there is only one history whose Lord is 
Christ"38, God is the locus of history. All things exist 
from, in, and through God; and in "Him", they exist for 
fulfilling "His" purpose - Salvation; and at the end 
return to "Him". History is God ad_vividus. "It is 
through the sacrament that men encounter God. This is an 
encounter’ in history, not because God comes from 
history, but because history comes from God"39.
The extent to which history is here perceived as both 
God’s self-communication and product, as well as arena 
of activity, goes to actually subverting the very use of 
the word "history" in this context. We therefore propose 
that "history", in liberation theology’s terms, is best 
called, a "theostory". It is a treatise on what God
38. Ibid. p .1 53
39. Ibid. p. 259
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does, for’ indeed, in Gutierrez's theology, all actions
of humanity in history, "whether Christian or non-
Christian” are imbued with religious significance40:
Socio-political struggle, human maturity,
reconciliation with God - do not belong to 
different realms, but to a single single saving 
reality . . . G o d ’s grace and m a n ’s task are
therefore also united,41
in another application of this notion that all
political struggles, even those traditionally found
reprehensible by orthodox Christianity, are part of
God’s single activity of realising His Kingdom on
earth, we find this far-reaching reflection in Bonino,
based on Gutierrez’s thinking:
A few Christians have embraced Marxist ideology 
- understood in absolute terms - with a sort of 
religious fervor. This, in turn, results in a 
total loss of faith or in the surrender of the 
historical contents of the Christian Gospel. 
There can be no doubt as to the sincerity of 
many of these people. They may in fact be much 
closer to the Kingdom than most of their 
orthodox opponents.42
Where does all this leave the "poor" (and their
role) whom a Marxist class-analysis would isolate as 
the proletariat who are the "grave diggers" of the 
oppressive capitalist system? Are they merely a part of 
God, His se1f-reve1at ion, and His grand plan of
■ A_Theology_of_Liberation, p.72
41. Loc. c i t .
42. _Revo1utionary_Theology_Cgmes_of_Age, p. 96
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Sa1vat i on?
10.3.2. The_Poor j__Towards_A_Def ini t i on
George Pixley and Clodovis Bof f ’ s The__Bible_L_the
Church and the Poor, is the most comprehensive and
intensive attempt at presenting and exp Acling 
liberation theology’s conceptualisation of the "poor" 
as a factor in socio-historical development. There we 
find an explicit and a once-for-all attempt at defining 
the "poor" as identified in liberation theology.
The authors begin by declaring that, in liberation
theology, the p o g r , are not taken metaphorically, but
as an empirical social reality. They are those who
suffer from basic economic need, "those who are
deprived of the material goods necessary to live with
any d i gn i t y "4 3. Futhermore, beyond this empricial
identification, there is, it is asserted, a "structural"
identification of the poor. They are not the poor as
individual cases but as a collective class. Corollary to
this, the fact is noted that,
they constitute a social phenomenon that has
been produced . . . they have been reduced to
poverty (impoverished) or held in poverty by the 
forces of the system of domination. In this
sense the poor are the dominated class.44
In a summary, further to the fact that they are a
43. The_Bib 1 e_L_The_Church_and_the_Pogr , p. 1 
44 . Ibid. p .3
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dominated class,
the poor of today can be defined by three
adjectives: collective, conflictive, and
alternative. The poor are a collective
phenomenon, they are the product of a
conflictive process and they demand an 
alternative historical process . 4 5
They fall into two main groups, (a) The marginalised
those who are outside the prevailing economic system 
oj are positively excluded from it (the unemployed, 
beggars, outcasts etc.); (b ) the exploited — those whom 
the socio-economic system treats unjustly. The "working 
poor", "the proletariat" and the rural workers46.
The second dimension of Pixley and B o f f ’s
presentation is a critical isolation of tradi t ional 
erroneous or ideologically malicious definitions of the 
poor. All these are definitions which concentrate on the 
poor as individuals who are victims of misfortune, and 
who should be helped through "charity" and ”aid" 4 7 . In 
contradiction of this, they assert the structuralist 
definition of the poor, as outlined above.
This definition or description of the poor, goes 
beyond the descriptive. It is also not merely
normative in that it is laden with an implicit
45. Ibid. p.l
46. Ibid. p.4
47. Ibid. p. 3
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everything else, insinuates protest. It "pretends" to 
offer a revolutionary analysis of a given context.
In conclusion, we note that this definition of the 
"poor" is well laden with Marxist epistemological 
sensibilities, in particular the class analysis of the 
Communist_Manifesto. As we go further on, though, as we 
intend to do in the following paragraphs, we readily 
discover that this is only true at a prima_facie level. 
Most lamentably, at the crucial point where the self- 
liberative activity of the dominated-class-poor is to be 
described. our liberation theology’s "poor" dissolve 
into a mystica 1 -theo 1 ogica 1 phenomenon.
10.4. THE MYSTIFICATION OF THE POOR
We begin by seeking to point out that besides the
erroneous and ideogical malicious description of the
poor isolated by the authors, and the rest of 
.liberation theologians, there is another "erroneous"- 
by virtue of its revolutionary impotence - description 
which is implicit in liberation theology’s own critical 
description. This is stated in the extension that, the 
poor, as a socio-economic category, as a class .
" are the Lazaruses who live in a conflictive
situation and seek an alternative huraanity"48
judgement of the state of the poor. It, above
48. Ibid., p. 8
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situation", (historical epoch of the capitalist mode of 
production), is described in such terms:
"One could say that the present state of the 
world is a gigantic recreation of the parable 
of Dives and Lazarus [Luke 16:21-30]"49
When making a tabular contrast of the different
concepts of the poor: the individualistic, "bourgeois",
and their reformational, collectivist one, Pixley and
Doff provide the following schematic description:
[ LAZARUS T H EN':J Asking for charity: for
bread in the world, while waiting for his
reward in ’Abraham's bosom'
[ ’LAZARUS N O W ’:] Demanding justice: a place in
the table with the rest now, whi 1 e_not_denying 
_[heaven_[_X t he alternative system) .50 (emphasis
ours, brackets original)
We therefore note that, the definition of the "poor" 
and their identification as a social reality, issues 
from and is constructed by a model and historical 
notion which is derived from the theological history of
ancient Israel as recorded in the Old Testament, as 
well as other theological sources from the New 
Teastanient , as the above case indicates. This biblical 
theological nuance of the "poor" is adopted as an 
absolute conceptual determinant of a definition and
49. Ibid. p.7
50. Ibid. p . 6
where, in addition, the nature of this "conflictive
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'pool'" the victims of the capitalist system as
experienced in Latin America and the Third World in
general 51. A theological construct - defining who the
"poor" in the Bible were - is grafted onto a
sociological analysis, and is used in such a manner as
to render such an analysis dependent on it. For
instance, Gutierrez climaxes his brief review of the
"Biblical meaning of poverty" with this conclusion:
And final ! 3 . man not only has been made in the 
image of and likeness of God. He is also the 
sacrament_gt_God . . . the reasons for the
Biblical rejection of poverty have their roots 
here: to oppress the poor is to offend God 
himself; to know God is work for justice among 
ruon . . , ill a word, tiie existence of poverty
represents a sundering both of solidarity among 
men and also of communion with God. Poverty is 
an expression of sin, that is, a negation of 
love. It is therefore incompatible with the 
coming o f the Kingdom of God, a kingdom of love 
and justice. Poverty is an evil . . . to
eliminate it is to bring closer the moment of 
seeing God face to face, in union with other 
m e n .5 2
perception 01 the historical status and role of the
The same line of thought is repeated with a more
pointed emphasis by Bonino:
Poverty is not a hazard or misfortune but the 
result of certain people’s greed and injustice.
It is intolerable because it contradicts_the
LLry_purpose of_Godis act_of deliverance - to
rescue his people from the slavery of Egypt. It 
robs man of his humanity as a steward and 
transformer of the world and therefore it 
contradicts_the__mandate_of_creation. Fina 1 ly it 
breaks human solidarity, and consequently it
51. Ibid. pp. 53ff, See also, Gutierrez, _A_Theology_of
Uberat ion. pp. 2 91-302
52. A_Theo1ogy_of_Liberation, p. 295
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Gosiroys l£iiowshj.p among men and wi_th_God .
i'ove rty in this sense is a scandalous fact which 
must be eliminated. God himself is engaged in 
the struggle against it; he is clearly and 
unequivocally on the side of the poor.53
(emphasis ours)
Two elements which are pertinent to a probable 
struggle for the social transformation of this
condition of poverty emerge on the foregoing statement
of Bonino's. First, is that poverty, the existence of a 
class of the marginalised and exploited, though 
identified as caused by human greed, is found 
intolerable only (or primarily) because it contradicts 
some theological principles, He mentions three of these 
(underlined in quotation). Secondly, which in itself is 
u n ex 1 ens i on of the former since it is still a 
motivational theological principle, is the claim that 
God is engaged in the struggle of the poor. The class 
struggle of the proletariat, "the working poor", is a 
divine engagement. Besides resonating what we noted
earlier on Gutierrez’s notion of what we called 
"ibeostory", this is what enjoins the Church to 
perceive itself as a sacrament of salvation54.
We note that the theological, again, serves as the 
(absolute) motivation and determinant of participation 
in the historical struggle for the liberation of the
53. Revo 1 utionaryTheology_Cgmes_of_Age^_ p. 112
54. _A ._Theol ogy_of _Li bera t ion . p. 255
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poor. This governs the manner of participation in such 
struggles, as well as the kind of the goal which is 
envisaged, the result of such struggle. As we saw from 
Gutierrez above, the goal of any such struggle is the 
realisation of the (elusively defined) "kingdom of 
God " .
At another dimension, or as the second descriptive 
identification of the "poor" (remembering that as we 
indicated above, the description offered here is an 
insinuation of protest which is suggestive of remedial 
action) we find an incidence of the reduction of the 
poor into an abstract theological category.
In their book, under a chapter headed, "The Poor:
Sacrament of G o d ’s sa1vation"55, Pixley and Boff give
the most incisive (and innocent) development of this
theme and tendency. The poor are established as a
symbolic mediation of the knowledge of God and of
Christian religious self-development. They are portayed
as an icon and a sacrament. As icon:
The Christian God cannot be understood
without the poor, the defenceless, the 
despised, all those in need.56
I n add i t i o n ,
there is no separation or distance between 
Christ and the poor . . w e  meet the poor in




of the Lord, his real expression and not just 
an intermediary between us and him. It is in 
this sense that the poor are the sacrament of 
Jesus: the manifestation and communication of
his mystery, the setting of his revelation and 
dwe1Iing.57
This "historicist" use of "sacrament", goes back to 
Gutierrez’s pioneering work. In introducing this, he 
deliberately isolated the original Greek use of this 
category in the New Testament as misterion, and went on 
to distill the fact that "according to Paul, mystery
means the fulfillment and the manifestat ion of_a
salvific_plan"58. As sacrament, and as a reality of 
history, which is a salvific "theostory", the poor are 
therefore a mystery^ What they actually are, the 
essence of their being as a social entity, is beyond 
sensuous resolution. On the basis of this, Boff and 
Pixley affirmatively assert: "Without being rooted in
the mystery of God, the option for the poor becomes a 
mere blueprint for action."59
This further clarifies our critique in the previous 
chapter, that this is a tendency very much similar to 
Feuerbach’s, where, as Engels and Marx pointed out, 
historical and empirical "man" becomes the theological-
57 . Ibid. , p . 113
58. A__Theglggy_of „ L i b e r a t i o n , p.259. For his discussion of 
sacrament" and "mystery", see also, pp. 258- 262
59. Op Ci t . p 10 9
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philosophical abstract "Man"60. Here we have the same: 
the historical and sociological "poor" are turned into
the a theological abstraction of "the Poor" - a 
sacrament , which by all definitions is but a mere
sym bo 1 .
Boff and Pixley go deeper than this though. After
quoting from the Vatican II’s Lumen Gentium, that
"Indeed, the Church recognises in the poor and 
suffering the likeness of her poor and suffering 
founder"61, they continue to conclude that, "so we need 
to bear in mind that it was a poor person who founded 
the church. The option for the poor is based, then, on 
theological (permanent) reasons, not just on
sociological (transient) ones”62
Here we are given a stark claim that the theological, 
the abstract theoretical deduction and idealism, is of
a higher value, epistemologically, than material-
sociological reality and analysis that are based upon
this. (The option of the poor is not founded on a
60. "[Feuerbach] is realistic [materialist] since he takes 
his start from man . . . this man remains always the same
®bstract man who occupied the field of the philosophy of 
religion . For this man is not born of woman; he issues, as a 
chrysalis, from the god of the monotheistic religions. He 
therefore does not live in a real world historically come into 
heing and historically determined." F. Engels, _Feuerbach_and_the 
-Qd in, Selected_ Works , One Volume, p.604
61. Lumen_Gentium, para. 8 , quoted in op. cit., p. Ill 
62. T h e B i b l  e JL_the_Church_and_the_Poor , p. 111.
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historical or socio-material analysis, but on a 
theological imperative).
Further on, within the same scope of affirmation, it 
is claimed that, "there is coincidence between Christ 
and the poor, not just in a moral, but in a mystical 
sense^_and_so_on_the_deepest_level_of_reality."63
Is it possible for a system which entertains a claim 
that the mystical is the "deepest level of reality", to 
be associatable with a post-Feurbachian, and "contra- 
Hegelian" Marxist epistemology? How much more alien is 
this when it is used in relation to defining the role of 
the "working poor"!
In our last demonstration of the extent to which this
sovereignty of theological abstraction - the
application of ecc 1 esiatical dogma, derived from the
Bible and variously interpreted - is taken as a
determinant of both the motivation and the goal
(alternative) of the struggle of the poor, including
the principles for the prosecution of their struggle
for liberation, we read the following apt summary from
Ibe_BibleJ__The_ChurchJ._and_the_Poor :
Christianity is Christo-centric, and cannot be
otherwise, in the sense that Jesus Christ 
undeniably occupies the center of everything
for it, as Lord of_the world_and history. All
the rest, including the question of the poor,
63. Ibid. p.113
325
is organised and harmonized around this greater 
reali ty .
The starting point or ultimate principle of the 
option for the poor is to be found in faith in 
Chr i s t .64
Linked to this is Gutierrez’s reminder that :
Seeing human history as a history in which the
liberation of Christ is at work broadens our
outlook and gives political commitment its
full depth and genuine meaning.65
10.5. CONCLUSION
I
Resulting from all these: a positive theocentric
definition of history, a mystical-theo 1 ogical
conception of the "poor", plus an affirmation of the
primacy of faith in Christ as the basis and motivation
for engagement in a liberation process - we find that 
liberation theology reaches conclusions which exposes 
the serious limits to its uti 1 isabi 1 ity in a liberation 
struggle.
For instance, having identified that the Church is 
the sacrament of G o d ’s salvation in history, Gutierrez 
finds himself, in having to work out the historical 
actuality of this salvation, confronted with the fact
of class struggle. This leads him into a very
illuminating perplexity:
How can we reconcile the universality of
64. L o c . cit., pp. 115, 116
65■ _The_Power_of_the_Poor_in_History, p. 63
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charity [love] with the option for a particular 
social class? Unity is one of the notes of the 
Church and yet the class struggle divides men; 
is the unity of the Church compatible with class 
struggle ? 6 6
In searching for an answer, the following comes out 
of the same theological delimitation: The gospel 
demands love for all; class struggle demands an option 
for one class at the expense of the other; this is a 
contradiction which must be recognised and acknowledged 
as a challenge for the need of a cultivation of a 
balance and a synthesis between the two, an achievement 
of which will enhance o n e ’s faith profoundly. "This is a 
challenge that leads [a Christian] to deepen his faith 
and to mature in his love for others"67. Thus Gutierrez 
escapes.
However, the theory itself remains with a gaping 
exposure that he is not conscious of the fact that the 
church is not some mystical entity; that it is 
populated by human beings who are not only flesh and 
blood, but are social beings who are not abstractly 
presented with the choice as to which side of the 
"class struggle" they must throw their weight on; that 
by virtue of their existence in class-society, they 
belong to either the oppressor class or the class of 
the oppressed and exploited. The "sacrament" Church
6 6 . O p . c i t . p . 2 7 3
67 . Ibid. , p .  275
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society, is a "sacrament" riddled with contradictions 
and antagonisms which, of necessity, obliterate the
very "scramentality" of the very Church. History bears 
ample testimony to this.
Liberation theology attempts to create a fusion, at 
the basic epistemo 1 ogical plane (where methodological 
presuppositions are formed), between traditional 
Christian thought matrix and Marxist analysis. This
encounters problems from the outset. As a result a
selection of certain aspects of M a r x ’s theory which can
be taken for assimilation into the intended enterprise 
of creating a theology which is of utilitarian relevance 
to a revolutionary situation is made 6 8 . The main motif 
of our foregoing presentation is to demonstrate that
this approach breaks down in the process. Moreover, it 
breaks at the most crucial stage of the systematic
rationalisation of liberation theology: at the level of
actual practice, where liberation theology is to be put 
into the hands of the "poor" as a theory converted into 
a material force. At this level it breaks down into not 
only an "aborted materialism", but into a conservative 
theology. In corroboration of this, we consider two
conclusions, one from Boff and Pixley and the other from 
Gutierrez. The first one, below, from Boff and Pixley,
(the locus of liberation theology), in capitalist
6 8 . Note the other title of Bonino’s book; Doing_Theo1ogy_in 
2-E§volut i onary_Si tuat ion
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should be read with M a r x ’s theory of class struggle in 
mind :
The overall objective is not struggle against 
the ruling clases, but a struggle for justice 
and liberation . . . the initiative for the
class struggle comes from the ruling classes, 
leaving the dominated no alternative but to 
fight to defend themselves. Finally, the 
struggle for the poor includes battling against 
situations that are simply the result of social 
backwardness, not directly the outcome of class 
relationships - illiteracy, lack of basic 
hygiene, and so on.
So, all in all, the option for the poor cannot 
be seen as simply a translation of the Marxist 
class struggle into Christian terms.69
Illiteracy, lack of basic hygiene, and so on - poor 
and inadequate educational facilities and a general 
lack of social amenities in the Third World - is not 
the outcome of class relationships?!
The second conclusion, from Gutierrez, should be read
with the inquiry as to the role of liberation theology
as a instrument of change in terms of Marx’s definition
of the transition of theory into a material force in
mind. It is also an ignominously classic
characterisation of liberation theology:
The theology of liberation . . . has no
intention of being a revo 1 utionary_Christian
ideology. It is reflection from a point of 
departure in the concrete historical praxis of 
human being. It seeks to understand the faith
from within this historical praxis and from 
within the manner of living the faith as a 
revolutionary commitment . . . Hence its themes
are the great themes of all true theology, but 
its focus, its manner of approaching them, is




At a philosophical level, as we try to return to our 
position that what is definitional of Feuerbachainism, 
which we charge liberation theology for being a version 
of, is its methodological preponderance of the "human", 
we may seek to pose this again in the light of our 
foregoing conclusion. What has come out of this is that 
liberation theology is not only humanistic in the sense 
of the incidence of an methodological emphasis on the 
human person (e.g, Gutierrez’s insistence that "the 
purpose of those who participate in the process of 
liberation is to ’create a new m a n ’"71), it 
qualitatively goes beyond this. In a more stark 
revelation of what Feuerbach only showed subtly and was 
to be excavated from within his system by Frederick 
Engels, the human being, as he appears in liberation 
theology's critical-analysis, as "the poor", is taken 
much more as a theoretica 1 -re 1 igious concept (symbol) 
than as an historical entity. "Man", wrote Gutierrez, 
"has not only been made in the image and likeness of 
God. He is also the_sacrament_of_God"72.
70. The_Power_of_the_Poor_in_History. p.61
71. A_Theology_of_Liberation. p.189
72. Ibid., p .295
330
Moreover, even the minimal theoretical recognition of 
the historical masses, the "poor", is embedded and
defused into a theory of God who is in history. The
"poor" are but just mediations of this God. On this 
score, liberation theology further exposes itself as 
being a Feuerbachianism which is grounded on 
assimilating aspects of the early Feuerbach, i.e, 
Feuerbach before his 1839 "Towards a Critique of
Hegel’s Philosophy". Its notion of history is
dramatically Hegelian. In this regard, reference has 
also to be made to our discussion and conclusion of 
Miranda’s quarrel with Althusser’s notion of history as 
being a process without a teleological Subject.
Miranda's passionate emphasis on the primacy of the
human actor, is merely a premise that is subtly deduced
from the conclusion that there exists a supra-
historical power, which humanity is subject to, which
is controlling history. Even as an argument for the
preponderance of human volition and independence in
history, this volition of the human person, can be
shown to be only a reaction of the person’s subjection
to some higher power. This is not the case only as far
as believers are concerned, as we noted in the
universalism of Gutierrez. Miranda betrays this
presupposition in his statement that:
Aside from the absolutely f undamenta1 theses
in the thought of Marx and Engels . . .  we 
also find another important conviction in their 
thought that may well be even more important.
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It is the conviction that history has an end and 
a g o a l , and that this end is good . . . In
strict logical consistency we cannot believe 
that a good end exists for history unless we 
believe that God is directing history . . . the
most striking feature of Marx’s thought is its 
full eschatological awareness
. The eschaton is the definitive triumph of 
good over evil. Scientifically speaking, 
however, we cannot demonstrate that good 
ultimately has to triumph over evil unless we 
include in our demonstration the prove of G o d ’s 
existence (the scientifically demonstrative
procedure followed by Hegel)73
This belief and hermeneutic presupposition of the 
fact of the Christian God as being the supreme Subject 
of history, according the "procedure folowed by Hegel", 
exposes the extent to which Miranda's campaign for the 
induction of the "human subject" into Marx’s system, is 
merely a veiled propaganda for the preponderance of God 
as an agent of history.
Interestingly, he only introduces this as a deployed 
argument whenever he is confronted by outright 
declarations in Marx’s writings about the reality of 
the fact that there are instances where there is a 
clear evidence of the independence of history from
human will and action. His standard reduction of such 
incontrovertible evidence is that, "both Marx and
Engels appeal to a higher principle which guides 
history, and which human agents and protagonists are
73. Marx_Against_fhe_Marxists., pp. 265, 266
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incapable of contro11ing"74. For instance, he uses
this statement to interprete the following passage from 
Engel’s Letter to Vera Zasulich (23 April 1885), 
making reference to the possibility of a revolution in 
Russ i a :
Supposing these people imagine they can seize 
power, what does it matter? Provided they make 
the hole which will shatter the dyke, the flood 
itself will soon rob them of their illusions.
But if by chance these illusions resulted in 
giving them a superior force of will, why 
complain? People who boasted that they had made 
a revolution have always seen the next day that 
they had no idea what they were doing, that the 
revolution made did not in the least resemble 
the one they would have liked to make. That is 
what Hegel calls the irony of history, an irony 
which few historic personalities escape.75
Even though there is a reference to Hegel, the 
overall context of Marx and Engel’s thinking, leaves no 
room for an inference that they were ascribing the 
autonomy of the dynamics of political revolutions to an 
activity of God, which is what is implied in Miranda’s 
interpretation. Contrary to Miranda’s use of this 
passage, it only further corroborates our thesis on how 
according to Marx and Engels, the human agents are non­
determinant of history, but instead, as hinted above, 
that whatever form their involvement takes, it can only 
be the making of "the hole which will shatter the dyke", 
and that "the flood itself will soon rob them of their
74. Ibid., p. 89
75. Cited in, loc. cit., p.89, from: K. Marx, E. Engels,
j5iected_Cgrrespondence (New York, International Publ . , 1942), p.
^00
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illusions". Doubtlessly, Engels was here writing out of 
the experience of his reflection and analysis on the 
tragedy of the the Paris Commune76. Miranda's reading of 
Marx is clouded by his precocious inferences to the role 
of a "higher principle", God.
In Liberation theology, as we saw in Gutierrez’s
work, God, the "type" of Hegel’s Geist, is not only the 
immanent and paramount, the fact that the question of
his existence or otherwise is not raised, is itself a
deliberate methodological stance. History is the self­
objectification of God. Struggles in the Objective, in 
h i s t o i’ y a n d nature - existence of the poor as the result 
of the conflictve socio-economic set-up - are a process 
of the self-negation of God. He is there in the poor, in 
their struggle, as them and with them. He is the self­
estranged struggling to return to itself. This
recognition, a rational consciouness of this, is the 
Aufhebung of God - a gaining of the true knowledge of 
the Christian God ("the Christian God cannot be 
understood without the poor . . .”77).
This is a pre-critical Hegelianism as was nurtured in
Feuerbach (to the extent of the emphasis on the
76. See, K. Marx, The_Civi1_War_in_France (1871), in Marx, 
-nge 1 s, _Selec ted_Works_i.One_Yglumel , pp 271 - 309.
77. T h e B i b l  e J.__The_ChurchJ__and_the_Pggr , p. Ill; See also,
°Se Miguez Bonino , _Chr i s t ians__and_Marxi st s J__A_Mutual _Chal lenge 
•LReyolut i on (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1976), pp. 32-33
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thinking being), ai the same time, it even risks 
falling outside of Feuerbach’s later Idealist- 
Male r i a .i. .i sm (humanism) in its positing of "man in 
history” as a mere disguise of God. On the other hand, 
it is miles away f r o m Marx’s historico-dialectical
ma terialism.
Ironically, and most noteworthy for us, is the fact 
that this Hegelianism of liberation theology comes from 
the fact of its endeavours at relating itself with Marx. 
It is from Marx that it gleaned its Hegelian
consciousness. Unfortunately, this is done either from 
the young Marx, or from a a perspective which 
uncritically emphasises the influence of Hegel on the 
thinking of the older Marx78.
As we noted in the course of our disquisition, Marx 
developed his epistemology and theory of history-
which marks the break between the Feurbachian 
philosophy of the young Marx, and Marxism - by going
back to a critique of Hegel (using Feuerbach’s 
affirmation of the material as well as his genetico- 
critical method, as a platform); by inverting H e g e l ’s 
philosophy of history from a historical idealism into a 
historical materialsm, through the inversion of Hegel’s
78. See, Gutierrez, A_Theo1ogy_of_Liberation, pp. 24,25, and 
F38nl2 for his positive references to the use of the Young Marx, 
as well as liis claim that Latin American liberation theologians 
âve found the Hege1ianistic Marxism of Benneto Croce most useful
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dialect ic f rom its idealist conception, into the
materialist one. It is with this core of M a r x ’s thought
thaï 1 iberation theology cannot bo identified.
How apt therefore is Marx’s remark, in the Economic
and_Phi1osophiça 1_ M a n u s c r ipts_of_1844, that :
On close inspection, theological_criticism is 
found in the final analysis to be nothing but 
the culmination and consequence of the old 
philosophical, and especially the Hegelian, 
transcendentalism, twisted into a theological 
caricature [ ! ] 7 9
79. K. Marx, Economic_and_Philosophical__Manuscripts_of_1844 
I Mo scow, Progress Publishers, 1977 ), p. 20
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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
This study has as its primary premiss the argument 
that while a Left Hegelian, Karl Marx was not merely an 
admirer of Ludwig Feuerbach, but that, his
philosophical orientation and as well as the
epistemological framework of all his work during the
years up to 1845, were that of the philosophy of 
Feuerbach. It is only towards the end of his private 
research and reflection in what became the Economic_and
Philosophical M&Uyscripts of 1844 that he began to
disavow the basic epistemological postulate of this 
philosophy. We draw attention to the fact that the
d i f f e r en t _L a_speci f i ca of this Feuerbachian philosophy
which Marx had then embraced, is its humanist 
materialism which was developed as a critique of 
Hegelian Idealism.
Thus, we demonstrated that the actual rejection of 
Feuerbach was expressly facilitated by M a r x ’s own
independent critique of Hegel’s epistemology. This
consisted in a reworking of the fundamental epistemology 
of Hegel’s philosophy from its Idealistic form, and its 
reconstruction into a materialist one. We assert that
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historical Idealism _L_and_a demonstrative statement_of
the inadequacy of Feuerbachis critique__of_Hegel. In
introducing this assertion, our objective has been to
draw particular attention to the fact that this 
historical materialism, being an epistemological 
paradigm, sets itself against and replaces Feuerbachian 
humanist materialism which Marx had espoused until 
then. M a r x ’s explicit expression of an option of 
historical materialist as a progrssive critique of
Feuerbachian materialism is codified in his Theses_on
Feuerbach.
historical materialism is a critical negation of H e g e l ’s
On the basis of this premiss we have contended 
against views that posit the argument of an absence of 
a discontinuity in M a r x ’s thought between the period 
of his youth and that after 1845. Our main proposition 
is that M a r x ’s formulation of historical materialism, 
is first and foremost an epistemological event. 
Secondly, that, as an epistemolgical development 
occurring within M a r x ’s thinking, it is a personal 
discovery which radically replaces his earlier 
Feuerbachian epistemolgical framework of humanist 
materialism. The character of this Feuerbachian 
materialism we have described in Chapter 7., and 
compared and contrasted it with the relevant aspects of 
historical materialism, viz, M a r x ’s anthropology and 
conception of human freedom in Chapter 8 .
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We also highlighted that, besides its humanistic basis, 
Feuerbach’s materialism haboured and yielded another 
epistemological tendency, which is, transcendentalism. 
This, we discovered, is a result of Feuerbach’s search 
for the middle ground between British empiricism and 
French mechanical materialism, on the one hand, and 
speculative rationalism, on the other. The net result 
of this is that his entire work remains within a 
Hegelian idealist frame of reference which is content 
with abstracting the ideal (Man) over the concrete 
(human being as existing within history as a 
participant in the process of production of social 
life) .
We then adopted this elaborate and polemic historico- 
philosophical construct as a critical paradigm to test 
the claim of the genetive relationship and
epistemological affinity between Latin American theology 
of liberation and the philosophy of Karl Marx. We 
investigated the extent of the awareness of liberation 
theologians of the implications of the coupure 
§ELStemologigue Marx undergoes in 1844-45, especially 
insofar as this is a judgement on humanism. We found not 
only a general absence of this awareness, but also a 
defence - most sytematical1y mounted by Juan Luis
Segundo and Jose Porfirio Miranda - of this failure to 
note the importance of this to the composite
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theoretical logic of Marxist materialism. In line with 
this position, there is then a claim, which is 
rigorously advocated by Miranda, that Karl Marx 
perennially retained the philosophy of the human being- 
humanism as the epistemological framework of his
entire work despite the methodological intentions he
proclaims in The_German ideology (1845) and he applies
in his work thereafter. We then pointed out that
Miranda’s assertion is equivalent to a claim that Marx 
remained a Feuerbachian throught his life.
Our major observation, however, is that, in their
advocacy of a humanist Marx, Segundo and Miranda are in 
fact exposing the nature of the philosophical basis 
upon which Latin American liberation theology has been 
constructed. While it has been claimed that liberation
theology has emerged as a theological appropriation of
Marxist philosophy, and continues to be inspired by
this, they, as a matter of fact, reveal that it is out 
of the the Marxism of the Feuerbachian young Marx that 
the latter has been formulated. This led to our
submission that Latin American liberation theology is 
essentially, in respect of its epistemology, a
Feuerbachianism. This, as we demonstrate in Chapters 9 
and 1 0 , shows itself most glaringly when the 
transcendentalism of Feuerbach’s materialism is recalled
vis a vis the nature of theological worldview which
liberation theology persists in retaining and employing
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as a framework for analysing socio-historical reality. 
We pointed out that such a theological epistemology is 
objectionable when it is used in any way that seeks an 
identification with Marxist Theory. This exposure of the 
pre-Marxian nature of liberation theology leads to the 
conclusion that as a theoretical tool which seeks to be 
of service in informing actions of social transformation 
and human development, liberation theology cannot be of 
much use. This fact is amptly attested to by liberation 
theology’s "theory" ol history - the mystical 
interpretation it accords to human involvement in 
revolutionary struggle - which we presented in Chapter 10
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THE CONTOURS OF A MARXIAN CRITIQUE OF LIBERATION 
THEOLOGY: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF ALISTAIR K E E ’S
M a r x _a n p _t h e _f a i l u r e _o f _l i b e r a t i o n _t h e o l o g y
Alfredo Fierro seminally broached the subject of the 
problematic which the import of Marxist epistemology 
has for Latin American liberation theology with the
publication of his The M i Tipan t _Gospe J_ j An_ana1ysis_of
contemporary_poiitical theologies 1. His critical review
of the impact of the resurgence of interest on Marxism 
during the 1960s on the formulation of liberation 
theology led him to the conclusion which could only be 
framed as the question as to whether a "materialist 
theology" - which is what Marixist epistemology seems to
conjure vis a_vis theology - is ever possible2. In 1978
Jose Porfirio Miranda dove-tailed Fierro's
consternation and cautionings with the publication of
his Mar.S_Against_the_Marxistp_The Christian_humanism_of
Karl Marx3. This work served as a notable milestone
within the corpus of the struggle of liberation 
theology to define the extent of its relationship with 
Marxism. In it Miranda went beyond a mere defence of the
1. Alfredo Fierro, El_evange1io_be1igerante (Estella, Spain: 
Editorial Verbo Divino, 1975) English, trans, by John Drury
(London, SCM Press, 1977 )
2. Ibid., p. 378
3. El__Cristianismo de__Marx, Mexico City: Publ by author,
1978; English transl. by, John Drury (Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis
B°oks , 1980)
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traditional position that Marxism and Christianity are 
compatible and posited an apologia to the effect that 
Karl M a r x ’s entire thought was essentially and 
consciously a Christian humanism. Alistair K e e ’s work,
MaL 5 ._!and the_Fai lure_of _Liberat ion_Theology4 , published
in 1990, falls within this context of Fierro’s 
evaluation of the validity and implications of the use 
of Marxism in liberation theology.
Howevfij , unlike Fierro’s, Kee ' s work has as its motif 
the paradigmal application of the problematics of
M a r x ’s critique of religion to the proclaimed raison 
d_etre of the theology of liberation, i.e, its being an 
intra-religious attempt at social change. He evaluates 
the extent to which various Latin American liberation 
theologians have assimilated Marx’s critique of 
religion. Besides Miranda, the works of Hugo Assmann, 
Clodovis Boff, Leonardo Boff, Jose Miguez Bonino, Helder 
Camara, Gustavo Guttierrez, Antonio Perez-Esclarin, Juan 
Louis Segundo, Jon Sobrino and Camillo Torres, are 
assessed against this paradigm.
The conclusion he reaches, or rather, his thesis, is 
that liberation theology has satisfactorily responded 
to M a r x ’s "moral" critique of religion: the
4. Alistair Kee, Marx and the Failure of Liberation
Theolggy (London: S C M , 1990) Alistair Kee is a Reader in the
department of Theology and Religious studies at the University of 
Edinburgh .
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construction and use ot religion by the ruling classes 
as an institution of control and as a means of 
Legitimating their political programmes5. Also,
liberation theologians have responded assiduously to 
M a r x ’s "ideological" critique: that, in its cultic
forms and as a intellectual system of beliefs, religion 
perpetuates the idealistic notion that eclipses the fact 
that the formation of ideas is conditioned by material 
factors, and that therefore, religion itself is 
inexorably open to manipulation by the dominant class of 
any given society. Where liberation theologians have 
failed, according to Kee, is in confronting and 
assimilating Marx’s critique of religion as being a 
reversal of reality, which Kee calls, the "ontological" 
c r l t i. q u e .
This "ontological critique” is constituted by M a r x ’s 
critical affirmation of Ludwig Feuerbach’s conclusion 
that religion is essentially a circumlocution of the 
subject and objection of human consciuosnessG. That in 
religion, the human being worships himself,
subconsciously. That, in worship, the human subject 
externalises its real essence, and objectifies this 
through imagination as being something which is outside
5. ibid., p .3 9
6 . See, K. Marx, "Towards a Critique of Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right: Introduction” , in, David McLellan Karl
 Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1987),
PP ■ 6 3 - 7 4
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of himself and, at the same time, awe-inspiringly
greater and more perfect the himself7. As Kee explains, 
Marx adopted, and critically extended this view of 
Feuerbach by creating out of it a theory which exposes
the process oi alienation as effected by money, the
State in capitalism. Just as in religion, so in the 
fetishisation of money and reverence of the State, is a 
human being not aware that he is in fact bowing down to 
what actually are the products of his mind and hands- 
his labour.
Kee draws attention to the fact that according to 
Marx religion is a framework and source which 
perpetuates this negative process of the reversal of
reality and the alienation of the human person from
himselfS (his species-being, which, according to Marx 
is labourB). He affimatively extends this Marxian 
critique with an interpretation that, "given the place 
of religion in society . . . the religious inversion
7. See, L. Feuerbach, _The_Essence_of_Christianity, e d . by, 
(1- Elliot (New York: Harper & Row, 1952 ), passim^
8 . K e e , p p .41-45
9. Illustratively, Kee quotes from Karl Marx’s
Kconomic_and_Phi. 1 osophxcai_Manuscripts_of _1844 :
"Jusi as in religion the spontaneous activity' of 
the human imagination, of the human brain and 
the human heart, operates on the individual 
independently of him - that is, operates as an 
alien, divine or diabolical activity - so is the 
worker’s activity not his spontaneous activity, 
it belongs to another; it is loss of his self".
(K. Marx, F. Engels, Collected__Works, Vol. 3,
London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1977, p. 274)
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of reality makes other inversions possible and credible 
. anyone who is involved in religion, who accepts 
the reversal of reality, is more likely to accept other 
forms of reversal" 1 0 .
In failing to confront this fundamental indictment
on religion liberation theologians have ipso facto
failed to make any fundamental contribution to the 
"renewal" of Christian Theologyll, according to Kee.
Moreover, in their treatment of the question of Marx 
and religion, they have not only ignored this aspect of 
M a r x 's critique, but have deliberately rejected itl 2 . 
"They have assumed that the ontological question is 
simply the European debate about the existence of 
G o d ”13, he observes.
K e e ’s main contention is that Marx’s fundamental
critique of religion is ontological. This is the
questioning of the very being of religion as well as
its self-definitional form. As such, the implications
communicated by this critique is that,
as long as religion continues in its 
present form it will reinforce and legitimize 
all forms of the inversion of reality, and will 
consciously or unconsciously support the
10. Kee, p. 46
1 1 . Ibid., x
12. Ibid. p. 282
13. L o c . c i t .
348
ideology of the ruling class ! 4
Accordingly, in failing to respond to this challenge 
in its systematic self—construction, and in even going 
out of its way to methodologically refuse to address 
this issue, insofar as it is a dimension of religion, 
liberation theology remains a reinforcement of the 
human propensity to invert reality and to subject 
himself to se1f-a 1ienation. It belongs to the genre of 
religious intellectualism which has not awaken to the 
fact that, "the idea of the supernatural belongs to 
that world -view which has now been discredited."15
In addition, as a judgement derived from the fact of 
the omission to address the ontological critique of 
religion, Kee declares that, whereas Latin American 
liberation theology has been accused for being 
Marxistl 6 , he, on the contrary, finds that, "it is not
Marxist enough. Or rather, that Liberation theology,
from using Marxist philosophy 'in an
insufficiently critical manner’ [Cardinal Ratzinger], 
has not cared or dared to apply it in a sufficiently
14. Ibid. p. 87
15. Ibid., p. 280
16. Kee makes reference to the Vatican’s "Instruction on
■ci'tain Aspects of the ’Theology of Liberation'", of Cardinal
J o s e p h  Ratzinger and Archbishop Alberto Bovone, of September
Cj84 . See, J. 1.. Segundo , Theo 1 qgy_and_ t he_Chur chj__A_Response_ to 
Bardina j___Rat zinger __and__a__Warnin£_to_the_Whole_Church ( London : 
beoffery Chapman, 1985.
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careful and comprehensive manner"17
He concludes that the deliberate omission to
confront Marx on this particular line of hi s critique, 
puts the credibility of the work of liberation 
theologians in serious question. It de1egitimates the 
uses to which they employ marxist philosophy in the
systematic construction of liberation theology and, in
turn, the overall credibility of this theology, as both 
a historically novel theo 1 ogica 1 -inte 1 1 ectua 1 system, as 
well as a theology which claims a utilitarian value in 
farili tating social revolution. In a declaration of a 
conviction from which this conclusion flows, he states:
Marx's criticisms of religion have to be
accepted before there can be profound and long- 
overdue change in theology. I am convinced that 
liberation theology has failed in this, it has 
failed at an intellectual level . . . it has
failed the cause of the gospel of Jesus Christ 
in the modern world and consequently the very 
people it has attempted to serve.18
Our critique of K e e ’s proposition is based on two 
sets of arguments. The first questions the legitimacy 
of ascribing "ontology" to Karl Marx, in the manner 
that he does. The second is a set of issues that relate 
to the nature of liberation theology, and the 
methodological limitations it imposes on attempts to
17. ibid. p . 2 1 1
18. Kee., p .x
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apply a marxi an cr i t ique to any of its features
a ) Ontology_in_Marxist_Analysis?
Ontology is an abstraction of metaphysics. Quite
rightly,  Ihñ_Qoncise Oxford_Dictionary defines it as
"branch of metaphysics dealing with the nature of 
being". It is an area of philosophical enquiry
concerned with nature and meaning of existence, where 
existence is perceived in the traditional metaphysical 
sense of an empirical reality' on which reason is being 
exercised as an independent activity'. M a r x ’s philosophy, 
via its progenitor of Hegelian and Feuerbachian 
philosophy, emerged as an express negation of this type 
of phi i.osophy and epi s temoLogy. It is a consummation of 
a critical movement which was initiated by Hegel, where
philosophy as metaphysics is transformed into meta­
history, i.e, - from being a reflection on Nature to
being a reflection on the process of Nature. With Marx, 
this was taken further from being a mere reflection
(idealism) on the process of Nature, to being a 
utilitarian analysis of this process in relation to 
human communal life, leading to the assertive
inaugaration of the epistemo 1 ogica 1 system of historical 
materialism. Historical materialism, as an
epistemo logical system, is a revolutionary negation of
"ontological epistemology' .
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'Vo contend, therefore, that in his application of 
historical materialism Marx could not have been 
interested .in a critique of religion as a static 
phenomenon - which is what ontological epistemology is 
essentially about but on religion as a social
reality. Contrary to K e e ’s identification of the
"reversal of reality" critique as the fundamental 
aspect of Marx's critque of religion, we maintain that 
the apex of his critique of religion is centred on the 
proposition that religion, like all ideological
formations, is but an epiphenomenon which is secondary 
to the material phenomenon of developments in productive 
forces and the nature of social relations from which a 
particular religion arisesl9.
Granted , Marx hinted critically on the relation of
religion to the process of the reversal of reality.
This, however , was already' Feuerbach’s discovery. All
that he did was to convert this theory of Feuerbach’s
into a framework for the creation of a paradigm for the 
criticism of the way human society relates to the
systems of its environment. He was not criticising 
religion for being a reversal of reality. After
Feuerbach's The__Essence__of__Christianity that could
hove been a literal re-invention of the proverbial 
wheel. Neither was Marx creating a theory_for_the
19 . See, Preface_to_A_Critique of_Political Economy, in D.
McLellan, op cit, p. 38 9
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£l_iiipisn) of religion , as Kee claims20. By 1843, two
vears be l ore his engageemnt in a systématisation of 
historical materialism, he already held that, "the 
r 1 1 1 i c i sm ol religion is essentially complete"21. Why 
create a theory for a criticism that is already 
e >; h a us te d ?
At the risk of undermining the motif of his work, Kee 
is forced to make the same observation and a very 
startling admission. He writes:
Marx does not provide us with the criticism in 
its fully developed form. He takes the criticism 
of religion [as an inversion of reality, in 
dens] and uses it as a model for application to 
other social institutions. But he did not care 
to return to apply it comprehensively to
religion. That is the task which we have decided 
to undertake. In seeking to apply M a r x ’s general 
theory of reversal to religion we are actually 
attempting to go beyond Marx himself . . .22
Does this mean that it is not to the ontological 
critique of religion by Marx that liberation 
theologians have failed to respond to, but to K e e ’s own 
"marxian" ontological critique of religion?
The philosophic background and context to the 
"reversal of reality" critique is M a r x ’s struggle to 
remould Feuerbach’s philosophy into a system that could 
be utilisable in dealing with problems of political
20. op cit, p.49
21 . From, "Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of
fright: Introduction", in D . McLelIan, P . 63
2 2. O p . cit., p . 67
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economy. To create a "science" out of an "ideology", to 
use Louis Althusser’s categories23. Marx was creating a 
I'hi-QUE > a scientific explanation (which is what 
biltorical_materialism as an explication of the history 
of human social formation claims to be), out of what 
Feuerbach had merely posited in contemplative terms. 
What was merely a jeremiad by Feuerbach on the negative 
effects of the process of self-projection as manifested 
in religion on the human individual was inverted into a 
Theory_ for the subversion of social reality in toto. 
Feuerbach’s criticism of heaven was "transformed into 
the criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into 
the criticism of law, the criticism of theology into the 
criticism of politics"24. The context of the "reversal 
of reality" critique is the criticism of Feuerbach, and 
not an "ontological critique of religion". Insofar as 
the critique of Feuerbach marks the starting point of 
M a r x ’s development of historical materialism, this 
critique is the foundation of the development of Marxism 
in general, and not an isolated criticism of religion. 
Marxism - dialectico-historical materialism - is not 
founded on the criticism of religion, but on the 
critique of the underlying epistemology of Feuerbach’s 
philosophy. This is encapsulated in the 1845 Theses_on 
Esyil'bach (Thesis IV):
23. Louis Althusser, Pol itics_And_History (Surrey, England:
tdiwin Brothers, 1972), p. 116ff
24. Karl Marx, "Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of
Kight: Introduction", in D. McLellan., p.64
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Feuerbach starts off from the fact of religious 
se 1 f-estrangement , of the duplication of the 
world into a religious world and a secular one.
His work consists in resolving the religious 
world into its secular base. But the fact that 
the secular lifts off from itself and 
establishes itself as an independent realm in 
the clouds is not explained. And this can only 
be explained by the inner strife and self­
contradictor i ness [Sichselbswidersprechen] of 
this secular base. Therefore, the latter must
itself be both understood in its contradiction 
and revolutionised in practice. Hence, for 
example, once the earthly family is discovered
to be the secret of the holy family, the former 
must then itself be destroyed in theory and in 
practice25.
Herein lies the cantus firmus of the theoretical
advance from Feuerbachianism to Marxism. Marx observed 
that the self-alienation which Feuerbach had spotted as 
occurring within the individual human being due to an 
act of worship, is actually taking place in social 
reality, and that the fact of the occurrence of this 
alienation (Selbswidersprechen) in social reality is 
what actually makes religion possible. This is different 
from K e e ’s assertion that Marx claimed that religion 
makes social alienation possible. Historical materialism 
consists in having this the other way round. The 
material base facilitates and shapes the production of 
superstructura! phenomena.
This fact also addresses the point that at the 
matured phase of his thought and system Marx never 
found it necessary to devote any writing to a criticism
25. K. Marx, F. Engels. Collected Works. Vol. 5, p. 3
'Passage slightly paraphrased).
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of religion. Kee recognises, albeit without any cogent
theoretical account. The fact is that, within the field
ol the problematics which are called into being by a
historical materialist epistemo 1 o g y , religion is not an
issue of any special importance at all. It is
ib§ 2 T®iicaliy superfluous. It adds nothing to the
sti’uctural development nor interpretation of historical
materialism. As an element of analysis within an
historical materialist epistemo 1 o g y , it is found as
dependent on the shape of an obtaining socio-historica 1
reality. It is an epiphenomenon of the phenomenon of
social alienation and pi'e - s c i en t i f i c conditions of
social development. Changes at the material level
determine the production of religion, and since there is
a development in history from forms of social reality
which are based on social anatagonism and human
alienation to forms of societal formations where this is
absent, so will religion eventually become superfluous,
in_reality_i Juan Luis Segundo well observed the first
aspect of this point (theoretical superfluousness) in
his argument that:
Historical materialism cannot be a metaphysics 
it cannot propound general, atemporal 
statements about God or atheism, or even basic, 
human anthropological faith. It was, it is, it 
will always be, a critical tool . . .26.
b ) Liberation_Theolqgy_as_a_Methqdolggy
26. J.L. Segundo, Faith_And Ideologies (Maryknoll: Orbis
Books, 1984), p. 194
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one fundamental problem with K e e ’s work, is in its 
choice of the most fundamental aspect which should form 
the basis for the evaluation of liberation theology from 
a Marxist philosophical perspective. We maintain that an 
identification of such a basis has to be an outflow of a 
cogent analysis of liberation theology, which if it is 
to reach as far-reaching a judgement as the one Kee 
concludes with, has to be sure that it is based on what 
is of the essence of liberation theology.
The essence of liberation theology, is that it is a 
lb§QlQgy. or rather a critique of the dominant theology 
of the Christian religion. It is not an autonomous 
religious system, which needs to defend its status 
against phenomenological criticisms of religion, qua 
religion. As Jon Sobrino, painstakingly explains, "This 
theology understands itself as a theology, 
theology here becomes conscious that it is theo-logy, an 
into I i o d u a l  discourse m  the service of 1 iberation"27. 
Kee seems to have failed to appreciate that liberation 
theology is an int el Iectual__d i scour se_on_a_particular 
relieiqn_: t radi t iona 1 _Chr i st iani t
Liberation theologians are not "scientists of
 As the second stage of our critique, we suggest that
27. Jon Sobrino, The__True_Church_and_The_Poor (London: SCM
, 1981), p .15
religion", bur ''scientists" of the Christian religion. 
Indeed, they are more than "scientists of the
Christian faith"; this is what all Christian
theologians are. Rather, they are "philosophers of the 
science of the Christian faith". Like activists in the 
philosophy of science, they engage in a critical
second-order activity not on the Christian Faith per 
se, but on how theologians in the past and present have 
gone about the critical task of conceptualising this 
iai th2 8  . Lt is with the method of doing theology, the 
"science” of the Christian religion, that they are 
essentially concerned. This means that liberation
theology is primarily a methodology29, a "negative"
systematic proposal of a new way of doing theology - a 
critical reflection on ecclesiastical praxis30.
The work of liberation theologians is at this 
r i J: i ca 1 > aE opposed to the religio- 
SQientific level of engagement with religion. A Marxian 
critique of religion, therefore, is required to engage
28. For example, Gustavo Guttierrez, A ___ Theology__of
Li be r at i on I liaryknol .1 : Or bis Books, 1973 ) opens with a chapter
giving a critical review on how the task of theologising was 
understood throughout the past of Church history.(p. 6 f .)
29. For example, Jose Miguez Bonino: "The new current of
theological reflection in Latin America has not yet gone beyond 
Prolegomena ■ • • the meaning of this new current lies precisely
in its reformation of the preconditions, presuppositions, and 
methods of doing theolgy at ail." in, ("Historical Praxis and 
Christian Identity", in, Frontiers_of_Theo1ogy__in_Latin_America, 
tlarykno 11 : Orbis books, 1979, p.260).
30. Guttierrez, op cit., p. 12
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epi.s temological one. Liberation theology has to be 
interrogated on how seriously it has taken the
epistemologica] imp!ications of Marxism on its
programmatic concern with realising the efficacy of the 
Christian faith in history.
The choice between K e e ’s proposal that liberation 
tlieology should confront the "ontological implications" 
of M a r x ’s critique of religion, and our proposal for a 
confrontation of the epistemological implications, is 
neither arbitrary nor can it be an optional choice
between two parallel approches to a criticism of
liberation theology. This is because the ontological 
issue, as presented by Kee, is based on a misconception 
of the epistemological intention of M a r x ’s philosophy, 
as well as a false premise concerning what Latin
American theology of liberation is all about.
c ) The Af£irmatyon of Christian Fai th iB_Liberation
Theology
The operational scope of the critical engagement of 
liberation theologians lias never intended nor pretended 
to extend beyond the bounds of an acceptance of 
Christianity. As Jon Sobrino testifies, "Theologians in 
Latin America begin by accepting the Christian Faith"31.
liberation theology at this level - the hermeneutical-
31. Sobrino, op cit., p.37
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Positing this as one of the paramount differences 
between the task of Anglo-Saxon theologians and Latin 
American theologians, and in an illuminative "response" 
to K e e ’s charge that liberation theologians skirt M a r x ’s 
critique of "ontological" religion because they take the 
problem of God to be a European problem. Sobrino 
observes that:
The questions to which [European theology] has
sought answers are . . . how is it possible to
believe today? What meaning can faith have today 
when its meaning seems to have been lost? The
task has been to recover the meaning of faith.
Latin American theology, [on the other hand,] 
is interested in liberating the world from its 
wretched state, since it is this objective
situation that has obscured the meaning of the 
faith, its task is not primarily to restore the 
meaning to the faith in the presence of the
wretched conditions of the real world. It is to 
transform this real world and at the same time 
recover the meaning of the faith. The task, 
therefore, is not to understand the faith 
differently, but to allow a new faith to spring
from a new practice.32
This is a novel application of Karl M a r x ’s Xlth 
Thesis against Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only 
interpreted the world in various ways; now the point is 
to change it". This observation is important because 
M a r x ’s Xlth Thesis, specifically addresses the 
methodological issue (relating to Philosophy). It 
introduces the call for a unity of intellectual 
reflection and material reality, where the former is 
seen as dependent on, and determined by the latter. 
Sobri.no’s statement that in liberation theology, "the
3 2. Sobrino, op cit . , p.20
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tar.k . . . is not to understand the faith differently ,
but to allow a new faith to spring from a new practice" 
alludes to Marx's VI lith Thesis: "All social life is
essentially practical. All mysteries that induce theory 
to mysticism find their resolution in human practice and 
in the conception of this practice". Practice, the
historical reality of a given society, including its 
religiosity, must be recognised as the point of
departure at the same time the object of transformation.
Hugo Assman would add that it is on the basis of the
recognition of a particular issue’s political relevance
(question of power) that determines its inclusion in the
agenda of the theological reflection (conceptign of
practice) of the community33. Consequently, the issue of
a Marxian critique of religion, insofar as it appears as
a theme within the vissicitudes of the subject of
"secularisation", is viewed as irrelevant because it
deemed as not possessing a direct bearing on the pratice
of participants in the activity of liberation theology,
and as a theme in European theology, it has been
conducted in purely apolitical terms. Assman notes:
The ’secularization’ theme as expressed in 
Europe and the United States, concentrates 
almost exclusively on the de-sacralization 
brought into the man-nature relationship by 
technology, and ignores the primordial
(political) aspects of the man-nature-man 
relationship, and the whole question of
33. Hugo Assman, __Theology_of_a_Nomad_Church (Maryknoll:
Ch'bis, 1976), pp 35-36
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The point raised by Sobrino above, indicates 
liberation theology’s methodological option of an
affirmation of Christianity while seeking its more
appropriate applications within relative historical 
conditions of human suffering. The dynamics and 
experience of this human suffering, insofar as it is 
perceived as politically-caused, Assman would add, is 
what decides what is crucial to the system of 
liberation theology35. This methodological affirmation 
of Christianity as a religion, is a direct outflow of
an empirical realisation of the suffering and
struggling of the "Third World", that - in the words of 
the Boff brothers - "Christianity can no longer be 
dismissed as the opium of the people, nor can it be 
seen as merely fostering an attitude of critique: it
has now become an active commitment to 1iberation"36.
Therefore, K e e ’s criticism that, "by adopting the 
perspective of the underside of history, liberation
theology is a very radical revision of traditional
orthodox theology, but it has never ceased to be just 
that. Nor can it be, as long as M a r x ’s ontological
34. Ibid:, p.57
35. Ibid., pp. 33-39
36. Leornado Boff, Clodovis Boff,  Introducing_Liberation
Theology (Kent: Burns & Oates, 1986), p.7
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criticism of religion is deliberately avoided"37, is 
not a criticism at all, but, unawares to him, is a fail’ 
compliment of liberation theology. Liberation theology 
has never declared a willingness of being more than a 
radical revision of traditional theology. In his the The 
Power_of_ the_Popr_in_History, which was published eight 
years after A_Theology_of_Liberation^ Gustavo Guttierrez 
declared:
The theology of liberation . . . has no
intention of being a revolutionary Christian 
ideology. It is reflection from a point of 
departure in the concrete historical praxis of 
human being. It seeks to understand the Faith
from within ihs historical praxis and from
within the manner of living the faith as a 
revolutionary commitment . . . hence its themes
are the great themes of all true theology, but 
its focus, its manner of approaching them, is 
d i f f e ren t .3 8
d ) The_Scope of_the_Use_of_Marx_in_Liberation_Theplggy
All liberation theologians referred to in K e e ’s work, 
demonstrate a consciousness of the fundamental 
epistemo 1 ogica 1 and structural difference that exist 
between Marxism as a philosophy and social theory, on 
the one hand, and on the other, of Christianity as a 
Faith which is constructed by a set of basic tenets 
which define it in relation to other areas of human 
knowledge. In their employment of Marxism, these
37. Kee, op cit, p. 179
38. G. Gutierrez, The Power of the Poor in
History (Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis books, 1979), p.61
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theologians, with perhaps a questionable exception of 
Miranda, are not attempting to create a new "field of 
knowledge" which is aimed at being a syncretism of 
Marxism and Christian theology. They seek to remain 
theologians (this includes Miranda). All that they are 
doing is a creation of a system of religious discourse 
which would be useful, primarily, to the Church 
(religious community), and which builds on
reinterpreting traditional credal formulations by 
liberating them from their original cu 1 turo-historica 1  
embodiments, by seeking contextual meanings for them. It 
is therefore inappropriate to ask, as Kee does 
(rhetorically) , tha t :
Now that liberation theology has been
enlightened by M a r x ’s social philosophy and
purified by his moral criticism, why does it 
still cling to models and repeat doctrines from
a tradition which is so alien to experience in
the modern world?39.
The following submission of Leonardo and Clodovis
Boff, in their Introducing Liberatipn_Theolpgy, may be
taken as a summary representation of liberation
theology’s calculated regard of the work of Karl Marx.
As the first and cardinal point they state that,
In liberation theology, Marxism is never 
treated as a subject on its own but always from 
and_in_re1ation_to_the_poor. Placing themselves 
firmly on the side of the poor, liberation
theologians ask Marx: ’What can you tell us
about the situation of poverty and ways of
overcoming it?’ Here Marxists are submitted to
the judgement of the poor and their cause, and
3 9. op c i t . , p . 180
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not the other way around.40
This is a statement that, there is no readiness to
submit liberation theology to any fundamental revision
by Marxist theory. Liberation theology as, ideally, a
popular theological reflection by the people
themselves, is primarily formulated by these people’s
experiences and not an outside theoretical system. On
the other hand, liberation theologians do not see
themselves as being in the task of refining and
defending marxist philosophy. Liberation theology,
feels no obligation to account to social
scientists for any use it may make - correct or 
otherwise- of Marxist terminology and ideas,
though it does feel obliged to account to the
poor, to their faith and hope, and to the
ecclesial community, for such use41.
To put it in more specific terms, according to 
Leonardo and Clodovis Boff, "liberation theology freely 
borrows from Marxism certain ’methodological pointers’ 
that have proved fruitful in understanding the world of 
the oppressed"42. And this is being done only within the 
restricted framework of a concord that "liberation 
theology uses Marxism purely as an instrument"43. Where 
there has been a show of special attention on Marxism,
40. B o f f , Boff., P .28
41 . L o c . c i t .
42. L o c .c i t .
43. Boff, Bo ff., P .28
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this according to Segundo, has been engaged upon merely 
as an attempt, "to salvage the imperishable nucleus of 
Marx's ideology insofar as it does relate preciselj’ to 
Fai th"44 .
The over-aching perception, and deliberate stance, is 
that :
Liberation theology maintains a decidedly
critical stance in relation to Marxism. Marx 
can be a companion on the way (see Puebla, 
para. 544), but he cannot be the guide, because 
’You have only one teacher, the Christ’
(Matt.23:10).45
In the light of this, the title of K e e ’s work, Marx
and the Failure of Liberation Theology may be
misleading as it may be read to imply that liberation 
theology has failed to fulfill what it had set out for 
itself to achieve, namely, - in terms of his argument- 
to appropriate Marx "comprehensively" and
"sufficiently” . None of the works of the Liberation 
theologian Kee examined ever declared such an
intention. The above presentation of the submission of 
Leonardo and Clodovis Boff accounts for this.
44. _Faith_and_Ideologies, p. 179 
4 5. O p . c i t .
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Conclusions The Contours of a §n Critigue_of
Liberatign_Theglogy
A criticism of liberation theology vis a vis Marxism 
needs to be based on as contingent an asssesssment of 
the former as possible. In the first place, the scope 
of the intention at which liberation theology, or the 
work of specific liberation theologians, seeks to 
dialogue with Marxist philosophy has to clearly 
delimited. The danger of imposing an objective on 
liberation theology which it had never claimed needs be 
avoided. Secondly, as we have demonstrated above, it is 
crucially important to establish the fundamental 
hypostatic form of liberation theology: namely, that it
is a way of interpreting religion, instead of being a 
religion itself. This in itself imposes a limitation of 
the range of issues raised by Marxist philosophy which 
could be deployed against liberation theology.
The constitution of the causa bellum between
liberation theology and Marxist philosophy, which works 
like those of Fierro and Kee is setting, needs also to 
be noted. The confrontation between liberation theology 
and Marxist philosophy, is more than just an
engagement in a comparative study of the relationship 
between theology and philosophy. Marxist world-view 
constitutes the optics of liberation theology. Think of
367
Undoubtedly, even as an "instrument” , Marxism is an 
instrument which a theology of liberation cannot do 
without. This was recognised from the start. As 
Gutierrez testified in A_Theo1ggy_gf_Liberation:
It is to a large extent due to Marxism’s 
influence that theological thought, searching 
for its own sources, has begun to reflect on 
the meaning of the transformation of this world 
and action of man in history.47
Marxism is the most comprehensive critique of the 
dominant philosophical tradition which, in Latin 
America in particular, has been found to be the source 
of the suffering and oppression from which historical 
liberation is sought, i.e, Capitalism48. In the epic 
words of Jose Miguez Bonino, "it has proved, and still 
proves to be, the best instrument available for an 
effective and rational realization of human
possibilities in historical life49 . . . it is the
unavoidable historical mediation of Christian
46. See, A. Nicholas, "The Story of Praxis: Liberation
Theology’s Philosophical Handmaid", Religion in_Communist_Lands,
17:1 (Spring 1989), 45-58
47. _A_Theology_of_Liberat ion, p.9
48. See, J P Miranda, _Marx_and_the_Bibl ej__Cr i t ique_of _the 
£hi1gsophy_gf_Oppresion (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1974), 
PP. xvi - xix
49. Jose M Bonino,  Revolutionary Theology Comes of
Age (London: SPCK , 1975), p.97
the theme of praxis46.
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obedience"50
The foregoing positive assertions on Marxism, do not 
contradict the schema outlined by Boff, which we 
introduced above. All of these, and to a large extent 
even what Miranda maintains, is posited within a pre­
defined parameter of the acceptance of Marxism. A quick 
sorting of what is acceptable and not acceptable from 
Marxism has already been done, and liberation theology 
is being constructed only on the basis of what is found 
acceptable. As Boff would alert us, inter alia: "Marxist
materialism and atheism do not even constitute a
temptation for liberation theo1ogians"51.
Therefore, a faithful criticism of liberation
theology’s use of the thought of Marx can, in it most
radical extent, only go as far as a criticism of this
restrictivness of the acceptance of Marxist philosophy
which liberation theologians have set for themselves. It 
will supremely have to ask: What are the
epistemological, or even ideological, presuppositions 
which determine the width and depth of the scope of what
liberation theologians have decided is to be taken from
Karl Marx?
In contradistinction to K e e ’s approach, we propose
50. Ibid., p.98
51 O p . c i t . , p . 2 8
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"rational" mediation of the Christian Faith, the most 
legitimate and productive critique of this form of 
theology in relation to, or from a Marxian perspective, 
is the one that focuses on a critical assessment of the 
epistemological core and presuppositions of this 
theology apropos that of marxist philosophy. A primary 
justification of the fundamental significance of this 
approach, is borne by the fact that Marxist philosophy, 
insofar as it is by and large a doctrine of historical 
materialism, is an epistemological system. It is a 
systematic polemic on the new way of intepreting 
history. We maintain that what is called for is an 
interrogation of the quality of the "package" of 
Marxism which liberation theology has apportioned for 
itself to use as an instrument in its system.
that since liberation theology is only a form of a
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